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Introduction: 
Barthes’s relevance today
Roland Barthes (1915-1980) was one of the leading scholars who 
developed semiotics into an academic discipline and gave it intellectual 
credibility in the latter half of the 20th century. Barthes’s theoretical 
reflection and analytical case-studies covered a vast field. His work on 
theory was based on Ferdinand de Saussure and Louis Hjelmslev, but 
his texts refer also to Roman Jakobson, Sigmund Freud, the Ancient 
philosophers and rhetoricians, and even to Charles S. Peirce. In case- 
studies, he focused on topics as diverse as, for example, toys, cars, 
cinema, photography, cities, fashion, and literature, which remained 
central all through his career. It is fair to say that Barthes’s importance 
for semiotics is matched only by few exceptional figures, such as Juri 
Lotman, Umberto Eco, and Algirdas J. Greimas.
However, Barthes has a peculiar position in the pantheon of 
semiotics. Firstly, as a criticizer of myths, he might have wanted to 
deconstruct evaluations that lift few scholars above others and to show 
how interpretations are motivated first and foremost by the historical 
context of reception and the power structures that prevail in it. He 
argued that there is no privileged meta-language that could not be 
superseded by another language, distributing the material according to 
new distinctions, and this holds also for our contemporary interpreta­
tion o f his work. In Barthes’s analysis, “pantheon” of any science 
might have turned out to be just another bourgeois myth.
Secondly, Barthes was an elusive thinker, not building just one 
theory and not interested in working out in detail the consequences of 
his arguments, but rather keen on pursuing theorizing as an open 
process according to the questions and problems that the empirical 
cases presented to his critical gaze. As a result, it is not always clear 
how many Barthes there actually are and how their mutual relation­
ships should be understood. It has been asked whether Barthes the
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essayist resists time better than Barthes the theoretician and also о 
which theoretician one is actually talking about: the structural or the 
textual one? The temptation to make distinctions between Barthes s 
different aspects and periods is strong.
After Barthes’s death in 1980, there seemed to be a tendency to play 
down his scientific work and to emphasize his value as a literary author, 
that is, as a brilliant essayist, a master of the fragment and a renovator of 
the genre of autobiography. Support was searched for in his own 
writings, and especially in his late expressions of the fatigue he felt 
towards the modern experimental writing he had been introducing and 
defending in France. However, we now know that until the very end he 
also openly claimed to have remained a semiotician, which for him 
meant methodological work with and on oppositions, codes and their 
articulations. The very same elements had earlier provided him the 
theoretical means for the defence and interpretation of the literary 
experimentations of Alain Robbe-Grillet, Philippe Sollers and other 
contemporary writers. If Barthes distanced himself from the avant-garde 
literary disputes he had alimented earlier, he argued for his case with the 
same methods and concepts he had been using before.
In his posthumously published College de France lecture course on 
the neuter, Barthes defined semiotics, or semiologie, as “ecoute ou 
vision des nuances” (“listening to or vision of nuances”, Barthes 
2002a: 37). The methods and concepts of semiotics were for him first 
o f all tools for the exploration o f differences in signification. This 
meant also an active work o f interpretation. Barthes did not venture 
into interviewing informants and establishing statistical evidence for 
the social significations he was analysing, but rather exposed different 
possibilities of interpretation that he saw as available, behaving more 
like Faust than an ordinary laboratory scientist and occasionally even 
at the risk of “bitise” (Ette 2002; Marty 2006: 125-139). If we 
consider literature as an interpretation o f socially and culturally signi­
ficant reality, as a means to semioticize and to inquire what is already 
semioticized, then it is clear that semiotics in Barthes’s understanding 
of the word did not stand in opposition to literature, but rather was the 
necessary way to access it, the approach that had to be incessantly 
developed further in order to be capable o f attaining the complexities 
o f signification that are typical for literature and constitute a large part 
of its cultural value.
It is thus possible to argue that literature (or writing, ecriture) and 
theoretical research were necessary companions to each other in
Barthes s work, and that no abusive hierarchization should be 
established between them. Furthermore, it has been claimed that the 
linguistic inventions and figures Barthes developed in his specific, 
more literary than traditionally scientific way of writing were actually 
for him the means to do philosophical research (Milner 2003; see also 
Marty 2006: 9-17). There was a nurturing and inspiring relation 
between theory and literature in his work, and research has to take 
both into consideration. Barthes’s insightful analyses and challenging 
theories only exist accompanied with his literary work on language 
and discourse, and vice versa.
Research today can profit from the posthumous publication of the 
lecture courses Barthes held at the College de France. The three volu­
mes present Barthes’s reflections on the neuter (Barthes 2002a), on 
communal forms of living (Barthes 2002b) and on the writing of a novel 
(Barthes 2003). They have been edited respecting the unfinished nature 
of the manuscripts, showing Barthes’s original notes as well as the 
omissions and precisions he made in lecturing. Barthes himself 
considered his appointment to the College de France as marking the 
beginning of a new era in his life, one consecrated even more fully than 
before to literature and especially to the project of writing a novel. 
Consequently, scholars have often focused on the last period from this 
angle. Arguments have been presented for and against about whether 
the novel project was a failure or a success and about terms in which it 
should be understood (see for example Compagnon 2002, Knight 2002). 
This interest in Barthes the author was obviously spurred already by his 
autobiographical writings in the 1970’s and the posthumous book 
Incidents (Barthes 1987). It is not exaggerated to say that he counts 
today as one of the important French authors of the latter half of the 
20th century. On the other hand, Barthes’s theoretical works from the 
earlier periods are still instrumental for general reflections on literature 
(see for example the discussions on Barthes in Culler 2007 and 
Compagnon 1998). In teaching semiotics, Barthes’s early Mythologies 
(1957), despite the 51 years that separate the present form their 
publication, is hardly superseded as an introduction to critical social- 
semiotic analysis. The same holds for his essays on images and music.
Barthes’s signification for today’s research is thus strong and 
varied. Fie is a classic in semiotics and literary studies, read as one of 
the main historical figures in these fields. But he is also a continuously 
inspiring, challenging and even provoking thinker whose heritage is 
far from' being fully elucidated. The articles in this special issue
Introduction 9
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explore Barthes’s relevance for semiotics, literary studies, musicology 
and cultural studies, proposing novel ways to read his works and 
connecting them to questionings and analyses that are pertinent to 
contemporary research. The key idea has been to apply Barthes s 
thinking in novel ways and to look for unnoticed continuities or con­
nections in his works, pursuing reflection rather than stopping for 
reconstruction. The fact that the writers’ affiliations range from 
semiotics to literary studies, French studies and cultural studies, 
already reflects Barthes’s importance 28 years after his death. All the 
texts are based on presentations given at the international symposium 
“Barthes Relevance Today” held at the University of Helsinki Institute 
for Art Research in December 13, 2007.
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Writing the Present: 
Notation in Barthes’s College 
de France lectures
M ichael Sheringham
All Souls College, University o f Oxford 
Oxford 0X1 4AL, United Kingdom 
e-mail: michael.sheringham@all-souls.ox.ac.uk
Abstract. In his lectures at the College de France in 1978-1979, Barthes 
focuses at length on the activity of 7a notation’ (in English, notation): 
grabbing a fleeting event or impression as it happens, and registering it in your 
notebook. This article explores the ramifications of notation, as outlined in the 
lectures (where it is associated with haiku, Joycean epiphany and Proustian 
impressionism), linking it to Barthes’s longstanding interest in the ontology of 
modes o f signification. Allied to his concept o f the ‘third meaning’, and to 
later terms such as the incident and the romanesque, notation is seen to be 
central to the preoccupation with affect, subjectivity and individuality we 
associate with Barthes’s later work. Linked with the fantasy of writing a 
novel, notation also chimes with the “fantasmatic pedagogy” of Barthes’s 
lectures where ideas are explored in a highly personal way through the 
accumulation of discontinuous traits. Through notation the affect-driven, de­
centred Barthesian subject finds its voice.
In his penultimate set of lectures at the College de France in 1978—
1979, the first year of the two-year course he devoted to La 
Preparation du roman (Barthes 2003; Preparing fo r the Novel),' 
Barthes focuses at length on the notion or activity of 7a notation’ 
(hereafter, in English, notation). Its sphere of application is everyday 
life, the ambient world from which the would-be novelist is deemed to 
derive his materials. In the simplest terms notation consists in 
grabbing a fleeting event or impression quickly, on the wing, as it
1 “Preparing for the Novel” is as yet untranslated into English. The title and all 
other citations are given in my own translation.
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happens, and registering it in your notebook. Notation is insepara e 
from the kinds of things that prompt it, which Barthes calls notan a. 
not big, heavy, ponderous things, or meanings that need to be wor e 
at or worked out; but little stray things, linked to moods, w ms, 
transience, banality, circumstance.
1 want to explore the ramifications of notation as concept and 
activity —  in the context of the College de France lectures, but also in 
the wider context of Barthes’s work. ‘La n o ta t io n I will argue, is at 
the core of late Barthes and thus central to one of the many ‘Barthes’ 
who are still so relevant today: the Barthes of affect, of subjectivity, of 
the body, and so forth. Notation ties in with the exploration of 
photography in Camera Lucida, as well as with Barthes’s concepts of 
the incident and the romanesque. But 1 also want to suggest how 
notation —  the values and affects it stands for —  is a perennial feature 
of Barthes’s writing and sensibility and of his theoretical endeavour. 
Writing to his friend Georges Perros on 11 April 1961 Barthes 
congratulated him on his Papiers colles, a book consisting of a series 
of disconnected notes and observations on everyday life, literature and 
philosophy. Praising the way Perros’s non-fictional writing captured 
reality in a new way Barthes wrote: “it’s extraordinary that it should 
be possible to tap in (capter) by means of something other than the 
imaginary. But in the end what you write is always half-way between 
dreaming and thinking” (Barthes 1988: 107). Perros went on to 
develop his art of notation and annotation in two further volumes of 
Papiers colles (which bear this text on their back covers: “decisively, 
lazily, haphazardly, Georges Perros notes. Bits and pieces; explosions, 
rages, despair, quiescence, in response to moods, to books, to places, 
in short the way we all live: in moments, flashes, dazzles” (Perros 
1961: back cover). Barthes’s enthusiasm for his friend’s cult of the 
note and the fragment as a way of catching fleeting experience clearly 
made a deep impression on him.
One of the things that led Barthes towards linguistics and se­
miology was his fascination for the different ways in which meanings 
are articulated. But perhaps his central contribution to the convergence 
of the linguistic and the literary lay in his interest in the affective or 
existential dimension of meaning production and reception. Barthes is 
always interested in the effect certain forms o f meaning production 
had on him. He is less concerned with what meanings mean 
(message), or how meanings mean (code), than with the affective
impact of certain processes of meaning. In this affective economy, less 
is generally more: Barthes is led to the minutiae of meaning, what 
happens in the gaps between obvious meanings. In a famous text of 
1970 he talks about the ‘third meaning’: not the first, the message, or 
the second, the symbolic or connotative level, but the third meaning, 
which he labelled obtuse, because of its wide compass, and also 
because it is the meaning that is only there in the first instance for the 
singular, embodied, individual —  not the intellectual subject but the 
obtuse one, the idiot in us (Barthes 2002, III: 485-506). And of course 
we find a similar distinction in Camera Lucida between the Studium, 
the obvious meaning of a photograph, the one we are supposed to see, 
and the punctum , the stray detail that makes an impact on me here and 
now when I look at the image (Barthes 2002, V: 785-894 passim).
Even in his out and out semiological phase, in The Fashion System 
for example, Barthes is interested in the existential dimension of the 
modes o f signification he progressively taps into as he develops his 
analyses in various fields.“ Already in Writing Degree Zero he is 
haunted by the allure of a mode of signification, an ecriture, that 
would be a sort of degree zero, a ‘white writing’ that would elude 
ready-made ideology. Mythologies is concerned with the heavy- 
handedness of ideology, as it manifests itself in operations of meaning 
production that were current in the mass media of the 1950s. If 
Barthes spent much time looking at the opposite of what appealed to 
him in the sphere of meaning, this was partly because the third 
meaning, the punctum, the notandum —  the thing grasped by 
notation —  whilst being very real, is associated with what is concrete, 
and therefore very hard to grasp, or to found anything on. 
Increasingly, the forum for Barthes’s semiology became not the 
literary work but the city street, not the page but what he called “the 
page of life itself’, and “the live writing of the street” (Barthes 2002, 
III: 412). Hence, in late Barthes we are dealing more and more 
explicitly with ways of living, lifestyles, art de vivre. Like Michel 
Foucault in the same period, Barthes moved towards the “care of the 
se lf’, a search for a posture, a way ot being in the world.
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2 See “Barthes and the Everyday” in Sheringham 2006.
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*  *  *
Barthes’s account of 7a notation’ (which in French means the activity 
of noting things down and not, as more commonly in English, a script 
or idiom for doing so) occurs primarily in the set ot lectures he 
delivered at the College de France in 1978—1979. Following his 
election, thanks to Foucault, to a chair in literary semiotics at the 
College in 1977, the challenge for Barthes was to adapt the form of 
teaching he had evolved at the Ecole des hautes etudes, where the 
staple was the seminar, to the format of the ex cathedra lecture. In his 
inaugural lecture at the College, titled Lesson, Barthes announced that 
his aim was to provide what he called a ‘fantasmatic teaching’, of a 
fragmentary' and digressive kind. He would, he told his audience, 
explore, over the thirteen weeks of the series, the ramifications of a 
fantasy. And over the next four years, until just two days before he 
was fatally injured in a street accident, Barthes delivered four remark­
able sets of lectures in which he combined intensely personal and 
idiosyncratic preoccupations with immensely wide literary and philo­
sophical reference points. In his lectures, Barthes is always present as 
a singular human being, speaking in the first person, with specific 
memories and desires. The quest he embarks on each year is seen to 
have a bearing on the direction of his own life, and events such as the 
death of his mother, or his desire to adopt a new kind of writing — 
perhaps a sort of novel — are incorporated into his endeavour.
Barthes devoted his first series of annual lectures to the question of 
“How to live together?”, exploring, via the resonances of a single 
concept, that o f idiorhythms, the best balance between being on one’s 
own and living with others. His second series took ‘The Neutral’ as its 
central focus. In December 1978, Barthes told his audience that he 
was now embarking on a longer-term project that might occupy him 
for a number o f years. Having reminded them of his commitment to 
human subjectivity after its obliteration by orthodox philology, by 
Marxism, and by certain kinds o f structuralism —  “better the blinds of 
subjectivity’’, he observed, “than the impostures of objectivity. Better
the imaginary' of the subject than its censorship” (Barthes 2003: 2 5 )__
Barthes set out his most personal fantasy yet: that o f making a radical 
change in his life and deciding to write some sort of novel.
The title of Barthes’s last course is ambiguous: the preparation ‘o f  
or ‘for’ the novel refers to his own process o f working out what sort of
novel he might write (he explains that he has not yet acted on his life- 
changing fantasy), but also to what he has gleaned from his conside­
ration of two key aspects or stages of how other novelists prepare for 
the novels they are to write. The first step or stage is to effect the 
transition “from life to work” (the sub-title of the first set of lectures). 
Taking it as evident that novelists draw on their own observations of 
life (not necessarily autobiographical but experiential) Barthes is 
concerned in the first lecture course with how the novelist collects and 
processes the materials out of which the work will be made. And it is 
here that the activity of notation will be central. In the second set of 
lectures, subtitled “the work as will”, Barthes considers how writers 
take the next step: how they convert the desire to write a novel into 
novel-writing itself. Drawing on the letters, diaries, and plans of a 
number of writers, including Chateaubriand, Balzac, Flaubert, Proust 
and Kafka, Barthes considers the kind of life the writer chooses to live 
in order to make writing possible.
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*  * *
How does the activity of notation fit into Barthes’s conception — or 
more accurately his fantasy —  of ‘Preparing for a novel’? Barthes 
explains that his fantasy springs from particular novels, above all 
Proust, but also Tolstoy’s War and Peace, and he asserts that for him 
the novel is always in some sense affirmative. But if the novel is a 
generous genre, its way of celebrating experience often depends on 
memory, on preserving a cherished past. This does not, however, fit 
Barthes’s fantasy because, he tells us, he suffers from a poor memory. 
Apart from brief flashes (as illustrated by the ‘anamneses’ sequence of 
Barthes by Barthes, which consists in fact of a series of rapid 
notations; Barthes 2002, IV: 836-847), he has no long-term memory, 
and does not dwell upon or seek to reconstitute his past. Perhaps then 
the novel is not for him, despite his fantasy?
To avoid this impasse Barthes steers his meditation round to the 
view that the kind of novel he might write would have to be charged 
by other energies, that can also be found in the novels he likes, and 
charged above all by the fact that underlying these novels is what he 
takes to have been the author’s profound engagement with his own 
present, at least prior to the start of composition. For Barthes tells us
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that his own affective link is not with his past but always with the 
present, his present “in its affective, relational, and intellectual dimen­
sions” (Barthes 2003: 45).
But the present is what is right there, at the end of one’s nose. How 
can one reconcile this proximity with the distance implied by the kind 
of enunciation that characterises writing and particularly novel 
writing? If Barthes is convinced that the novelists he admires shared 
his conviction that literature is always “made from life”, it is also clear 
to him that life is always present life. Hence, for him, preparation fo r  
the novel refers to “grasping that parallel text, the text of ‘contem­
porary’, concomitant life” (Barthes 2003: 45). If he believes—  and 
this is what he will seek to demonstrate throughout his discussion of 
notation — that one can “write the present by noting it —  as it “falls” 
on you or under you (before your eyes or in your ears)” (Barthes 
2003: 45), he is less clear about whether you can make a novel out of 
such present writing. For it may be that the novelists he admires have, 
at a certain stage, made the transition from life to work, have 
transformed “present writing” into novelistic form, have gone from 
the discontinuity, the fragmentariness, of notation, to the continuity of 
narrative structure. This may be what happened, in Proust’s case, 
when Contre Sainte-Beuve turned into A la recherche du temps perdu: 
Barthes is obsessed with this hypothetical moment which he links to 
the death of Proust’s mother, just as his own decision to write a novel 
was linked to the death of his own mother.
The issue then might be, Barthes surmises, whether in fact he is 
searching for a ‘third form’, a sort of hybrid ‘novel through frag­
ments’. To investigate this he decides to look at two seemingly 
diametrically opposed ways of incorporating the notation of the 
present into literature: on the one hand the mode of extreme brevity 
enacted in the Japanese poetic form of haiku; and on the other hand 
the profuse writing by which Proust converted his own life into the 
endless flowing sentences o f A la recherche.
Interestingly, Barthes says that to illustrate the activity of noting 
the present he could have focused on writers’ notebooks or bio­
graphical diaries (Barthes 2003: 47). Why did he choose haiku? One 
answer is that Barthes’s passion for haiku, which had arisen a decade 
earlier through his visits to Japan from 1966 onwards, had always 
been associated with the idea of writing the present. At the core of 
Empire o f  Signs — Barthes’s book on Japan, or as he puts it, his book
about a fantasy country he calls Japan, which has a series of short 
fragmentary essay on aspects of everyday life in Tokyo — are four 
key fragments devoted to haiku. Initially he focuses on the way 
westerners tend to want forcibly to inject meaningfulness into haiku, 
ignoring the fact that, according to Barthes, the Japanese see haiku as 
a “practice aimed at bringing language to a halt [...] breaking [...] the 
inner recitation that constitutes our person [...] working on the very 
root of meaning” (Barthes 2002, III: 408). Switching in his characte­
ristic way from modes of signification to the field of lived experience, 
Barthes sees the particular semantics of haiku as the touchstone of a 
particular quality of event, the ‘incident’, where it is not what happens 
but the fact of happening that counts.
Transposed onto “the page of life”, haiku, as incident, has the 
quality of a “light fold”, as it is rapidly read “in the live script of the 
street” (Barthes 2002, III: 408). Haiku is associated with “an 
awakening before the fact of the event” (Barthes 2002, III: 410). 
“Haiku isn’t a rich thought reduced to a brief form; it is a brief event 
that has found its appropriate form” (Barthes 2002, III: 411). Rather 
than reminding us of something in the past, haiku “probes the memory 
of what has not happened to us: it makes us recognise a repetition 
without origin, memory without persons, speech without moorings” 
(Barthes 2002, III: 412). For Barthes haiku is of a piece with “any 
discontinuous trait, any incident in Japanese life as it offers itself for 
me to read”, and points in the direction of an equivalent way of living, 
“a graphic mode of existence” (Barthes 2002, III: 415), where human 
agency is enshrined in micro-gestures that are akin to delicate brush­
strokes. Haiku suspends meaning and prompts the response: “that’s 
right, that’s exactly it”, where ‘it’ isn’t something special, a hidden 
meaning, something symbolized by the event, but is the event itself 
(Barthes 2002, 111:415).
In his account of notation Barthes devotes many pages to haiku. 
But because he sees it as epitomising the act of notation as writing the 
present, he in fact progressively builds up a set of traits, properties or 
parameters that are of far wider application. For example, before 
embarking on his discussion of haiku (which will provide the frame­
work for the account of notation), and in order to forestall impatience 
with the apparently technical considerations that will follow, Barthes 
insists that his concern is with a “interrogating a practice’ (Barthes 
2003: 49), a technique, or —  key word —  a gesture. But he adds that
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for him every action, technique or gesture has its own ethos and 
ethics. And thus he claims that his account of haiku as an act of 
notation is an investigation of the intersection of the aesthetic and the 
ethical. Whatever intellectuals may think, an interest in the technical 
aspect of writing, in how novelists gather their materials, organise 
their lives, and so forth, is for Barthes an interest in the ethical. 
Because, he goes on to say, the privileged field where the aesthetic (in 
the shape of techniques and gesture) and the ethical coincide, is in the 
minutiae of the everyday, the domestic realm. Perhaps the desire to 
write a novel is the desire to partake in a ‘domestic' practice of 
writing. Just as Proust compared his novel in progress to the dress the 
seamstress cuts and pieces together, so Barthes casts himself in the 
role of a housewife, anxious to get the right ingredients for his home­
made offering (Barthes 2003: 51).
A discussion of haiku occupies the central core of the first lecture 
course on La Preparation du roman in 1978-1979. Eight of the 
thirteen sessions are devoted to haiku, following three introductory 
sessions. Two entire sessions are devoted to conclusions, and it is here 
that what Barthes now calls ‘4he daily practice of notation” (Barthes 
2003: 137) becomes the central focus. This helps us to understand that 
everything Barthes says about haiku, the many traits he progressively 
elucidates, are related to the desire to talk about a practice of capturing 
present experience, and about the place of such a practice in the 
process of writing a novel.
In embarking on his discussion of haiku Barthes offers this defini­
tion of “my haiku”:
haiku = the exemplaiy form of the Notation o f the Present = a minimal act of 
enunciation, a form that has maximal brevity, the atom of a sentence that 
notes (marks, homes in on, glorifies, endows with fam a ) a minuscule element 
o f ‘real’, present, concomitant life. (Barthes 2003: 53)
Barthes concedes that this definition is not canonical: he is talking 
about “my haiku”, and he defends the overall principle of his lecture 
course whereby the subject (not the narrow narcissistic ego, but the 
voice of subjectivity) is allowed to be voiced, uncensored. He also 
concedes that the haikus to which he responds have been translated 
into French (he lists the various anthologies he quotes). The material 
parameters of haiku: three lines, a fixed number of syllables, tenuous 
presence on the page, are all ones he responds to in mediated form,
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and moreover via haiku’s written rather than spoken forms (in Japan 
they are often read aloud).
Barthes’s slow unfolding of the traits he identifies with haiku 
proceeds through a series of five rubrics:
(1) In The Desire fo r  Haiku (Barthes 2003: 61-66) Barthes talks 
about the way haiku is a desirable or desire-bearing form, because in 
Japan ordinary people want both to write them and to read them. 
Haiku writing is a daily activity which fits in with the way haikus 
capture “a vibration of the world”. Barthes accounts for the happiness 
haikus induce by citing their unhierarchical quality, their acceptance 
of what seems futile and tenuous. A haiku can talk about anything: it 
posits “the emergence of absolute immediacy”, the co-presence of 
contingent elements. In a haiku the co-presence of items is not meto­
nymic, antithetical, or causal: we are confronted with “a neutral con­
secutiveness”. Haikus circulate in a community, playing down author­
ship, authority, possession. Haikus, Barthes says, posit “a 
quintessence of subjectivity”, but not an author. A haiku belongs to 
anybody. And thus, Barthes affirms, “haiku is Desire, in so far as it 
circulates”. Haiku is “made at life’s own level, without remainder”.
(2) In Le Temps q u ’il fa it (Barthes 2003: 66-84) Barthes starts 
from the idea that the only rule regarding the content of a haiku is that 
it should contain a reference to the season. This links what is placed 
before us, in a haiku’s three brief lines, with the cosmos: not via 
description, but by summoning up directly the essence of the season 
itself, the essences of summer or autumn. Barthes connects this with 
references to the weather, and he bemoans the poverty of French 
where the same word, temps, is used for the English words time and 
weather. Yet he argues that the way the French language gets round 
this, via the expression 4e temps q u ’il fa i f ,  when referring to the 
weather, adding a modal verb (with the verb faire —  ‘to do ‘or ‘to 
make’), shows that what is at stake when we refer to weather 
conditions is “the active relation of the subject and the present” 
(Barthes 2003: 71). A remark to a neighbour on the subject of weather 
is not just phatic but existential: it alludes to the “subject’s sense of 
being, to the pure and mysterious sensation of living" (Barthes 2003: 
12)? In adverting to “le temps q u ’il fa it” haiku tends towards what 
Barthes calls “the individuation of the hours of the day’ (Barthes 
2003:74).
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Haikus always aim at the particular rather than the general, homing 
in on variations of weather endows a single da\ with variegation, a 
ranee of nuances, “a mottled, differentiated range of intensities" 
(Barthes 2003: 75). In a haiku, each hour of the day is a level of 
sensitivity. Haiku is a discourse that articulates states and levels for 
which there are no set words. At stake here is a principle that Barthes, 
citing Deleuze’s recent work, calls Individuation or Nuance. Indivi­
duation is a notion that links irreducible singularity, 4a nuance 
fondatrice', to particular moments, to weather, colour, phenomena. On 
this view, subjectivity (Barthes cites Nietzsche and again Deleuze) is 
essentially mobile, not fluctuating but constituted by a network of 
mobile points: subjectivity is not like a river, even a changing one, but 
a mutability that is discontinuous (and yet smooth [aheurtee]). 
Ambivalent, or dialectical, individuation shores up the subject in its 
individuality, its sovereignty, but at the same time “undoes” (defait) 
the subject, multiplies it. pulverises it, absents it (Barthes 2003: 79).
This makes it clear that what is at issue in Barthes’s account of 
haiku as notation is the status of the subject. And he goes on to make a 
range of comments that connect nuance to a poetics of emptiness, to 
difference, always with weather, “le temps qu ’il f a i f  \  on the horizon. 
Drawing on Blanchot’s readings of Mallarme, Barthes links haiku and 
indeed “all notation to a falling back on one’s native impressions, a 
route back to the sheer sensation of life, the feeling of existence” 
(Barthes 2003: 84). It is worth noting that in this section Barthes 
quotes passages on exchanges to do with weather from a diary he kept 
in July and August 1977 in his summer retreat in the Basque country. 
The diary was one of the forms Barthes toyed with in his quest for a 
literary form in which to channel his desire to write and his passion 
for the present. In an important essay. Deliberation, he discusses the 
reasons why he judged his experiment in diary writing to have been a 
failure (Barthes 2002, V: 668-681).
(3) Barthes considers next haiku’s relation to the ‘Instant" (Barthes 
2003: 84-93). He stresses that the dimension o f time haiku grasps or 
saves is not the past but the present: “Time is saved right away [tout 
de suite] [through] a concomitance of the note (of writing) and of what 
incites it” (Barthes 2003: 85) —  what he will further on call the 
notandum —  the thing to be noted. Paradoxically, ‘Notatio (the fact of 
noting something down)' — the Latin word Notatio underscoring the 
fact that Barthes construes it both as a practice (exemplified by haiku)
and as a rhetorical strategy like disposition or elocution — is also 
linked to the desire to remember. In fact haiku, and notation in 
general, convert immediate sensation into memory:
This uncompromisingly pure Instant, which seems to resist any type of 
duration, any kind of return, any setting aside, any freezing (this absolutely 
fresh Instant, as if one were eating the noted thing, straight from the tree, like 
an animal grazing on the living grass of sensation), this Instant also seems to 
say: to remind me — when I reread. An Instant that aspires to be a Treasure: 
Tomorrow: memory. This contradiction would express itself as follows: 
haiku [involves] a new and paradoxical category: ‘immediate memory’ as if 
Notatio (the fact of noting) permitted one to remember there and then. 
(Barthes 2003: 86)
(4) Under the heading Pathos (Barthes 2003: 93-111) Barthes 
focuses on affect and emotion. In haiku, affect is linked to perception, 
not in the banal sense of a faculty, but as an action, an event. In 1970 
Barthes had written a set of brief ‘notations’ of his experience in 
Morocco, which were only published posthumously under the title 
Incidents. The following year, in an essay on Pierre Loti, he further 
elaborated the notion of the incident and of what just ‘falls’, ideas he 
links with haiku in Empire o f  Signs:
The incident is simply what falls, softly, like a leaf, onto the page of life. It is 
this fleeting, weightless fold in the fabric of days; it is what can scarcely be 
noted: a sort of zero degree of notation, just enough to enable something to 
be written. (Barthes 2002, IV: 109)
In his lectures Barthes connects the idea of the incident to another of 
his abiding preoccupations: the presence of tangible objects (tangi- 
bilia) in literary texts. For Barthes, the “passage of the tangible” gives 
us “a flash of the referent” that can be linked to fantasy and desire 
(Barthes 2003: 95). Regarding emotion, Barthes notes that haikus 
display a localised emotiveness (‘emoi tenu’) marked by the frequent 
use of exclamatory syllables like ‘oh’, and ‘ah’, although he goes on 
to stress that discretion is a key characteristic of haiku. “Haiku”, he 
writes, “is assent to what is [... ] a happy assent to fragments [eclats] 
of the real, to affective inflexions” (Barthes 2003: 111).
(5) In another rubric, The Reality effect (Barthes 2003: 113-127), 
Barthes considers “how haiku’s way of saying produces a reality 
effect”, a term referring to instances when language gives way to a
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sense of certainty that the real has been attained (Barthes 2003: 113).4 
In a few pages Barthes adumbrates the key arguments he will develop 
in Camera Lucida regarding the “this has happened” side of the 
photograph, and he proposes that haiku comes very close to the 
‘noem’, the epistemology, of the photograph: ‘да a e te ’\ ‘it has been’. 
And he goes on to suggest that while haiku articulates nuance and 
variegation, in showing how the world is infinitely divisible it also 
chooses a point at which to posit the real:
It is obvious that the world (the Notable, Notandum) can be infinitely divided 
(physicists do it) [...] so it follows that freeze-framing a notation has a 
certain arbitrariness [...] at a certain point [haiku affirms] that I have posited, 
affixed language. Yet, at what point in the descent into the infinitely subtle 
did I decide to affix language? (Or: why note this rather than that?). Perhaps 
the decision (and the little satori it provokes in reading) arises when metrics 
encounters a fragment of reality and makes a knot in it, stops it; a moment 
when the real is raised aloft by a combination of 5-7-5 syllables and allows 
this moment to be stated. (Barthes 2003: 119)
For Barthes this is what poetry does. And what it achieves is an 
experience he characterises by the word ‘ Tilt' (Barthes 2003: 123— 
127), from the expression used in pinball, fa ire  tilt', when the game is 
stopped momentarily by an abrupt gesture that sets all the alarms 
ringing: “a good haiku engenders a ‘tilt’ in the reader. But a haiku can 
also represent the tilt, the ‘that’s it’: the brusque apparition of the 
referent in the stroll of life” (Barthes 2003: 123).
*  *  *
The two sessions of Barthes’s lecture course where, after the focus on 
haiku, he opens up the discussion and works towards some conclu­
sions, are together titled Passages (Barthes 2003: 137-161). Here he 
returns to the connections between “the fragmentary notation of the 
present” (Barthes 2003: 137) and the novel. How much ‘notation’ can 
be carried over into the novel? Barthes looks at this under four 
headings. He firstly considers notation “as a daily practice”. Since it is 
an act that aims to capture a “sliver of the present” (Barthes 2003: 
137) as it strikes you, notation poses a number of practical problems.
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Barthes explains that his own practice involves always being equipped 
with a retractable biro (no need to take the cap off) and a pocket 
notebook. The ‘copeau’ or sliver consists in what he calls “my 
personal, inner scoops (.scoop: spade, sheath, the action of scooping, a 
grab, a round-up, a first flowering)”, which he wants to gather on 
life’s very surface (Barthes 2003: 137). Suddenness, and a sense of 
kairos, the opportune moment, are key here: and so notation is a kind 
of reportage, not directed at 7a grosse actualite’ (the big news), but 
at, ‘my own little news’. Thus the impulse to note is unpredictable and 
notation is essentially “an outdoor activity — not the desk but the 
street, the cafe, with friends” (Barthes 2003: 137). Barthes’s practice 
is to make what he calls a notula, often just one scribbled word, in his 
notebook, and then later to turn this into a nota by expanding it into a 
sentence on an index card. “Notable phenomenon: I forget the idea if I 
don’t make a mark (notula) however elliptical; equally, once I’ve 
registered the nota I clearly remember the idea as a whole and even its 
form (its sentence)” (Barthes 2003: 137). Another practical conside­
ration is making oneself available ( ‘disponible’): noting things as they 
come up in life (‘я тёте la vie') requires time and also what Freud 
called ‘floating attention’. Barthes also observes that notation can 
become like a drug, or a mother from whom we are reluctant to be 
weaned, and he links this to Protestantism (citing Gide and Amiel as 
autobiographical diarists) since notation involves direct contact with 
the truth rather than mediation. Notation involves the “direct 
articulation of the thinking subject and the sentence-making subject” 
(Barthes 2003: 139).
Next are ‘The levels of notation’. Reiterating a point he has often 
made elsewhere, that “meaning depends on the level or scale of 
perception” (Barthes 2003: 140), so that if you were to blow up five 
square centimetres of a Cezanne painting you would have a Nicolas de 
Stael canvas —  Barthes argues that homing in on the minuscule does 
not necessarily imply brevity: in Proust for example the experience of 
the tenuous often leads to long flights of investigative prose.
He then goes on to consider what he calls the unit of notation, the 
notandum, and the various roles it can play (the various “'justifi­
cations” it can receive). A Functional role, as when a character’s 
minor trait “serves to indicate something necessary to the system ol 
the Story” (Barthes 2003: 142). A Structural role, where the notandum 
is determined not by its content but by the rhythm of its appearance,
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its infrequency for example, or its very futility. A Symbolic role, as 
when the thing noted is a sign of something else (as example Barthes 
gives a long citation from K.afka). An Aesthetic role, here Barthes 
cites an incident from his own recent life, when, waiting for a bus in 
Paris he had seen a woman with a curious way of walking. In this 
instance the notandum was aesthetic because a particular type of 
sentence structure was required in order to register the impression it 
gave. The sentence had to be both contrastive and exclamatory, 
something like: “well, if a man walked like that he’d be called 
effeminate” (Barthes 2003: 144).
Summing up the question of levels, Barthes argues that, in formal 
terms, as a 4forme breve’, notation is what cannot be summarised. A 
notation is a syntagm, a basic unit of signification. Barthes then posits 
that the brusque emergence (surgissement) of a notation is that of a 
sentence: the impulse, the jouissance of notation, is that of producing, 
or hatching, a sentence. Observing that a whole course could be 
devoted to this, Barthes makes a series of remarks on the nature of the 
sentence, notably around the idea of “sentence fetishism” (associated 
with Flaubert), a condition where, like poor Emma Bovary, we 
become victims of the fatal allure of certain kinds of statement 
(Barthes 2003: 149). As a 7eurre\ a ‘blind’, the sentence, he says, 
wipes out (scotomise) everything else (Barthes 2003: 149). And he 
cites holiday advertisements that make us see the white sand, the 
beautiful women, and the cocktails, but omit the airport hold-ups, the 
frightful crowds and the painful sunburn.
Finally, getting back to the novel “as Utopia, Fantasy, Sovereign 
Good” (Barthes 2003: 151) —  or at least to the last and most 
important relay towards what he now calls the “modem nota” — 
Barthes considers two final facets o f notation, its quiddity, associated 
with Joyce, and its truth, associated with Proust.
Joyce’s famous epiphanies were originally composed (in 1900— 
1903) to stand alone, but were then incorporated into his first novel 
Stephen Hero, itself a step on the way to Ulysses. In the same period, 
Proust went from the scattered writings of his early years to the vast 
continuum of A la Recherche. Fascinated by these two instances of 
passage, of transition from notation to experimental novel, Barthes 
considers the Joycean epiphany, defined as “the sudden revelation of 
the quiddity —  the whatness —  of a thing” (Barthes 2003: 151), as a 
model for his own experimentation with the form he called the ‘inci­
dent’. Drawing on Richard Ellman’s biography of Joyce, and quoting 
one of Joyce’s texts, Barthes is fascinated by the fortuitous, discrete, 
spasmodic character of epiphanies, which depend on an artistic 
posture of receptivity and availability:
This Joycean experiment with epiphanies is very important to me, and 
corresponds exactly to my own search for a similar form, which I call the 
Incident: a form I experimented with in snatches in The Pleasure o f  the Text, 
Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, A Lover ’s Discourse, an unpublished text 
(Au Maroc) [later Incidents], and my chronicles in the Nouvel Observateur. 
(Barthes 2003: 152)
The reference at the end is to a weekly page Barthes wrote for the 
famous French weekly news magazine, Le Nouvel Observateur, 
during more or less the exact duration of his lecture course (Barthes 
2002, V: 625-653). As he lectured week by week on the difficulties of 
writing the present, probing, via haiku, the parameters of such an 
enterprise, Barthes was supplying his listeners at the College de 
France (who often read his weekly column on the way to his lectures), 
and a much wider readership of over half a million, with a sample of 
his own experimentation with the form he called the incident. Each 
weekly Chronique comprised an average of four separately titled and 
unconnected entries ranging from a few lines to a couple of substantial 
paragraphs. In each case Barthes formulated concretely his subjective 
reaction to things that had grabbed his attention that week, for 
example an encounter at the hairdresser’s, media coverage of the 
collective suicides of a sect in Guyana, a rumour that mayor Chirac 
planned to outlaw busking, advertisements and health campaigns. The 
first Chronique appeared on 18 December 1978, two days after his 
third lecture. His final column would appear on 26 March 1979. But 
already in his last lecture, on 10 March 1979, where Barthes discusses 
Joycean epiphany, he adumbrates the terms in which, in his final 
column, he would announce the suspension of his Chronique, and 
explains why he deemed the search for an adequate form to have 
failed. What he says in the lecture is that a common property of the 
haiku, the epiphany, and the Incident is that they should posit “imme­
diately signifying events”, that they should eschew all commentary:
the difficulty o f the haiku, the epiphany, and the incident is the constraint of 
not-commenting [...] the extreme difficulty (or courage) |lies in] not giving 
the meaning, any meaning; deprived of commentary, the inconsequentiality of
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the incident is laid bare, and to let this inconsequentially stand is almost 
heroic. (Barthes 2003: 153)
Yet. Barthes explains, in view of the large circulation of Le Nouvel 
Observateur he had felt that “it was impossible not to give to each 
incident its moral” (Barthes 2003: 153). And thus (as he would en­
large in his final column in the magazine) his Chronique, in failing to 
let incidents speak for themselves, was a failure. In this instance 
Barthes had not found a form to match his ambitions. And he wonders 
if Joyce too, in abandoning his epiphanies in their original form, and 
bringing them into the framework of his novels, had not confronted 
the same problem of feeling that the Western reader needed inter­
pretation and could not tolerate elliptical brevity.
In Proust’s case, Barthes argues, the fragmentary' moment that 
exists in a problematic relation with any established form, is not 
connected with the quiddity of things, but with what he calls “the truth 
of affect” (Barthes 2003: 155). This has an affinity with haiku and 
epiphany because for Barthes it is enshrined in what he calls ‘Ihe 
moment of truth”, a moment which, as in haiku, prompts the reaction: 
“That's just it!” (C ’est да), an experience of ‘77//’. The moment of 
truth is readerly rather than writerly, and for Barthes it is associated 
supremely w'ith two moments in fiction —  the death of Prince 
Boltonski in War and Peace, and the death of the narrator’s grand­
mother in A la recherche (this insistence on death is of course poig­
nant given the death of Barthes’s own mother which had prompted his 
decision to think about writing a novel). The essence of such moments 
for Barthes is their radically concrete nature, rendered through details 
such as the grandmother’s gestures, or her ruffled hair, painstakingly 
combed by the servant Fran9oise (Barthes repeats the word concrete 
six times in one page of his lecture).
Moment of truth = solidity, compactness, firmness of affect and writing, an 
indivisible block. The moment o f truth is not an unveiling but on the contrary 
the sudden emergence of the uninterpretable, the last degree of meaning, of 
the ‘after that there is no more to be said’, hence the filiation with haiku and 
epiphany. (Barthes 2003: 159)
Not surprisingly perhaps, Barthes ends his lecture course on an ambi­
valent or pessimistic note. He suggests that even if one could devise a 
mode of reading that would be founded on receptivity to such mo­
ments in fiction, they are in fact at odds with the novel itself In the 
end, the possible convergence between notation, notandum, and the 
novel, anticipated and hypothesised all the way through La Prepa­
ration du roman, never takes place, the two curves remaining 
asymptotic.
In truth the Novel [...] with its long flow, cannot sustain 'truth' (that of the 
moment): this is not its function. I see it as something woven (= Text), a vast 
spreading canvas painted with illusions, blinds, invented things, ‘fakes’ if you 
like [...] punctuated, threaded with [rare] moments o f truth that are its 
absolute justification [...] when I produce Notations, they are all ‘true’: 1 
never lie (I never invent), but precisely, 1 do not accede to the Novel; the 
novel begins not with the false, but when one mixes without warning the true 
and the false: the absolute, glaring truth, and the brightly coloured brilliance 
of a falsity that stems from Desire and the Imaginary [...]. Perhaps managing 
to write a novel (this is the perspective — the vanishing point — of this 
lecture course) means ultimately accepting to lie. In the end, resistance to the 
novel, an incapacity for the novel (for this practice) is a moral resistance. 
(Barthes 2003: 161)
* * *
A fascination with notation —  a way of grasping the ‘third meaning’ 
that eludes (or subverts) both denotation and connotation — is at the 
heart of Barthes’s late work, and in discussing it explicitly in his 
penultimate lecture course Barthes drew together many strands of his 
thinking. The passion for notation can be linked to a number of ‘turns’ 
in late Barthes: an affective turn — towards intensities; an everyday 
turn, amplifying his abiding concern for everyday life; a turn towards 
the ‘romanesque’, the stuff of the novel, but without the alibis of 
fiction and narrative. The desire for notation accompanies and informs 
Barthes’s quest for new modes of writing, as he sought, after years of 
reacting to avant-garde currents, to give his own creativity a proper 
outlet. Through autobiography; the simulation of a lover’s discourse; 
diary writing; the incident, the chronique, and other ‘formes breves'', 
and ultimately through the photograph, Barthes sought to find a form 
that would realise his ambition of “writing the present”.
The lure of notation is also connected with Barthes’s fascination 
with lives, with the raw materials, the bits and pieces that human lives, 
considered outside any teleology, are made up of. In a  famous state-
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ment in Sade, Fourier, Loyola Barthes called these bits and pieces — 
stray facts, anecdotes, memorabilia biographemes , and in the last 
years of Barthes’s life Proust was at the centre of this concern. When 
he went on to give his last set of lectures the following year, 
continuing the theme of preparing for the novel but going on to 
consider “the work as effort of will”, Barthes included many 
biographemes from the life of Proust and also from other favourite 
writers (Chateaubriand, Kafka, Flaubert), drawn from letters, diaries, 
and correspondence, as he sought to pin down how writers organise 
their lives, and their time, in order to write. This fascination with ‘bio­
graphemes■’, and with the stuff of lives, relates of course to Barthes’s 
long-standing passion for details (fashion details for instance), and for 
variegation, difference of degree (which he called ‘bathmologies’ in 
Barthes by Barthes). He coined the term ‘Marcellisme' to convey his 
curiosity about the life of Proust (or Kafka, or Flaubert) — fuelled by 
his enthusiasm for George Painter’s biography of Proust. This can of 
course seem like quaint obscurantism. But when situated in the 
context of the project of grasping the present, and reflecting on the 
epistemology of notation, Barthes’s obsession with the writer’s life is 
a fascinating route into new ways of thinking about the human subject.
Ultimately, then, notation is the vehicle, the sounding-board, for 
the subject that seeks articulation in late Barthes, a subject whose 
voice we hear most clearly, not in Incidents or Chronique, but in 
Camera Lucida. Yet now that they have been published at last, and are 
beginning to receive the recognition they deserve, it is to the four 
series of College de France lectures that we should perhaps look for a 
glorious flowering of the Barthesian subject. Consisting in a stream of 
notations, gathered up into a series of “traits”, labelled with a key 
word and then presented in a randomized, unhierarchical order, the 
“fantasmatic pedagogy” of the lectures confirmed the key place of 
notation, and the third meaning it registers, in the signifying economy 
of Barthes’s work. If his search for a new kind of romanesque never 
burgeoned into anything resembling a novel it surely flourished here 
in the wonderful affective and intellectual feast his lectures provided 
for their audiences in the 1970s and for a new readership in the 
twenty-first century.
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Записывая настоящее: 
нотация в лекциях Коллеж де Франс Ролана Барта
В сових лекциях 1978-1979 гг в Коллеж де Франс Ролан Барт со­
средотачивался на понятии 7а notation’: запись прошедшего впечат­
ления или события во время его случания. Настоящая статья анали­
зирует виды нотации, приведенные в лекциях (там виды нотаций 
связывались с хокку, эпифанией Джойса и прустовским импрес­
сионизмом), связывая их с долговременным интересом Барта к онто­
логии разных видов обозначения. Нотация находится в одном ряду с 
понятием «третьего значения» и более поздними терминами «инци­
дент» и «романный» и кажется центральным в проявившимся в 
поздних работах Барта интересе к аффекту, субъективности и инди­
видуальности. Так как нотация связана с фантазией написания ро­
мана, то это понятие отзывается и в «призрачной педагогике» бар- 
товских лекций, где все идеи развиваются в сверхличном стиле 
посредством нагромождения различных не связанных между собой 
элементов. Бартовский децентрализованный, действующий аффек­
тивно субъект говорит именно в смысле нотации.
Olevikku kirjutades: 
ülestähendamine Barthes’i College de France’i loengutes
Oma 1978.-1979. aasta loengutes College de France’is keskendus Roland 
Barthes mõistele 7a notation’ (inglise keeles "notation'): mööduva mulje 
või sündmuse üles tähendamine märkmikusse selle aset leidmise ajal. 
Käesolev artikkel analüüsib ülestähendamise liike, nii nagu nad loengutes 
välja toodud on (loengutes on ülestähendamise liike seostatud haiku, 
Joyce’i epifaania ja prustiliku impressionismiga), sidudes neid Barthes i
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pikaaegse huviga erinevate tähistusviiside ontoloogia vastu. Ülestähenda- 
mine kuulub samasse ritta ‘kolmanda tähenduse’ mõiste ning hilisemate 
terminitega ‘intsident’ ja ‘romaanilik’ ning paistab sellisena olevat keskne 
Barthes’i hilistes töödes väljenduvas huvis afekti, subjektiivsuse ja indivi­
duaalsuse vastu. Et ülestähendamine on seotud romaani kirjutamise 
fantaasiaga, kõlab see mõiste vastu ka Barthes’i loengute ‘kummituslikus 
pedagoogikas’, kus kõiki ideid arendatakse üliisiklikus stiilis erinevate 
omavahel mitte seotud elementide kuhjamise läbi. Barthes’i afektide ajel 
toimiv ja detsentraliseeritud subjekt leiab väljenduse just nimelt üles­
tähendamise mõistes.
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Abstract. While it is well known that Roland Barthes consecrated his last 
lecture series at the College de France to the theme of the preparation of a 
novel, it is less known that his first writings on literature focused on the same 
question, but from a less individual point of view. The interrogation that 
motivates Le Degre zero de I ’ecriture (1953) and many of the essays in Essais 
critiques (1964) is the question of how to write, of what procedures one can 
follow in preparing a literary work of art. At the two ends of Barthes’s career 
one finds the same themes of writing as action and of the writer’s possibilities 
and motivations in writing. The article explores the hypothesis that there is 
ground for a positive theory of the author in Barthes’s work. It seeks to 
discover similarities between writings from the early and the late period that 
concern three themes: (1) writing as action, (2) the deferral of its achievement, 
and (3) writing as representation. The article ends with a discussion on the 
relationships between Barthes’s positive theory of the author and related 
important issues that have been discussed recently in literary criticism.
At the last stage of his life, during the short period as professor at the 
College de France, Roland Barthes spoke more and more explicitly of 
his desire to write a novel, focusing in his last series of lectures in 
1978-1979 and 1979-1980 on the topic of la preparation du roman 
and working privately on plans for a novel the title of which was to be 
Vita Nova. Given that Barthes had published in 1968 the provocative 
essay La mort de I'auteur, it is not surprising that this enactment of a 
writer’s role has given rise to a lively scholarly discussion. Inter­
pretations vary. It is possible to see Barthes’s project as a failure and a 
logical outcome of his work on the neuter and the related themes, such 
as silence and abstinence, for example (Comment 1991); as an
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existential choice of a specific form of life where the phantasm of 
writing a novel expresses devotion to literature (Compagnon 2002); or 
as a success, the outcome of which was not a novel, but the 
autobiographical prose published as the posthumous book Incidents in 
1987 and preceded by the half-theoretical, half-literary essay 
Deliberations in the revue Tel Quel in 1979 (Knight 2002).
Even though the generic extension of Barthes’s achievement as a 
writer is yet to be established —  was he also a literary writer in 
addition to the largely recognized brilliant essayist? —  it is clear that 
he has become an author in the strong sense of the word. As research 
develops, arguments become more and more backed up with referen­
ces to Barthes’s Oeuvres completes and manuscripts and conjectures 
on his intentions and desires. This “authorialization” of Barthes as a 
writer goes often hand in hand with a re-evaluation of his career in the 
light of the themes and projects of the last period. While some 
researchers have argued that Barthes’s career was a coherent one 
(Buffat 2002), others have interpreted Barthes’s late interest in the 
writer’s work and the desire, the will and the intentions it involves, as 
well as his confession-like statement of being tired of the 
(post)modem literature he had defended earlier, as an abandonment of 
the textual theory of the 1970s and even as a sheer negation of the 
theoretical projects of the earlier years (Brenner 1993).
What I am about to do is another type of analysis of Barthes and 
the question of the author. While it is well known that Barthes 
consecrated his last lecture series at the College de France to the 
theme of the preparation of a novel, and that he approached the topic 
by methodologically analysing his own phantasms of writing and the 
literary texts that resonated with them, it is less known, or at least less 
discussed in research that Barthes’s first writings on literature focused 
on the very same question, but only from a less individual point of 
view. The interrogation that motivates Le Degre zero de Г ecriture 
(1953) and many of the essays in Essais critiques (1964) is the 
question of how to write, of what procedures one can follow in 
preparing a literary work of art, within the specific context of post-war 
France. These aspects in the early essays have been overshadowed 
first by the structural period and its focus on systematicity and 
conventionality, and then by the textual period and its insistence on 
the text and the reader as the producers of signification. However, at
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the two ends of Barthes’s career one finds the same themes of writing 
as action and of the writer’s possibilities and motivations in writing.
The hypothesis that I want to explore is that there is actually 
ground for a positive theory of the author in Barthes’s work. By 
“positive” 1 mean that this line of thinking is not mostly interested in 
what the writer is not —  that is, not an authority, not the granter of 
meaning, not the privileged participant in communication, as the essay 
on “the death of the author” has so clearly argued —  but rather in 
what the writer does, what are his or her possibilities for action and 
the acts through which he or she sets premises for meanings to 
develop. By “theory” I imply that there is generality in Barthes’s 
thinking, that his treatment of the topic transcends his own experience 
and those of the writers he has written about, and that his reflections 
can be interpreted as constituting an organized whole that offers a 
coherent understanding of the topic. I will not pay attention to the 
differences of historical context between the texts, but instead I will 
try to discover similarities between writings from the early and the 
late period. The similarities concern three themes, which will be 
discussed in the following order:
(1) writing as action;
(2) the need to endlessly restart writing, or the deferral of its achieve­
ment;
(3) writing as representation.
I will end my analysis with a discussion on the relationships between 
Barthes’s positive theory of the author and some of the important 
concerns in recent discussions in literary criticism, addressing thus the 
main theme of this special issue of Sign Systems Studies, Barthes’s 
relevance today.
Writing as action
Barthes’s first work, the collection of essays Le Degre zero de 
Гecriture, published in 1953, sketches a short history of French 
literature from the classical period to the post-war era. Barthes s 
approach is based on the notion of writing, ecriture, which he defines 
as the dimension of choice and thus of liberty situated between the 
collective system of language and the biologically grounded style. The 
overall discussion is determined to a great extent by the intellectual
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debates of the time, and especially by Sartre’s theory of engaged 
literature. This emphasis on the historical and the political seems to be 
far from Barthes’s concerns in the College de France lectures in 1978-
1980, where his method in analysing the topic of “la preparation du 
roman” is based on the exploration of the subjective phantasm of 
writing a novel, and especially of the activities that precede the act of 
writing (such as taking notes), and where the historical dimension of 
literature is marginal if not non-existent.
Nevertheless, these differences between the early and the late work 
can be overcome, if Barthes’s understanding of history in Le Degre 
zero is clarified. In this book, Barthes reads works from the classical 
period and the 19th century from the point of view of the writer’s 
condition in relation to the literary language of his or her time. What 
Barthes analyses are the political and cultural significations that the 
different forms of literary language — writing in his terminology — 
carry along and the writer’s responsibility in choosing among the 
different forms and their significations. Even though forms and 
significations change, the writer’s condition, his or her responsibility 
in choosing a writing and thus affirming his or her social and political 
position, remains the same. Different historical contexts are thus 
linked together by this recurring general condition.
It is important to notice that writing is defined as instrumental 
activity in Le Degre zero. Barthes’s history of literature begins and 
ends with cases where the writer has at his or her disposal a form of 
literary representation that functions as a perfect instrument for com­
munication. For the classical writer, writing is not a problem, since the 
social significations the forms of literary representation carry are 
concordant with the vision of the world he or she shares with the 
reading audience. For Camus, who marks the other end of Barthes’s 
historical timeline, writing is also unproblematic, not because of 
ideological concordance, but because his ecriture blanche has reached 
a level of semiotic non-markedness that resembles mathematical equa­
tions and permits him to “discover and deliver” (Barthes 1953: 57) the 
human condition without disturbing social significations. In between 
these two extremes cases, Barthes situates a series of writers for whom 
writing, the forms of literaiy representation at their disposal in their 
specific historical context, has been a problem, since they have not 
accepted the significations brought into the communication by the 
forms of literaiy' representation. Writing is thus an instrument, but an
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instrument with a social dimension and with a history and con­
sequently with significations that are brought into the action of writing 
by these dimensions. The “writer’s formal identity” (Barthes 1953:
14) is based on the selection of the forms of literary representation he 
or she decides to use, and, metonymically, on the selection —  or 
refusal —  of the significations the forms carry with them.
Read in this way, Le Degre zero is parallel to Barthes inaugural 
lecture at the College de France, which serves as an introduction to his 
further work at the institution. Barthes argues in the lecture, published 
as Legon in 1978, that language and reality are incommensurable, and 
that the representation of the real is thus impossible, but also that this 
unbridgeable gap is constantly denied (Barthes 1978: 21-22). This 
refusal produces a continuous utopian effort to represent the real by 
language in literature. The devices used in this effort vary, and their 
changes constitute the history of literature. Like in Le Degre zero, we 
find here different historical contexts linked together by a recurring 
general condition, defined by the fact that language and the real do not 
have a common measure1. If literature in general is defined in Legon 
as a utopian effort to transcend this condition, to represent the real, 
then it is logically possible also to analyse the agents implied in this 
effort and their actions, that is, writers engaged in representing. This is 
the line of thought that leads from Le Degre zero to Legon and to the 
College de France lectures.
I will return to the question of representation at the end of my 
paper. Let us now focus on writing as action and try to see, at the level 
of praxis, what Barthes has to say in the College de France lectures 
about the writer’s work and how the early and the late writings can 
complement each other. The theme of selection or of choice is present 
here as it was in Le Degre zero, but it is situated at a different level. 
On the one hand, selection and choice determine discussions on the 
writer’s relation to reality and its thematization in the act of writing
1 This standpoint rests on a preliminary separation of language from what is 
considered as real. This idea, shared by most French structural and textual 
theoreticians o f the 60s and 70s, is problematic, since it abstracts language from 
its everyday entanglement with action, experience and emotions. It is also curious, 
given that the theoreticians that lay their argumentation on it often understand 
language as having a tremendous power in conditioning thought and action. 
Language is first abstracted from the real, then exaggerated and finally brought 
back to the real just to notice that it is no more commensurable with it.
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down observations, impressions and ideas (‘notation’ in French). On 
the other hand, selection and choice have an important role in the 
writer’s performative use of genres.
When Barthes analyses the role of writing down observations, 
impressions and ideas, he defines it as an act of marking, of drawing 
of boundaries and of isolation (Barthes 2003: 45-48, 137—1412). From 
the multidimensional and layered realm of the real, the act of writing 
down selects certain items and isolates them from the rest. This act 
foregrounds epistemological and ontological commitments and the 
question of values. One can always ask why one item is written down 
and not another, what justifies the act of selection and isolation. The 
action is thus in need of legitimization, and this can only be based on 
the writer’s conception of reality (ontology) and his or her personal 
knowledge and experience of the real (epistemology). Moreover, the 
further work on what is written down, the copying of notes for use in 
writing a literary text, thematizes their social relevance, since they 
become now a part of a potential act of communication. This is where 
writing actually begins, since the writer’s private work of writing 
down, situated at the intersection of language, personality and the real, 
acquires now a social dimension. Through being copied, notations are 
redirected towards possible readers, their appreciation, criticism and 
feedback.
The act of copying, of rewriting the notes in view of the literary 
work to be, has to be related also to Barthes’s discussion on genres. In 
this respect, Barthes’s College de France lectures stand in an explicit 
opposition to his essays from the 1960s. If in the Essais critiques in 
1964 writing was defined as an intransitive verb, meaning that writing 
is first and foremost linguistic activity, play with literary and ordinary 
language, and not oriented to the representation or communication of 
something that would exist prior to the text3, in College de France 
lectures Barthes writes that he is no longer sure whether this under­
standing is correct (Barthes 2003: 35-36, 203-209). He argues instead 
that one always writes something: for example a novel, a poem, or an
2 The pages are where Barthes discusses the topic most explicitly, but it runs 
through almost the whole volume, and other pages could thus be mentioned. This 
holds also for further references to Barthes 2003.
3 The introduction to Essais critiques contains, however, other comments on the 
writer’s situation that are relevant for our purpose and are discussed in the 
following chapters.
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essay. Writing in this respect is always determined by the codified 
aspects of the genre, like speech is determined by the system of 
language.
This does not mean, however, that the writer would be entirely 
subjected to genre. Barthes understands in his lectures writing as a 
performative work on the genres. The genre functions like a codified 
form for the private phantasm of writing. It sets the model to follow in 
seeking to realize the will to write as others have done — as Proust 
did, as Joyce or Dante did. Genre is not only a structure or a reper­
toire, but rather a signifying element in a network of references that 
extends to the authors who have used the genre and the values they 
represent. It permits a mimetic identification of the writer with exemp­
lary figures from literary history. But the realization of the genre in 
one’s own work has also a creative dimension. The performance of 
genre can give rise to new emerging aspects in the literary work. In 
this sense, the dialectic relation of a codified genre and its realization 
in writing has a creative dimension that constitutes the writing subject 
as author. It is in relation to the genre and to those who have practiced 
it with success that the writer establishes his or her identity through 
similarity and difference at the same time, through a successful 
remaking of a codified form and an individual deviation from it.
The deferral of achievement
The discussion so far has put forward the first elements of a positive 
theory of the author. In Barthes’s thinking, writing as action is 
selection and organization — selection among the possible forms of 
literary representation, marking and isolation of items to note, 
selection among notes to copy, their organization in regard to a 
potential act of communication, and choice of genres to follow, realize 
and transform in writing. Through these acts, the writer emerges as a 
cultural and social subject, as an agent that performs literary structures 
and categories and establishes epistemological and ontological com­
mitments that cannot be reduced to pre-existing elements and do not 
acquire meaning by difference alone, but instead constitute relations 
of continuity and similarity that give him or her positive consistency.
Having exposed this, we can turn to the second topic, which is the 
need to endlessly restart writing, or the deferral of its achievement,
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based on the social and the individual condition of the writer. In Le 
Degre zero de Г ecriture, Barthes’s diagnosis of the historical develop­
ment of writing is pessimistic. All forms of literary representation 
acquire cultural and social significations that are foreign to the 
intentions of the writers who use those forms. This holds for the clas­
sical writing, which became obsolete once the classical understanding 
of man and society collapsed, and it holds also for Camus’s ecriture 
blanche, which will inevitably be turned into a myth by the literary 
institution and lose its functional purity. Literature is in this sense a 
pursuit of a transparent instrument that always ends in a delusion. In 
Legon, Barthes defined this semiotization of form as the constituting 
force of literary history: it is because writing acquires historical 
significations that are independent in regard to its purposes of 
representation that writing has to be developed and experimented with 
(Barthes 1978:21-22).
This conflicting relationship between a writer’s intentions and the 
codified aspects of language and literature is at the core also in the 
introduction to the 1964 volume of Essais critiques (Barthes 1964: 9- 
18) which is actually one of Barthes’s most substantial discussions of 
the writer’s position and work, but which has been overshadowed by 
the emerging structural theory developed elsewhere in the essays. In 
the introduction, Barthes argues that ordinary ways of expressing 
emotions (his example is a letter of condolence) make, because of the 
conventionality of the expression, the emotions appear cold, even 
though they were true and expressed sincerely. The only way to 
communicate the singularity of the emotions is to vary the form. This 
is the condition of literature, and the writer resembles a friend looking 
for sincerity in that both are listening to their use of language and 
show concern for its affective effects on the listener at the level of the 
content expressed and of the form that expresses. In this way, 
literature, and all use of language as expression of emotions, is an 
endless play of variation, of resistance to the banality of conventions.
In the College de France lectures, Barthes describes a similar kind 
of a process of deferral of achievement, but this time it is based on the 
individual condition of the writer (Barthes 2003: 219-229). He applies 
the psychoanalytical concepts of Moi ideal and Ideal du Moi to 
describe what he understands as a projection of an ideal understanding 
of oneself as a writer, which motivates writing, but which is always 
deceived by the outcome of the activity. Writing is the realm of the
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Ideal du Moi, the exalting and exigent place provided by the 
symbolical dimension of language for the construction of oneself. The 
Ideal du Moi, however, does not coincide with the Moi Ideal, which is 
the imaginary understanding of oneself outside of writing, and which 
fundamentally motivates writing. This difference between the ima­
ginary Moi Ideal and the literary representation of oneself as Ideal du 
Moi is what makes writing an endless work. This is how Barthes 
describes the process:
[...] On pourrait dire que l’ecrivain raisonne (ou «marche», fonctionne) ainsi: 
«Je veux etre un type bien (Moi Ideal) et je  veux que да se dise, que да se 
sache (Ideal du Moi). » [...] mais en meme temps je constate que: non, ce que 
j ’ai ecrit n ’est pas tout moi', il у a un reste, extensif ä l’ecriture, que je n’ai pas 
dit, qui fait ma valeur entiere, et qu’il me faut ä tout prix dire, communiquer, 
«monumentalise!-», ecrire: «Je vaux plus que ce que j’ai ecrit.» (Barthes 2003: 
222-223)
[...] One could say that the writer reasons (or “proceeds”, functions) this way: 
“/  want to be a good guy (Moi Ideal), and I want it to be said, to be known 
(Ideal du Moi)”. [...] but at the same time 1 realise that: no, what 1 have 
written is not all o f  me; there is a surplus, extensive in relation to writing, 
something that I have not said and that makes my value complete, and that I 
will have to say at all costs, communicate, “monumentalize”, write: “I am 
more worthy than what 1 wrote” 4
The notions of Moi Ideal and Ideal du Moi thus describe at the same 
time the individual motivation for writing literature, its deception and 
the need to begin writing again that it produces. The points of view in 
Le Degre zero de l ’ecriture and the College de France lectures are 
different, but they describe basically the same phenomenon, which is 
the social and cultural dimension of literary semiosis as opposed to the 
individual one. The literary institution and the reading public will 
interpret texts in ways that can not be controlled by the writer, and in 
La mort de I ’auteur Barthes forcefully stated their right to do so 
(Barthes 1984: 63-69). This is also true for the different forms of 
literary representation the writer has at his or her disposal. The literary 
text and its from, be it conceived as an instrument for representation or 
a screen for the projection of the writer’s understanding of oneself,
4 All translations into English from French originals are by the author of the 
article.
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stand always at the intersection of the private and the public, and mark 
thus the intrusion of otherness into the writer’s work, which 
undermines the ego-logical purity and perfection of writing.
If the reader is free in interpretation only at the cost of the death 
of the author, as Barthes provocatively claimed at the end of the 
famous essay in 1968, then his reflections in the College de France 
lectures show the writer as split between two irreconcilable positions. 
The writer as author seeks to dominate the work and its significations, 
subjecting it to the logic of origin, expression and authenticity, 
whereas the writer as reader of his or her own work perceives the 
work according to the logic of textuality, as developing multiple 
significations that resist the patemalizing grip of authority and show 
the failure of the writer as author. However, despite the emphasis on 
the deferral of achievement, which might be interpreted as yet another 
element in a negative theory of the author, it has to be emphasized that 
Barthes’s description of the social and individual deception in writing 
constitutes also a positive understanding of the writer. By exposing 
the reasons why literature is a process of quest and delusion, Barthes 
helps to understand what motivates the multiple acts of selection that 
constitute writing as action and make the writer emerge as a cultural 
and social subject endowed with creativeness and individual 
consistency. The will to write the idealized understanding of oneself 
and the search for transparent instruments can be adopted as 
hypotheses that permit to analyze motivations in a writer’s series of 
actions, and also help to understand the writer’s production as a 
dynamical process with intentions, coherence and rationality, even 
though it were an endless process of failure from the writer’s point of 
view.5
5 Antoine Compagnon (2002: 223-224) interprets Barthes’s Moi Ideal and 
Ideal du Moi as establishing a typology of writers. This is clearly not the case. For 
Barthes, the two aspects of the self establish a logic o f deferral that is common to 
all writing.
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Writing as representation
To consider writing as representation seems to stand in an open 
contradiction with what is generally considered as the core of 
(post)structural literary theory, namely the argument that texts are 
production and simulation, not representation and mimesis. Barthes 
himself can be regarded as a fervent partisan of the poststructural 
understanding of literature, and a great deal of his writings in the 
1960s and early 1970s forcefully criticize theories of realism and 
expression and claim that, instead of making present a message that 
would pre-exist the text and of depicting reality in any faithful way, 
literary texts are only play with codes, intertexts and rhetoric effects of 
reality. Nevertheless, Barthes’s late works, as well as some of the 
early writing up to the introduction to Essais critiques, can also be 
read as reflection on literature as representation. In order to understand 
this, it is necessary to define what he actually means by representation 
in these works and especially what he understands as the object of 
representation. This discussion will then lead us back to the question 
of the author.
It is common to discuss representation as a relation between the 
world and the text, to consider it as linguistic description or narration 
of characters, events or settings, of things and processes that are not 
linguistic themselves and that exist somehow independently of the 
text, and to judge the success of representation in terms of equivalency 
or concordance between the depiction offered by the text and the non­
textual understanding of the items represented. Seen in this way, 
representation is evidently difficult, if not impossible, since the very 
notion depends on a primary separation of language and reality and 
the secondary effort to make them match again. As Barthes wrote in 
his inaugural lecture at the College de France, language is one­
dimensional and the world is multidimensional and thus the effort to 
make them meet in representation is a utopian wish (Barthes 1978: 
21- 22).
But this is not the idea of representation we find in Barthes’s late 
works, nor in some of the early ones. Here it is not the question of 
representing real persons, actions or settings by linguistic means; 
instead, it is the question of affects and their communication by the 
means of literature, and of a search for transcendence by these means. 
In the introduction to Essais critiques, Barthes claims that writing is
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motivated by desire and understands it first of all as a form of 
communication. It is because the conventionality of language and of 
forms of writing intervenes in the communication process and threats 
the originality and singularity of the emotion to be expressed that 
writing becomes a work on language. Only through a play of 
variations of form one can wish to convey one’s emotions to the 
addressee in an exact way. Seen from this perspective, Barthes’s 
(post)structural period and his theory of textuality, initiated by Essais 
cr itiq u es , can be considered as derived, if not even based on, an 
understanding of literature as communication and expression.
During the 70s, Barthes moved gradually from an antirealist 
textual paradigm towards a more moderate understanding of literature. 
This process was accelerated by the death of his mother, soon after he 
had been elected to the College de France. It seems as if, after this 
acute loss, it would have been difficult to speak of the real as 
consisting of codes, citations and intertexts only. The late essays and 
the College de France lectures do not propose a return to the naive 
theories of representation that were criticized earlier. Rather, they 
propose a theory of literary texts as mediated representations of 
emotions and affects, and especially of “moments of truth”, which 
Barthes sees as represented in works by for example Proust, Gide, 
Stendhal Tolstoi and Fellini (Barthes 2003 : 40-41 and 151-161, 
Barthes 2002: 177-180). These moments can be described as 
emotional crises where the subject is confronted, on the one hand, 
with the bare finitude of bodily human existence, and above all with 
sickness and death, and, on the other hand, with manifestations of 
deep emotions, such as pity and love. These moments can find in 
writing a literary' representation that gives them form and the power to 
move the reader, so that the “moment of truth” can not actually be 
separated from its writing, and becomes shared in the act of reading. 
Barthes describes this as follows:
Au plan de Г ecriture: Moment de verite = solidarity, compacite, fermete de 
1"affect et de fecriture, bloc intraitable. Le Moment de verite n ’est pas 
devoilement. mais au contraire surgissement de l’ininterpretable, du dernier 
degre de sens, de Yapres quoiplus rien ä dire [...]. (Barthes 2003: 159)
At the level of writing: Moment of truth = solidarity, compactness, strong 
hold between affect and writing, inseparable unity. The moment o f truth is not
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unveiling, but on the contrary appearance of what can not be interpreted, of
the last degree of signification, o f the after which nothing more to say [...].
Let us point out two aspects in this citation. Firstly, it is important to 
notice that the inseparability of the affect and its writing establishes a 
specific type of temporality. The “moment of truth” is not revealed in 
writing, as if writing would only be a means for the communication of 
something that exists independently of the text and before it; on the 
contrary, “the moment of truth” emerges in writing, acquires consis­
tency in writing. In this sense, representation is a creative process, 
although it is also a process of giving of form to an affect that is not 
itself literary or linguistic. Writing makes a qualitative difference: an 
affect represented is also at least potentially shared, communicated, 
and thus transcends the finitude of individual experience. Secondly, it 
is important to see that the “moment of truth” marks also the limit of 
interpretation. It is the last degree of signification, the appearance of 
something that cannot be further explained. What this means is that, 
like the obtus and the punctum , the moment of truth defies the 
generality of codes and sign systems and resists paraphrases. It 
belongs to the domain of the singular and the momentary, and is as 
such opposed to rational explanations that seek to integrate all the 
elements of the text within one interpretative perspective. In this 
sense, it demands a new type of pathetic critical reading that is based 
on the punctual moments in the text and seeks to understand their 
value and force.
This, however, does not mean that the “moments of truth” would 
only take shape as opposed to the structural elements of narration and 
the codified elements of the genre and language. In one of his 
unfinished and posthumously published essays, On echoue toujours a 
parier de ceux qu 'on aime (One always fails to speak o f  the beloved 
ones, Barthes 1984: 353-363), Barthes discusses Stendhal’s love for 
Italy and the problems in its representation. According to Barthes, 
Stendhal’s travel books on Italy failed, because they sought to give a 
direct expression to the emotion, and were consequently reduced 
either into stereotypical representations, or then into aphasia. Instead, 
Stendhal managed to represent the emotion in his novel La chartreuse 
de Parme, because the narrative and the symbolical structure of the 
novel permitted him to transcend his private situation and to express 
the emotion in a mediated form that made it not only readable and
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interpretable by others, but also felt, experienced. The novel as genre 
permits thus not only the shaping of the writer’s identity through 
performance, as was discussed earlier, but also the representation of 
the affect, through its narrative and symbolical structures that give the 
affect form, consistency and transcendence.
In the College de France lectures, Barthes emphasises further the 
interpersonal ethical relationship this search for communication of 
affects implies. According to Barthes (2003: 225-227), the recogni­
tion of the other that the reader is constitutes a necessary condition for 
transcendence in the act of writing. The writer can not seek commu­
nication of affects and acknowledgement for his or her value (the Moi 
Ideal) without a preliminary acknowledgement of the value of the 
others. If  this condition is satisfied, the novel —  and Barthes in 
inclined to include in the genre all works that seek the transcendence 
of egotism —  can become an occasion for a relationship of “mimetic 
sympathy” (Barthes 2003: 226) between the writer and the reader. 
Again, literature is understood as communication, but not in the sense 
of a simple transfer of pre-existing emotions, but as a search for 
communion where the effect produced in reading corresponds to the 
emotion that motivates writing.6 Since the only way to attain this is 
through taking into account the reader in writing, one can finally say 
that the birth of the writer can only be at the cost of the birth of the 
reader.
Barthes positive theory of the author and 
its relevance today
Barthes theory of the representation of affects may give rise to critical 
and even sceptical comments. One may ask whether there really is 
transcendence, or even communication in this process, or whether it is 
rather a question of the reader’s private experiences only. What gives 
rise to the “moment of truth” in reading may originate in calculated 
use of literary devices from the writer’s part; the experience in writing 
and in reading may not meet, and the reader may fall in the trap of 
emotional fallacy.
6 See also Miller (1992: 49-51), who argues that in Barthes’s novelesque 
writing the relationship between the writer and the reader is above all erotic.
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These remarks may hit a point, but they still are not, in my opinion, 
enough to disregard Barthes’s insights. Literature certainly is commu­
nication at risk, a process where the end product is rarely if ever 
similar to the original. Barthes’s reflections on the social and cultural 
semiosis of form give ample ground to defend this position. But disse­
mination is not a handicap; it is rather an advantage. The fact that 
literature offers a mediated way to represent emotions and affects may 
be exactly the factor that makes it suitable for the exploration, 
development and analysis of aspects of human existence that do not 
easily find place in other forms of representation or discourse. This is 
especially the case in the novel which as a genre permits a specific 
heterology of true and false (Barthes 2003: 161). The delegation of 
action, emotions, and commitments of all kinds to characters and 
narrators may be exactly the reason why literature permits writers to 
reveal, expose and narrate different aspects of human existence, from 
the sublime to the scatological.
Barthes makes this point in the essay on Stendhal. A similar kind 
of argument is made by Jorgen Dines Johansen in his recent book 
Literary Discourse. A Semiotic-Pragmatic Approach to Literature 
(2002). Dines Johansen argues that literature as mediated representa­
tion permits a specific type of exploration of aspects of human 
existence. It is because the subjectivity in the text is and is not 
concomitant with the subjectivity of the author that writers can at the 
same write about their innermost experiences and do it in veiled forms 
sheltered by poetic licence that screen off simple identifications. Like 
Barthes, Dines Johansen also considers the search for transcendence 
as one of the fundamental raisons d ’etre of literature. Writing can be 
motivated by the will to overcome time and by the will to give a 
public, shared and durable expression to emotions and experience and 
their objects; it can be an effort to bear witness. Interestingly, Dines 
Johansen’s frame theory is Peirce’s doctrine of signs, whereas Barthes 
remained faithful to structural methodology all through his career. It is 
in considering literature as action and writers as agents involved in 
this action that the Peircean and the Saussurean traditions of semiotics 
seem to best support each other.
From Le Degre zero until the last texts Barthes emphasized that 
writers’ action takes place in historical contexts, and that these histo­
rical contexts are semiotic situations. Each act makes sense in relation 
to cultural and social significations that are local and temporal, and for
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research on authors to make sense these factors have to be recognized. 
This argument is made also by Antoine Compagnon in the chapter he 
dedicates to the author in Le Demon de la theorie. Litterature et le 
sens commun (1998). He argues also for ethical responsibility towards 
the author. If writing is a historically situated and bodily grounded 
activity that is motivated by the will to bear witness, the reader may 
not be entitled to treat texts just as any objects. Literary texts are 
intentionally produced entities shaped by processes of selection and 
organization carried out by authors in specific contexts. Literary 
research can study these factors, but it can also disregard them. The 
choice is a scientific one, and an ethical one. Barthes’s call for 
pathetic criticism is here in line with Compagnon’s argumentation. 
Furthermore. Barthes helps to understand the inherently delusive logic 
at work in writing. Writing is, on the one hand, performative work on 
genres, application, realization and transformation of coded forms of 
narration and description. On the other hand, writing can give rise to 
deception only, since the Ideal du Moi and the Moi Ideal never meet. 
Subjectivity —  the subjectivity of the author — thus emerges in 
writing, but in an inherently deceptive process marked by a conti­
nuous deferral of perfection.
Literary theory has been under attack during the past years. Scho­
lars have argued that theoretical reflection has become a speculative 
musing detached from “real” concerns (Eagleton 2003; Patai, Collar 
2005). It is not rare to mention Barthes in these occasions. Barthes’s 
reflections on the author show, however, that theoretical sophistication 
need not deprive literary research of concerns that are vital and real, 
such as loss, suffering, love and desire, and their communication. It 
has been my intention in this article to show that Barthes’s work, 
which has in some occasion been unfairly reduced to the essay La 
mort de I ’auteur and other militant writings from the textual period, 
provides basis for a positive theoretization of the writer’s work and 
position within the literaiy field. The question of the author runs 
through Barthes career, stimulating reflection on possibilities and 
impossibilities of expression, communication, and communion. The 
posthumously published College de France lectures, due to their 
sketchy, unfinished nature, show us Barthes at the work of thinking, 
before ideas coalesce in their final form. In the introduction to the 
Essais critiques, Barthes wrote that the ‘4he material text (the Book) 
may have, from the writer’s point of view, an unessential character”
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(Barthes 1964: 11). The same holds for theory. The point is not to 
establish the final theory, but to continue coherent and general 
reflection that debunks naiveties and exposes complexities. Barthes 
work shows how to continue in this line in theorizing the author.
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Положительная теория автора у Барта
Общеизвестно, что Ролан Барт посвятил свою последнюю серию 
лекций в Коллеж де Франс подготовке романа, но гораздо меньше 
знают, что и его первые работы о литературе сосредоточивались на 
той же теме, хотя и с менее индивидуалистской точки зрения. Вопро­
сы, как писать и какие процедуры соблюдать в ходе подготовки
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художественного произведения, являются основой развития мысли 
как в «Нулевой степени письма» (1953) так и для многих эссе в 
сборнике «Критические эссе». Как в начале, так и в коние карьеры 
Барта рассматриваются темы: письмо как действие и возможности и 
мотивация автора при писании. В настоящей статье делается 
попытка доказать гипотезу, что в работах Барта наблюдаются начала 
положительной теории автора. Статья изучает совпадения между 
ранними и поздними работами Барта в трех аспектах: 1) письмо как 
действие; 2) задержка продукта письма; 3) письмо как репрезен­
тация. Статья заканчивается рассуждением о положительной теории 
автора у Барта и о ее связях с новейшими дебатами в современной 
теории литературы.
Barthes’i positiiv ne autoriteooria
On teada-tuntud tõsiasi, et Roland Barthes pühendas oma viimase loengu- 
teseeria College de France’is romaani ettevalmistamise teemale, kuid 
märksa vähem teatakse seda. et ka tema esimesed kirjutised kirjandusest 
keskendusid samale teemale, ehkki vähem individuaalsest vaatenurgast. 
Küsimused, kuidas kirjutada ja milliseid protseduure kunstiteose etteval­
mistuse käigus järgida, on aluseks mõttearendustele Kirja nullastmes 
(1953) ja paljudes esseedes kogumikus Kriitilised esseed. Nii Barthes’i 
karjääri lõpus kui alguses leiavad käsitlemist teemad nagu kirjutamine kui 
tegevus ja autori võimalused ning motivatsioon kirjutamisel. Käesolev 
artikkel üritab tõestada hüpoteesi, et Barthes’i teostes on täiesti olemas 
positiivse autoriteooria alged. Artikkel uurib sarnasusi Barthes’i varaste ja 
hiliste tööde vahel kolmes valdkonnas: (1) kirjutamine kui tegevus; (2) 
kirjutamise saaduse viibimine; ja (3) kirjutamine kui esitus. Artikkel 
lõpeb arutlusega Barthes’i positiivsest autoriteooriast ja selle seostest 
kaasaegse kirjandusteooria uusimate aruteludega.
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Abstract. The article examines Barthes’s A Lover’s Discourse (1977) in 
conjunction with du Maurier’s Trilby (1894) in order to present an argument 
about the similarities they share with the male masochistic fantasy as 
theorised by Deleuze in his Coldness and Cruelty (1989). Barthes’s insistence 
on the connection between art and love directs my approach. Trilby deals with 
love and aesthetics in the contexts o f art, music, and narrative. The discourses 
of Trilby’s competing lovers over the same woman serve as a point of 
comparison against which I read Barthes’s dramatisation of a lover’s 
discourse. I argue that Barthes’s lover shares a number of central discursive 
figures with the Deleuzian masochistic lover. I examine Barthes’s suggestion 
about the tension between the non-narrative discourse of love and the 
metalanguage of conventional love stories. I focus on those figures in a 
lover’s discourse that Barthes identifies as keeping this discourse from turning 
into a love story. My argument is that many of these figures are among the 
hallmarks of the masochistic fantasy. In particular the formula of disavowal 
safeguards the lover’s discourse, hindering it from turning into a conventional 
narrative about love.
Roland Barthes explains that he wrote Fragments d ’un discours 
amoureux (1977; A Lover’s Discourse [1978]) by simulating the 
action of primary language, the language of love. He purposefully 
avoids providing a metalanguage of love; instead, his aim is to paint a 
structural portrait of the discursive site of love. This is the site of an 
amorous T  speaking within himself, confronting the silent love
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object. Such a discursive site includes solely figures, that is, scenes of 
language showing the lover at work (Barthes 1978: 3). A Lover’s 
Discourse consists of a sample of what Barthes calls the thesaurus of 
figures, or fragments of discourse expressing things that have been 
read, heard, and felt about love. Barthes explains that a figure is 
established once a lover can say: “That’s so true! I  recognize that 
scene o f  language” (Barthes 1978: 4). He further clarifies that the 
figures enable the lover to make sense of what “befalls” him; how­
ever, as they occur to him in a random order, they do not organise his 
experience as a narrative. Barthes structures his discussion of these 
figures alphabetically in order to underline their non-syntagmatic and 
non-narrative nature (Barthes 1978: 6-7). This emphasis suggests that 
a metalanguage begins to work once a lover’s discourse is narra- 
tivised. It thus appears as if the discourse Barthes dramatises were 
inherently hostile to love stories. Although he does not specify what 
he means by love stories, they seem to designate conventional narra­
tives organised in accordance with the so-called classical model such 
as Balzac’s Sarrasine that Barthes analyses in S/Z (1970). Con­
sequently, he appears to start from the premise that a conventional 
love story, in its emphasis on sequence, causality, and organisation 
with a beginning, middle, and an end, already provides the first 
metalanguage of the lover’s discourse.
A Lover’s Discourse is Barthes’ most popular book, a fact partly 
explained by its perennially topical subject. Steven Ungar (1983: 117- 
119) emphasises the uniqueness of this book, for while it addresses 
problems of analysis and interpretation familiar from traditional con­
cerns of literary critics, it does so in a wholly new manner. It is part 
and parcel of Barthes’s search for “another semiotics” that is not tied 
to structuralism. Instead of an analysis based on metalanguage, Ungar 
observes. Barthes sees the affirmation of love as his goal. “To look for 
no more than the affirmation of love,” Ungar writes, “is then not at all 
a simple task when that affirmation calls for an attention whose rigor 
and sensitivity are none other than those of critical reading” (Ungar 
1983: 118). The plethora of literary and critical texts on which Barthes 
draws in demonstrating how a lover’s discourse functions suggests 
that any examination of this discourse must be placed in contexts 
allowing love to speak for itself. Literature and the arts in general are 
pivotal to this discourse, because, claims Barthes, any lover is always 
an artist.
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Barthes’s insistence on the connection between art and love directs 
my approach, for I juxtapose A Lover’s Discourse with a novel about 
love, George du Maurier s best-seller, Trilby (1894). What makes 
Trilby a suitable reference point for Barthes’s book is that it centres on 
the notion of the lover as an artist by exploring pictorial art, music, 
and fiction in relation to love. Trilby is a Künstlerroman focusing on 
the artistic development of two men, the painter Little Billee and the 
musician Svengali. Both love the same woman, Trilby, and both 
regard her as indispensable material for their creative work. A third 
man, a nameless artist-novelist, narrates this triangular love story. 
Trilby thus deals with love and aesthetic creation in the contexts of art, 
music, and narrative fiction. The rivalry of the painter and the musi­
cian over Trilby demonstrates their differences as lovers. In anticipa­
tion, I show that Little Billee’s discourse as a lover adheres to what 
Gilles Deleuze (1989) calls the masochistic fantasy, in which the male 
lover and the female love object mutually agree that he submit himself 
to her. In contrast, Svengali’s discourse is that of the demon lover bent 
on destroying the love object. The distinct discourses of Trilby’s two 
competing lovers serve as a useful point of comparison against which 
I read Barthes’s dramatisation of a lover’s discourse. More specifi­
cally, I argue that Barthes’s lover shares a number of central discur­
sive figures with the Deleuzian masochistic lover. The similarities and 
differences between the discourses of these lovers form the first focal 
point of my essay.
My essay’s second focal point is grounded in Barthes’s suggestion 
about the hostile tension between the non-narrative discourse of love 
and the metalanguage of conventional love stories. Once a lover’s 
discourse starts turning into a love story, maintains Barthes, the end of 
this discourse looms. The lover actually encounters pressure to shift 
from discourse to conventional narrative, thanks to the “scandalous” 
nature of love: in its sentimentality, it defies the humdrum nature of 
daily life (Barthes 1978: 175-179). In his own words, “The love story 
[...] is the tribute the lover must pay to the world in order to be 
reconciled to it” (Barthes 1978: 7).
In the following pages I focus on those specific figures in a lover’s 
discourse that Barthes identifies as keeping this discourse from 
turning into a familiar love story. My argument is that many of these 
figures are among the typical hallmarks of the masochistic fantasy as 
formulated by Deleuze in his Coldness and Cruelty (1989). This is to
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say that by exploring the workings of a lover’s discourse Barthes is 
actually illustrating many —  although certainly not all —  of the basic 
tenets of the masochistic fantasy. I maintain that these shared connec­
tions rest on one formula in particular that Barthes mentions 
repeatedly: “I know full well, but nevertheless [ ...]” (Barthes 1978: 
22, 62, 132, 177). As I subsequently show, this is the formula of 
disavowal that I then link to Barthes’s observations about waiting and 
suspense as typical figures of a lover’s discourse. It is this formula 
that safeguards the lover’s discourse, hindering it from turning into a 
conventional narrative about love. As it happens, the figures as­
sociated with it are among the characteristics that build up the 
Deleuzian masochistic fantasy.
Finally, I consider the tension Barthes perceives between dis­
courses and narratives about love. In this context, the fate of love 
plays a great role: does the end of an affair always terminate a lover’s 
discourse? What motivates my examination is that with A Lover’s 
Discourse Barthes encourages us to pay attention to the particular 
ways in which lovers talk, write, and read, while at the same time 
promoting the study of the various discursive and narrative strategies 
with whose help we not only deal with this perennially fascinating 
subject but also give it form.
At the time of its publication, Trilby was immensely popular, but 
since it is probably unknown to most present-day readers, I will 
briefly recall its plot line: Trilby deals with an artists’ community in 
Paris in the 1850s. The plot evolves around the triangle formed by the 
English painter Little Billee, a German-Jewish musician Svengali, and 
Trilby O ’Ferrall, a nude model for various artists. Little Billee falls in 
love with Trilby; pleased by his love, Trilby stops modelling. After 
Trilby finally consents to his proposal of marriage, Little Billee’s 
mother arrives on the scene, demanding that the engagement be called 
off. Trilby then vanishes from Paris, and Little Billee has a mental 
breakdown. Personal setbacks, including severe headaches, make 
Trilby seek help from Svengali who had previously eased her pain by 
mesmerising her. Aware of Trilby’s powerful voice, but her complete 
tone-deafiness, Svengali uses mesmerism in order to turn Trilby into 
an instrument for his musical ambitions. After rigorous training, 
Trilby starts performing to international audiences, causing a sensa­
tion wherever she goes. She and Svengali then re-encounter Little 
Billee. The meeting makes Svengali take revenge on both, for he is
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embittered that Trilby has never ceased loving Little Billee. During a 
performance in London, he does not mesmerise Trilby, and she sings 
out-of-tune. While the shocked audience is protesting, Svengali 
suddenly dies. Trilby goes mad, wasting away her last months in Little 
Billee’s care. Soon after Trilby’s death, Little Billee dies too. Only the 
narrator remains to recount the story of his former acquaintances.
In the throes of ravishment
Ravishment, to quote Barthes, is the “supposedly initial episode [...] 
during which the amorous subject is ‘ravished’ [...] by the image of 
the loved object” (Barthes 1978: 188). In more familiar terms, the 
figures dealing with ravishment dramatise the lover’s falling in love. 
When Trilby first meets Little Billee, she unwittingly touches the 
springs of his artistic sensibility by displaying her bare foot. He is 
“bewildered to find that a real, bare, live human foot could be such a 
charming object to look at” (du Maurier 1998: 15). Little Billee as­
sociates Trilby’s foot with “Olympian dignity” (du Maurier 1998: 15) 
and angels (du Maurier 1998: 20), that is, with classical Antiquity and 
the sublime. Ravishment affects the lover’s discourse, because it 
causes a reversal in subject-object relationships. It is the loved object 
that overwhelms the loving subject, not the other way round. The 
lover is thus subjected to the loved one. Barthes’s cautious 
phrasing— “supposedly initial episode” — shows, however, how 
difficult it is to characterise a lover’s discourse without recourse to the 
narrative terms familiar from love stories that typically assign love a 
particular starting point.
The lover’s ravishment begins with his sudden experience of a 
fascinating image such as the line of the shoulders, the slenderness of 
a silhouette, or the form of a foot (Barthes 1978: 191; see also 20, 71). 
Barthes links such an enchanting image with what Jacques Lacan calls 
le petit objet a (Fink 1997: 52), which appears to accommodate 
exactly a lover’s desire, although the lover knows nothing of it con­
sciously. This object is the unsymbolisable remnant of the lover’s 
symbiotic relationship with his first caretaker, usually the mother. The 
lover experiences the encounter with this object as personal fulfilment, 
as the conduit back to the lost union he once supposedly enjoyed with 
the mother. Given that ravishment, evoked by le petit objet a, springs
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from the lover’s earliest experience of love might explain Barthes’s 
reluctance to assign love’s discourse a definitive starting point. If this 
interpretation is correct, then this discourse cannot, in fact, have a 
nameable beginning, because the lover has been surrounded by love in 
the arms of his mother from time immemorial. Moreover, what serves 
as le petit objet a for one lover does not function in this role for 
another: “I cannot classify the other,” writes Barthes, “for the other is, 
precisely, Unique, the singular Image which has miraculously come to 
correspond to the specialty of my desire” (Barthes 1978: 34). No 
discourse or narrative can fully characterise this special object, a fact 
that further accounts for the difficulty of fitting the experience of love 
to any ready-made schemes.
Little Billee is dazzled by his first meeting with Trilby. Her 
beautiful bare foot inspires him to sketch it on the studio wall. He 
paints it from memory, and this painted foot, the novel’s narrator 
maintains, “was still to him as the thing itself —  an absolute reality” 
(du Maurier 1998: 24). In keeping with Barthes’s argument, Little 
Billee’s ravishment with Trilby takes place after the fact; that is, he 
does not fall in love with her when he sees her foot, but when he 
sketches this foot on the wall. Obviously, the foot is a fetish for Little 
Billee; and, indeed, Barthes conflates le petit objet a with a fetish. In 
psychoanalytic theory, fetishes are any objects that refer to the 
childhood fantasy of the mother as having a phallus. The lover’s 
fetishes are paradoxical in nature: although they focus on a bodily 
part, they nevertheless represent that part as a whole, as everything. 
This fascinating wholeness makes language falter, because it fits the 
lover’s desire perfectly, making him exclaim, “That’s it! That’s it 
exactly (which I love)!” (Barthes 1978: 20). This exclamation is all he 
can say of the love object. Thanks to the failure of language in the face 
of such perfection, the lover’s discourse cannot but imitate the 
fragmentary nature of various bodily fetishes. Thus, the hostility this 
discourse shows towards conventional love stories seems to be based 
on the fact that this discourse is moored in fetishes.
Barthes grounds the lover’s discourse in the lover’s experience of a 
fetish that defies language. Such a basis in turn suggests that the fetish 
serves as a gateway to another order of reality. In fact, Barthes 
maintains that a lover’s discourse does not derive from this world, but 
originates in a hallucinatory kind of image repertoire transporting the 
lover to another realm (Barthes 1978: 28, 99, 107, 127-128). We can
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begin to probe this other realm with the help of the narrator’s 
rhapsody in Trilby on the foot as an amorous fetish. The narrator 
explains the effect that the sudden sight of Trilby’s foot has on Little 
Billee in the following fashion:
[W]hen Mother Nature has taken extra pains in the building of [a foot] [...] 
the sudden sight o f it, uncovered, comes as a very rare and singularly pleasing 
surprise to the eye that has learned how to see! Nothing else that Mother 
Nature has to show, not even the human face divine, has more subtle power to 
suggest high physical distinction, happy evolution, and supreme development; 
the lordship of man over beast, the lordship of man over man, the lordship of 
woman over all! (du Maurier 1998: 16)
Little Billee thinks Mother Nature provides the substance of art. He 
also associates this substance with his own mother. Trilby, his new 
love object, has a special way of looking at him. The narrator 
describes this look in the following fashion: “and in a waking dream 
Little Billee would remember that his mother had often looked at him 
like that when he was a small boy, and she a beautiful young woman” 
(du Maurier 1998: 65; see also 175). At the novel’s end Trilby 
declares that she loves Little Billee just like his mother does (du Mau­
rier 1998: 269). This notion of love enabling the lover to rediscover 
the lost union with the mother reverberates throughout A Lover’s 
Discourse. Speaking of Goethe’s Werther, Barthes describes this 
union in these words: “nothing but the two of us [...] Werther forms 
for himself a child’s body in which phallus and mother are united, 
with nothing left over” (Barthes 1978: 128). Little Billee’s ravishment 
with Trilby demonstrates how the lover’s sense of such a union 
dominates the first phases of love during which he ecstatically 
explores the perfection of the loved being. The seeming correspon­
dence of the fetish with the lover’s desire produces this experience of 
the love object’s flawlessness (Barthes 1978: 197). Simultaneously, a 
trajectory emerges within this discourse: a fetish enables the lover to 
re-experience the symbiosis of the lost maternal union, which in turn 
makes available to the lover what Barthes designates as another realm. 
This is the space of the image repertoire both feeding the lover’s 
discourse and keeping it alive.
In discussing the figures of falling in love, Barthes identifies two 
features as particularly weighty: the lover’s fetishisation of the love 
object’s body and the return to the maternal union. In fact, Carol
Mavor (2007: 139) claims that the Barthesian lover’s discourse is 
wholly grounded in what she suggestively calls mother otic, the 
eroticisation of the mother. Taken together, these two features suggest 
that the love object associated with the mother lacks nothing symbo­
lically. Little Billee’s actions as a lover even imply that Trilby’s 
fetishised body generates the symbolism through which he expresses 
himself. After having sketched Trilby’s foot, Little Billee develops in 
leaps and bounds as an artist. Under the auspices of this fetish he starts 
finding his own individual style.
When we begin to tie these observations of the lover’s discourse to 
the masochistic fantasy, the first thing to notice is that the fetish plays 
the same role in both: it serves as a conduit back to the lost maternal 
union. A further uniting characteristic is the notion that this union then 
makes available the realm of the imagination. What is more, the fetish 
associated with the mother appears to generate the symbolism in terms 
of which both the Barthesian lover and the Deleuzian masochist 
expresses themselves (Deleuze 1989: 63). It thus seems that whatever 
similarities there are between these two types of lovers, they are 
grounded in the roles played by the fetish and the mother. I next 
explore these features in more detail.
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“I know full well but nevertheless...”
The lover keeps his discourse alive only by preventing it from turning 
into a love story, which would foresee the end of this discourse. 
Barthes says that keeping love’s discourse afloat requires that the 
lover protect the image repertoire feeding love. But how does the 
lover accomplish this task? Barthes suggests two tactics to this end: 
disavowal and a balance between what he calls the ‘two embraces’. 1 
discuss them in this order.
Barthes argues that the lover’s persistent affirmation of love in the 
face of all disparaging efforts to depreciate, limit, erase, and demystify 
it is encapsulated in the phrase: “I know, I know, but all the same 
[...]” (Barthes 1978: 22). This is the basic formula, but it takes other 
forms, too, such as “I have no hope, but all the same” (Barthes 1978: 
62); “I know perfectly well [...] but all the same” (Barthes 1978: 132— 
133); and “it’s stupid [...] and y e t ... it’s true” (Barthes 1978: 177).
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Now, as Deleuze points out, this is the formula of disavowal, one 
that invariably emerges with the fetish. The fetishist —  and both the 
Barthesian lover and the Deleuzian masochist is always one — uses it 
in order to deny the fact that the mother does not have the phallus. In 
effect, he says, “I know the mother doesn’t have the phallus, but all 
the same I believe it’s hidden somewhere about her; what is more, I 
have this fetish as proof of its hidden existence” (Fink 1997: 184— 
185). Such disavowal opens up a fantasy space in reality’s stead. It 
means that the fetishist knows how things stand in reality, but chooses 
to disregard this knowledge in favour of fantasy. His aim is to secure 
an ideal that is suspended in fantasy. In Deleuze’s words, this type of 
disavowal consists in “radically contesting the validity of that which 
is: [disavowal] suspends belief in and neutralizes the given in such a 
way that a new horizon opens up beyond the given and in place of it” 
(Deleuze 1989: 31). For Barthes in A Lover’s Discourse, this fantasy 
realm is the space of the image repertoire and of the imagination; 
similarly, for Little Billee in Trilby, it is the space from which all the 
arts spring. Deleuze even claims that the disavowal typical of the 
masochistic fantasy is “nothing less than the foundation of imagina­
tion, which suspends reality and establishes the ideal in the suspended 
world” (Deleuze 1989: 128). Thus, for Deleuze masochism is pri­
marily an art of fantasy (Deleuze 1989: 72). I want to suggest that the 
fetish serves the same function in the Barthesian lover’s discourse as it 
does in the Deleuzian masochistic fantasy: in both it enables the lover 
to access an imaginary realm of fantasy. In turn, it is this space that 
safeguards each lover’s discourse — but whether these discourses 
tally point-for-point with one another remains to be seen.
This intimate link among disavowal, the imagination, and fantasy 
helps to explain why Barthes characterises the lover as an artist. The 
reason is that the space opened up by disavowal involves sublimation. 
Suzanne Stewart (1998: 43) explains that “[a]n instinct is sublimated 
when its aim has been redirected and when its object has been 
replaced by a socially valued (nonsexual) one.” While associating love 
with sublimation is certainly familiar from many contexts (for 
example, aesthetic and religious discourses), it does raise questions 
about the role genital sexuality plays in a lover’s discourse. Trilby 
illustrates how disavowal feeds fantasy, enabling the enamoured artist 
to sublimate his instincts. That only Little Billee knows how to look at 
Trilby’s foot sets him apart from his artist friends, accounting for his
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superiority over them. Only his “girlish purity of mind" (du Maurier 
1998: 9) and his “quick, prehensile, aesthetic eye” (du Maurier 1998:
15) can perceive that the foot functions as a conduit to a higher order 
of reality. Little Billee seizes on this unexpected sight in order to 
disavow reality. His artistic gift is based on this connection between 
disavowal and sublimation, exhibiting a trajectory that moves from the 
fetish through disavowal to the opening up of a fantasy space in 
reality’s stead.
Little Billee's reaction on unexpectedly encountering the nude 
Trilby in a studio specifies further the role sublimation plays in his 
discourse as a lover. Trilby models in the same full-frontal position in 
which the painter Ingres’s painting La Source portrays a woman. 
Little Billee explains his stupefaction: ‘I saw her, I tell you! The sight 
of her was like a blow between the eyes, and I bolted!’ (du Maurier 
1998: 80); the narrator says that “as soon as [Little Billee] caught sight 
of [Trilby] he stopped and stood as one petrified, his shoulder up. his 
eyes staring” (du Maurier 1998: 82). Nudity as such is not at issue — 
“nothing is so chaste as nudity” (du Maurier 1998: 67) remarks the 
narrator —  but rather Little Billee’s sudden confrontation with a 
display of sexual difference. A woman’s nudity in art does not speak 
of sexual difference, but of sublimation: in the narrator’s words. “[t]he 
more perfect [a woman’s] unveiled beauty, the more it appeals to [the 
artist’s] higher instincts”; also, “[a]ll beauty is sexless in the eyes of 
the artist at his work” (du Maurier 1998: 67). But for Little Billee, 
sublimation necessitates the existence of one veiled woman, whose 
phallic quality comes into view as through a curtain. As we have seen. 
Little Billee associates such a woman, the necessary basis of his art. 
with his mother. What this means is that he could never have sexual 
intercourse with Trilby, because it would destroy both his love and his 
art.
Little Billee's discourse as a masochistic lover and an artist cannot 
accommodate sexual intercourse, but does such a danger threaten the 
Barthesian lover's discourse? Barthes actually identifies intercourse as 
an unfavourable element to this discourse, because having sex, he 
claims, sends the image repertoire to the devil (Barthes 1978: 104). 
What Barthes calls the two embraces are relevant in this context. The 
protection of the lover’s fantasy space takes place in discourse, 
specifically, in talk and speech. These, in turn, are grounded in 
suspension and waiting. Here is how Barthes describes the lover’s
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speech: “To speak amorously is to expend without an end in sight, 
without a crisis; it is to practice a relation without orgasm” (Barthes 
1978: 73). Further, Barthes refers to what he calls the “voluptuous 
infantilism of sleepiness” (Barthes 1978: 104) that takes place when 
lovers cradle one another. In this drowsy state they speak to each 
other. This intimate chatting marks a return to the mother, and here is 
what Barthes has to say about it: “In this companionable incest, every­
thing is suspended: time, law, prohibition: nothing is exhausted, 
nothing is wanted: all desires are abolished, for they seem definitively 
fulfilled” (Barthes 1978: 104). This companionable incest seems to 
share similarities with the masochistic fantasy in which the lover 
ostensibly pines after intercourse, but actually wants obstacles and 
detours in his way towards fulfilment. It seems that in both types of 
lover’s discourse, pleasure is generated by suspension and endless 
waiting, the purpose of which is to protect the union with the mother. 
In Mavor’s (2007: 157) phrasing, “Barthes prefers a state of sustained 
illusion, with both his mother and his lovers”. Katherine Kolb’s 
examination of the sexual politics of Barthes’s S/Z lends further 
support to my argument. She maintains that in his analysis, Barthes 
adheres to Balzac’s nineteenth-century view of artists as lovers, 
according to which “sexuality is a loss and a danger for men of action 
and thinkers and above all artists, who must conserve sexual energy 
for the sake of artistic potency” (Kolb 2005: 1571).
A closer look at Barthes’s two embraces elucidates further the role 
played by intercourse in the Barthesian lover’s discourse. In 
describing the companionable cuddle of intimate talk, Barthes makes 
the following observation:
Yet within this infantile embrace, the genital unfailingly appears; it cuts off 
the diffuse sensuality o f the incestuous embrace; the logic of desire begins to 
function, the will-to-possess returns, the adult is superimposed upon the child.
I am then two subjects at once: I want maternity and genitality. (Barthes 1978: 
104-105)
The Barthesian lover’s discourse is characterised by a pendulum 
movement swinging back and forth between idealisation grounded in 
disavowal and the actual sexual relationship. The moment of fullest 
fulfilment, however, takes place during the incestuous, but non-genital 
embrace — and this notion pervades the masochistic fantasy as well.
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There is a crucial difference, however, between the Barthesian 
lover’s discourse and the masochistic fantasy: the lover’s discourse 
accommodates the sexual relationship, while the masochistic fantasy 
rejects genital sexuality altogether. After Trilby finally agrees to 
marry him, Little Billee writes about the planned marriage to his 
mother (du M aurier 1998: 226), knowing full well that the mother will 
do everything in her power to hinder the marriage. She does indeed 
force Trilby to give up Little Billee. Paradoxically, Little Billee’s 
communication to his mother ensures that he retains the image of 
Trilby as an unattainable love object, thus enabling his growth as an 
artist.1
In this fantasy, Slavoj Žižek (1994: 95) explains, sublimation relies 
on elevating a flesh-and-blood woman to an inaccessible, impossible 
object resisting symbolisation. This is the position o f the cruel Lady 
familiar from courtly love. Little Billee’s action is in keeping with 
what Žižek (1994: 96) calls “the paradox o f the Lady”: while 
ostensibly the masochistic lover desires intercourse, he actually wants 
obstacles in his way towards fulfilment. These obstacles ensure that he 
is arrested in a state o f suspension and endless waiting. In the 
masochistic fantasy the cruel Lady functions as an object of desire that 
coincides with the force preventing its attainment (Žižek 1994: 96). 
While usually the symbolic father prohibits the son from pursuing the 
mother, now the mother assumes this function. Thus, instead of 
working through the oedipal prohibition, the masochistic lover 
resexualises it by positing woman as the seductive source of what du 
M aurier's narrator calls “the lordship o f woman over all” (du Maurier 
1998: 16). Associating the cruel Lady with the oedipal prohibition 
ensures that genital sexuality never takes place. Little Billee is a 
masochistic lover, for he turns the suspension o f genital sexuality into 
the pleasure o f being reborn as a true artist.
1 To reach the state o f suspension, the masochist strikes a deal with the love 
object. This deal may even take the form o f  a private, written contract as in 
Leopold von Sacher-M asoch’s works. George du M aurier’s variation is to make 
the artist’s mother strike this deal with Trilby: it is as if  the first cruel Lady 
abdicated from her throne in favour o f  a second one. The women together ensure 
that Little Billee’s love never reaches the genital stage. Although he suffers a 
breakdown, he nevertheless returns to England and begins to make him self a name 
as an artist.
Ways o f  keeping love alive 61
The significance that disavowal enjoys in the two types o f lover’s 
discourse under scrutiny here introduces differences between them. 
We just saw that the masochistic lover tries hard to make disavowal a 
permanent state o f affairs. To be sure, the Barthesian lover also prizes 
those moments when the oedipal prohibition and the law are 
suspended, making the incestuous maternal cuddle with its endless 
talk possible. But he also prizes those moments when this prohibition 
and the law are intact, for they enable the actual sexual relationship. In 
one crucial aspect, however, these two discourses converge: disavowal 
suspends reality. For the Barthesian lover this suspension is what 
hinders his discourse from being affected by narrative movement 
based on plotting and change. It has this effect, because it ensures that 
the lover’s discourse stays in a perpetual present. Without a past and a 
future a discourse cannot turn into a love story. The suspending role o f 
disavowal that safeguards the present thus explains why intercourse 
may threaten the Barthesian lover’s discourse. As we turn next to the 
larger social context in which love affairs take place, we gain insight 
into the threats that may crush this discourse and turn it into a familiar 
story o f (unhappy) love.
Show me whom to desire
Lovers never have full control: the loved one may die, she may leave, 
or love may simply evaporate. Love relationships frequently lead to 
disappointment, tears, grief, and breakup. Thus, no matter what a 
lover does, outside forces may turn his discourse into a conventional 
love story with a beginning, middle, and an end. Barthes identifies the 
imitative nature o f love as one factor causing breakups. He claims that 
no love is original: it always proceeds from other people, language, 
books, and so on. What this means is that “the loved being is desired 
because another or others have shown the subject that such a being is 
desirable” (Barthes 1978: 136). Every rival has first been a master or a 
guide, and this setup leads to difficulties. The lover says, “Just show 
me whom to desire, but then get out o f  the way!” (Barthes 1978: 137). 
The rival is, however, the one person with whom the lover can best 
talk about the loved object, because only the rival knows her unique 
merits. Trilby usefully illustrates this situation. When Trilby visits the 
artists’ studio for the first time, both Little Billee and Svengali are
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present. Each man immediately notices her uniqueness: the artist sees 
her feet, while the musician hears her voice. The two men serve as 
mirrors for one another, each imitating the desire the other shows, 
although they choose different parts o f Trilby’s body as fetishes.2
Triangulation and rivalry provide further instructive points for 
comparison between the lover’s discourse and the masochistic fantasy. 
Deleuze shows that the latter usually tests its strength through a 
triangular situation, because the presence o f a rival, also interested in 
the love object, adds to the masochist’s suspended, yet pleasurable 
pain.3 Svengali plays the part o f this third wheel in Trilby, and I look 
briefly at what happens when he gets hold o f her. Svengali represents 
yet another mode o f a lover’s discourse, namely, that of the demon 
lover bent on destroying the love object. Although Trilby is tone deaf, 
she has a magnificent voice and an unusually propitious physique for 
producing sounds. Svengali regards her as the voice he lacks. By 
mesmerising Trilby, Svengali is able to plant himself in her un­
conscious: “That Trilby was just a singing-machine [...] just the 
unconscious voice that Svengali sang with’’ (du Maurier 1998: 299).
Little Billee, Svengali, and Trilby are all depicted as internally divided 
figures. The artist’s two names convey his double nature: he is Little Billee, a 
private man. and also William B agot a publicly displayed artist. This distinction 
is central to Trilby, because the artist is bom through the private man’s 
participation in the masochistic fantasy. Svengali, in turn, is a German Jew, a 
mixture o f  high artistic ambitions and vulgarity. As for Trilby, she is of English- 
Scottish parentage, but has lived all her life in Paris. In light o f Deleuze's analysis, 
one may say that her French side represents the South, associated with nature, 
passion, and heat, while her English side represents the North, associated with 
morality, restraint, and coldness. Little Billee prizes her Northern side. For him, 
Trilby must "take place as a picture,” an event enabling him to put fantasy into 
pictures in the first place (see Stewart 1998: 77-78). This requirement reorganises 
Trilby’s characteristics so that restraint prevails, while hinting at the existence of 
passion and ensuring that it never bursts through. She must embody an arrested 
state o f  the perpetual postponement o f  pleasure. In contrast. Svengali cultivates 
Trilby’s Southern side: he dresses her up as a “Trilby o f  marble” (du Maurier 
1998: 299). a classical statue, but the music he makes her perform draws on a 
wide register o f  feelings. Passion thus bursts through the classical attire. The 
rivals’ contest over Trilby targets both the nature o f  the love object and its 
function as the springboard for art.
3 The rival plays a central role in the masochistic fantasy. Although this fantasy 
shoos awav the Father’s law, this law, o f  course, never disappears. The rival’s 
presence suggests the possibility that the absent father may return.
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Under his tutelage, Trilby metamorphoses into La Svengali, a singing 
sensation. La Svengali performs clad in a classical robe with her bare, 
sandaled foot —  the mark o f her phallic nature —  on a stool (du 
Maurier 1998: 209-210). Her triumph is vocalising Chopin’s Im­
promptu. This piece confirms her standing as the cruel Lady elevated 
to the Thing, that is, as the object that cannot be integrated into the 
symbolic order, but that nevertheless resides in the subject as desire. 
On hearing her sing, Little Billee experiences “his old cosmic vision 
of the beauty and sadness o f things, the very heart o f  them, and their 
pathetic evanescence,” in short, “a glimpse behind the veil” (du Mau­
rier 1998: 214).4 La Svengali’s music revives Little Billee’s ability to 
love by strengthening his subjection to her as his cruel Lady, but it 
also awakens his fierce jealousy o f Svengali. What is most torturous 
for Little Billee is the thought that Svengali has turned Trilby into a 
perfect cruel Lady —  a singing statue —  the foundation o f aesthetic 
creativity, while succeeding in having a sexual relationship with her. 
Svengali thus threatens to explode Little Billee’s masochistic fantasy, 
but Svengali’s sudden death postpones this event.
After the rival’s demise, Little Billee takes Trilby under his 
protection. The now insane Trilby wastes away, growing “more 
beautiful in their eyes, in spite o f her increasing pallor and emacia­
tion — her skin was so pure and white and delicate, and the bones o f 
her face so admirable!” (du Maurier 1998: 266). In a word, she has 
become a living statue. She is again Little Billee’s cruel Lady —  not 
Svengali’s.5 It also appears as if pictorial art triumphs over music. 
This happiest phase in Little Billee’s masochistic fantasy is shattered 
when Trilby receives an envelope containing Svengali’s picture. 
Gazing at the picture is enough to mesmerise her, making her sing the 
Impromptu as never before. After the song ends, Trilby dies calling
4 Stewart (1998: 102) observes that music seeks to transcend word and 
meaning, and, in its climactic moments, verges on the cry. Thus, it may represent 
the moment when the human voice encounters the Real, that is, the realm o f 
experience that cannot be symbolised.
Some critics such as Nina Auerbach (2000), Elaine Showalter (1995), and Mary 
Russo (1994) argue that as the novel’s most powerful character, Trilby refuses to be 
contained by her two admirers. This impression, however, is an illusion that tallies 
with the masochistic fantasy. Thanks to the association o f the cruel Lady with the 
Thing, Trilby must be larger than life. Yet the fact that Trilby has no real control 
over her fate —  even what seems to be her free choice o f leaving Little Billee has 
been manipulated by him —  shows how restricted her role actually is.
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out Svengali’s name. A doctor pronounces her dead, claiming that her 
death had actually taken place fifteen minutes before the performance. 
It thus seems that Svengali has managed to snatch her from beyond 
the veil.6 This event destroys Little B illee's fantasy, and he sees no 
way out for him self other than death. He soon dies, “as if  he were 
starting on some distant holy quest, like some gallant knight of old 
[ ...]  in another life” (du M aurier 1998: 288). The novel’s narrator 
suggests that this artist’s masochistic submission to a cruel Lady is so 
strong that the fantasy continues even in the afterlife.
Little B illee’s choice o f death ends his discourse as a lover; the 
novel recounts a full-fledged narrative with a beginning, middle, and 
an (unhappy) ending. Barthes points out that all possible solutions are 
internal to the amorous system. It is always the lover who goes away 
or dies; if  he sees him self as departed or dead, what he sees is always 
a lover. This, Barthes maintains, is the trap o f love: the lover is inside 
love's system without being able to substitute another system for it 
(Barthes 1978: 142-143). This trap introduces another important dif­
ference between a masochistic lover such as du Maurier’s Little Billee 
and the lover in Barthes' A Lover’s Discourse. The separating feature 
is this: the masochistic lover is not satisfied to let amorous madness 
cease o f its own accord. He always pushes it to a violent crisis, which 
typically ends the love relationship and leaves him as the odd one out. 
In contrast, in the ideal case at least, the Barthesian lover knows that 
he cannot put an end to love’s madness. What he can do, however, is 
to wait patiently for it to pass. The lover’s lot is to let love’s discourse 
run through him, raging at first, and then (perhaps) petering out of 
itself. This stance to love requires that the lover renounce his will to 
possess the other (Barthes 1978: 232-234). If, as was noted before, he 
has been within this discourse from birth onwards in the arms of his 
mother, then he can confidently submit himself to these fluctuating*7
tides o f love.
6 Svengali's artistic vision is not masochistic. He never submits to Trilby in the 
same fashion as Little Billee does. He remains in charge, turning Trilby into a 
mechanical puppet.
7 Mavor (2007: 159) observes that Barthes wavers between being a smothering 
and a distanced lover, but she argues that he actually never really wanted to be the 
latter.
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A lover’s discourse versus a love story
I would like to dwell further on Barthes’ suggestion that a lover’s dis­
course does not mix well with conventional love stories. On this point 
it is worth quoting him at some length:
The lover speaks in bundles o f sentences but does not integrate these 
sentences [...]  into a work; his is a horizontal discourse: no transcendence, no 
deliverance, no novel (though a great deal o f  the fictive). Every amorous 
episode can be, o f course, endowed with a meaning: [ ...]  it follows a path 
which is always possible to interpret according to a causality or finality [...]: 
this is the love stoiy, subjugated to the great narrative Other, to that general 
opinion which disparages any excessive force and wants the subject him self to 
reduce the great imaginary current, the orderless, endless stream which is 
passing through him, to a painful, morbid crisis o f which he must be cured, 
which he must get over. (Barthes 1978: 7)
The Barthesian lover is a vessel open to love’s discourse. Unlike the 
masochistic lover, he renounces the will-to-possess, which is a further 
differentiating feature between them. This characterisation o f the lover 
as an open vessel elucidates the non-narrative nature o f his discourse. 
This discourse washes over him —  or it courses through him —  which 
means that it resembles more a tide than a narrative. Even if  love ebbs, 
the wise lover knows that it will eventually flow again. Certainly, 
there is movement and thus change, but they are not narrative in kind. 
A lover’s discourse is cyclical and repetitious rather than syntag- 
matically linear. The narrative pattern o f a love story is stamped upon 
it afterwards, often under outside pressure, because the excessive, 
disorderly nature o f this discourse makes it distasteful to others.
In order to elucidate further the relationship between a lover’s 
discourse and love stories, it is helpful to view them in the light o f 
Barthes’s analysis o f Sarrasine in S/Z. As is to be expected, the her­
meneutic and proairetic codes (the codes o f enigmas or secrets and 
action sequences respectively) provide the backbone o f love stories, 
because together they organise the material into a plot. As we know, 
plots are processed in a linear fashion from a beginning to an end; 
they are thus non-reversible. In contrast, the semic code (thematic 
qualities associated with characters, places, and objects), the cultural 
code (various types o f knowledge and wisdom), and the symbolic 
code in particular resist —  or rather may be made to resist —
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recuperation into linear, non-reversible clusters o f meaning. Barthes 
treats the various figures o f  the lover’s discourse in a similar tabular, 
non-linear fashion as he deals with the narrative material he processes 
in terms o f these three reversible codes. Consequently, he ensures the 
multivalent nature o f these figures, fitting them to his notion o f love as 
the realm o f dreams and (pre-oedipal) fantasies. We may then 
conclude that discoursing as a Barthesian lover relies on the kind of 
construction that he illustrates in S/Z, one that disregards cohesion and 
unity, but keeps afloat multiple flickers o f meaning (see Barthes 1974: 
19-20, 151, 187-188,214-217). Another way o f putting this idea is to 
say that a Barthesian lover takes a writerly attitude to love.
Trilby is an instructive example in demonstrating how an author 
may contain the amorous excesses o f his characters. The novel in­
cludes fragments o f a lover's discourse, but they are controlled by 
being ordered as a love story. The novel accomplishes this control by 
separating the lovers from the narrator. In narratological terms, the 
narrator is extra- and homodiegetic; that is, he is part of the narrated 
world, but he does not participate in any o f the events he recounts. He 
is an artist-writer, who has lived in Paris, frequenting the same circles 
as Little Billee. His position is that o f a well-informed bystander. The 
random allusions to the narrator’s biography suggest that he is a 
fictionalised version o f George du Maurier himself, who is, as it were, 
doubly present in the novel through the roles o f narrator and illust­
rator. The book includes numerous drawings o f its main characters 
and key scenes by du Maurier. The feature uniting both narration and 
the illustrations is ironic distance. The narrator-illustrator’s status as a 
bystander enables his wryly bemused comments about characters and 
events. From the fringes he looks into the teeming life o f Bohemia. 
Mary Russo (1994: 130) remarks that by the late nineteenth century, 
Bohemia was a self-chosen subculture, a social and imaginative space 
where a young man could be an artist and live dangerously for a 
while. The narrator's distance from the world that is depicted is en­
hanced by his current status as someone w'ho has settled for a 
bourgeois lifestyle, in a fashion similar to Little Billee’s friend, the 
artist Taffy , at the novel’s end. This social status is the best proof, of 
course, that neither Taffy nor the narrator was gifted enough to 
become a true artist —  or a great lover.
Russo (1994: 140-141) draws attention to the grotesque discre­
pancy between the narrator’s rapturous descriptions o f Trilby’s
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fetishistic foot, Little Billee’s sketch o f it, and du M aurier’s two 
illustrations o f this foot. The first illustration displays Little Billee 
sketching the foot without showing the result, while the second one 
depicts the sketch and Little Billee with his artist friends admiring it. 
In this latter illustration, the scrawny sketch is actually a grotesque 
caricature, neither a representation o f the classic perfection o f Nature 
nor a testimony to Little Billee’s artistic gifts. What Russo does not 
consider, however, is that the illustration is not Little Billee’s original 
sketch, but the narrator-illustrator’s rendition o f it. Readers access 
everything through him; consequently, neither Little Billee’s art nor 
Svengali’s music is directly available. The grotesque gap between his 
actual illustrations and the lofty things he says about art serve, I think, 
as George du Maurier’s self-reflexive comment on his own artistry.8 
This grotesque discrepancy is one o f the ways in which the pseudo- 
biographical narrator signals his recognition o f his own artistic limits. 
He can write a best-seller and earn a good living as a caricaturist, yet 
he knows he will never reach the highest spheres o f art. This aware­
ness shapes his perspective: he remains an outsider both to the lover’s 
discourse, the masochistic fantasy, and high artistic achievement. 
Although his narration is insulated against these discourses, they 
nevertheless reach readers through the fates o f  the male protagonists.
Throughout my essay I have deliberately treated the lover as a 
masculine subject. Given Barthes’s goal o f dramatising the structural 
site of a lover’s discourse, his demonstration would ideally fit all 
lovers regardless o f gender or sexual orientation. Yet Barthes’s 
examples include only male lovers. Moreover, the figures that his 
lover’s discourse shares with the masochistic fantasy further identify 
the lover as male. Mavor (2007: ch. 4) argues that the Barthesian 
lover’s discourse is grounded in the special and limited case o f 
Barthes’s own life-long love for his mother, Henriette. Mavor (2007: 
135) suggests that after Henriette’s death, Barthes lost his will to live. 
In this reading then, Barthes’s fate mirrors the destiny o f the 
Barthesian lover —  caught in the trap o f love, the lover has only 
death as a way out. Barthes’s biography may suggest as much, but 
Mavor’s more significant observation concerns the Barthesian lover as 
“an eternal boy-child” (Mavor 2007: 143). Significantly, du Maurier
* George du Maurier first recounted T rilby’s  plot to Henry James, asking the 
renowned author to turn it into a novel. James declined the offer, suggesting that 
du Maurier take up the task him self (Showalter 1995: x-xi).
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shares this characterisation o f the lover by depicting Little Billee as a 
boy. Not only is Little Billee slender and slightly built, but also he is 
childlike and innocent. His boyishness emerges against the mascu­
linity emphasised in his artist friends (Showalter 1995: xv).9 Thus, in 
Trilby too the male lover is markedly a boy. And to borrow Mavor’s 
phrasing, the love o f such boys “is ultimately an exaggerated, if 
obsessive, tug on the skirt o f M aman” (Mavor 2007: 159).
The title o f Barthes’s probing o f a lover’s discourse, whether in 
French or in English, stresses the indefinite article ( ‘d ’un’ and ‘a’ 
respectively). It also emphasises the fragmentary character of this 
discourse. These are valuable clues to the nature o f his undertaking, 
showing that the discourse he dramatises is not the one all lovers 
everywhere speak and write. It may be difficult, for example, for 
female lovers to identify fully with some of the figures Barthes 
discusses. Indeed, a closer look at Barthes’s illustration of the 
workings o f this discourse demonstrates its sexualised and gender- 
biased moorings. Moreover, reading A Lover’s Discourse and Trilby 
side-by-side suggests that the Barthesian lover’s discourse harkens 
back to nineteenth-century views about love, art, sublimation, and 
masculine lovers. It is this legacy that reverberates in the perceived 
hostility between love’s discourse and love stories. A close reading of 
Barthes’s book thus suggests the inevitable ties that any scrutiny of 
amorous discourse has with its historical contexts. It is truly frag­
mentary, as it carries echoes from many different sources. A Lover's 
Discourse opens up new avenues for future research: on the one hand, 
it encourages us to examine the links among gender, sexuality, and the 
particular ways in which lovers talk, write, and read; on the other 
hand, it promotes the study o f the various discursive and narrative 
strategies with whose help we not only deal with the fascinating 
subject o f love but also express it.
9 The narrator also mentions that Little Billee was “was especially in thrall to 
the contralto —  the deep low voice that breaks and changes in the middle and 
soars all at once into a magnified angelic boy treble. It pierced through his ears to 
his heart, and stirred his veiy vitals" (du M aurier 1998: 43; italics added). The 
contralto merges a woman with a boy, and La Svengali is, o f  course, a contralto 
(du M aurier 1998: 209-210).
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Как сохранять любовь:
Ролан Барт, Джордж дю Морье и Ж иль Делез
В настоящей статье автор проводит сравнительный анализ «Дис­
курса влюбленных» (1977) Барта и «Трилби» (1894) дю Морье, 
высвечивая похожесть в их мазохистско-мужских фантазиях, как это 
явление теоретически описал Делез в своей книге «Холод и жесто­
кость» (1989). Автор статьи исходит из убеждения Барта, что любовь 
и искусство связаны между собой. «Трилби» говорит о любви и
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эстетике в контексте искусства, музыки и нарратива. Речи соперни­
чающих влюбленных, обращенные к одной женщине в «Трилби», 
являются основой сравнения с драматизацией речи влюбленного у 
Барта. По мнению автора статьи многие центральные фигуры речи 
влюбленного у Барта присущи и мазохистскому влюбленному Де- 
леза. Рассматривая предположение Барта, что между ненарративным 
дискурсом любви и конвенциональными историями любви имеется 
определенное напряжение, и сосредотачиваясь на тех образах в речи 
влюбленного, которые по мнению Барта препятствуют ее становле­
нию историей любви, автор утверждает, что некоторые из этих обра­
зов характерны для мазохистской фантазии. Более всего вос­
препятствует превращению дискурса влюбленного в конвенцио­
нальный любовный нарратив формула отрицания.
Kuidas armastust elus hoida:
Roland Barthes, George du Maurier ja Gilles Deleuze
Käesolev artikkel analüüsib võrdlevalt Barthes’i Armunu kõne (1977) ja 
du Maurier’i Trilby’t (1894), paljastamaks sarnasusi nende mehelik- 
masohhistlikes fantaasiates, nagu seda nähtust on teoreetiliselt kirjeldanud 
Deleuze oma Külmuses ja  Julmuses (1989). Artikli autori lähenemine 
lähtub Barthes’i veendumusest, et armastus ja kunst on seotud. Trilby 
räägib armastusest ja  esteetikast kunsti, muusika ning narratiivi konteks­
tis. Rivaalitsevate armastajate kõned ühele ja samale naisele Trilby's ongi 
aluseks, millega võrdlen armastaja kõne dramatiseerimist Barthes’il. 
Väidan, et mitmed Barthes’i armastaja kesksed kõnefiguurid on omased 
ka Deleuze’i masohhistlikule armastajale. Vaatlen Barthes’i oletust, et 
mittenarratiivse armastuskõne ja konventsionaalsete armastuslugude 
metakeele vahel on teatud pinge ning keskendun neile kujunditele armunu 
kõnes, mis Barthes’i arvates takistavad sel muutumast armastuslooks. 
Väidan, et nii mõnedki neist kõnekujunditest on tunnuslikud masohhistli­
kule fantaasiale. Paremini kui miski muu, kaitseb armunu kõnet kon­
ventsionaalseks armastuse narratiiviks muutumise eest salgamise valem.
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Abstract. Roland Barthes’s work has confronted contemporary culture with 
the question o f what happens when an object turns into language. This 
question allowed Barthes to “construct” well known cultural objects —  from 
novels to music, from images to classical rhetoric, from love to theatre —  in 
an unthought way, and to create new, even more unknown ones —  from 
contemporary myth to fashion, from Japan to food culture. In this paper, 
Barthes’s cultural criticism is considered alongside with the issues raised by 
Cultural Studies. More specifically, Barthes’s constant reflection on the myth 
undoubtedly entitles us to connect his cultural criticism to the work that, in 
those same years, was being produced by the English forge o f  Cultural 
Studies, namely the so-called “ Birmingham school” . Even today, Barthes’s 
work makes it possible for semiotics to be, to use his expressions, both “the 
science o f every imagined universe”, and a mathesis singularis, rather than 
universalis, that is to say a systematic way to approach the singularity o f the 
objects o f knowledge. On the basis o f this “transcendental reduction”, we can 
therefore wish for a “ second birth” and a transvaluation o f linguistics and o f 
semiotics, both to be applied through varied and disseminated forms o f 
intellectual activism.
What happens when a garment, a dish or a car turns into language? 
When a photo strikes us with a meaning that we perceive in a 
neglected, secondary and even obtuse “com er”? When a sport event or 
the face o f a star give rise to an epic narration? When a distant land 
and language are conveyed through writing? When a love discourse 
unravels through fragments?
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These are but a few questions with which Roland Barthes 
confronted the entire contemporary culture and to which he already 
provided an answer, in his texts, just by making their formulation 
possible. Such questions constructed well known cultural objects — 
from novels to music, from images to classical rhetoric, from love to 
theatre —  in an unknown way, and at the same time he created new, 
even more unknown, cultural objects —  from contemporary myth to 
fashion, from Japan to food culture. Barthes established a style in both 
humanities and social sciences. When, in his writings o f the 1950s and 
1960s, he elaborated some applications o f the theories o f European 
linguistic structuralism —  by Ferdinand de Saussure and Louis 
Hjelmslev in the first place —  he did it in a systematic, rigorous and 
almost maniacal w ay. But the field o f “practical” application he chose 
was the seemingly futile systems such as the Fashion “described” in 
specialized magazines, through which he was able to show the 
exemplary workings o f social signify ing systems. Those same systems 
that he had well portrayed in his work Mythologies (Barthes 1974b 
[1957]), whose 50th anniversary falls this year and which treated, as 
he said, collective representations o f mass culture as sign-systems.
Therefore a simple sign, such as the cover photo of a magazine of 
the 1950s {Paris Match), portraying a black soldier saluting the 
French flag, becomes a “form” capable of displaying an idea, or even 
an ideology: namely that o f France, just before the Algerian revolu­
tion. with all the rhetoric o f her colonial grandeur, claiming to keep 
together different people without any colour discrimination (Barthes 
1974b: 198). The myth is thus deconstructed and unveiled, but it is 
also grasped in its ability to fascinate: Barthes manages to turn the 
Tour de France, the face o f Greta Garbo, the strip-tease, the Citroen 
DS and even plastic, into sublime containers o f the effect produced by 
any m \th , which occurs at the crossroad between believing, making 
believe and wanting to believe. What a lot o f material the contem­
porary world would offer him for his mythologies! How vast was his 
ability to look at the future anterior!
But what fabric are myths made of?
It is not simply the same stuff that dreams are made of, to 
paraphrase Shakespeare and Sam Spade. Myth, says Barthes, is a 
“second-order semiological system” (Barthes 1974b: 196). It is pro­
duced by its “semioclastic” dismantling and, at the same time, by 
presenting itself through traces, fragments, singular and obtuse
interstices that allow it to resonate. Myth, if  recognized as such, 
establishes the ideological critique o f the language o f the so called 
mass culture, meant as “stolen language”, as mystifying transfor­
mation o f the cultural into the natural, o f petty-bourgeois culture into 
universal nature. But, at the same time, myth is also “speech”, that is 
to say a form, a signifying system subject to the laws o f a discourse. A 
myth is not an object, but an object converted into language.
According to Barthes semiology is a science o f forms, unlike those 
human sciences that can be defined as sciences o f values —  such as 
psychoanalysis, psychology or some types o f  literary criticism. That is 
to say, it does not look “behind” facts, but rather looks at their 
structures. There are, says Barthes, some “forms o f life”, some “forms 
of ideas”, that are defined as such precisely by virtue o f the values that 
they contain. “Mythology” studies precisely these “ideas-in-form” 
(Barthes 1974b: 199-200). Since Barthes first wrote about it, this 
science has been greatly needed, as the powerful development o f mass 
communication and the presence o f infinite old and new commu­
nication rites confirm that it is hard to find places or fields deprived o f 
social meaning. Barthes’s original and foundational idea o f not 
considering the myth in the classical, “archaic” or “traditional” 
context alone, and certainly also the idea o f opposing the mythologies 
to Levi-Strauss’ mythologiques, gave semiotics the possibility to 
establish itself as a social science, as critical sociosemiotics that can 
face the complexity o f the present. Barthes quotes the example o f 
himself before the sea, in itself a “simply” natural element. But as 
soon as we think o f the sea as “beach”, the mythical material —  or 
sociosemiotic material, we might say —  appears through various types 
of signs, such as flags, slogans, signals, sign-boards, clothes, even 
suntan (Barthes 1974b: 194n.).
Giving account o f the myth, Barthes cannot feel “estranged” from 
it, as his own position is shrouded in the intellectual fascination that 
the myth exerts. Sociosemiotic analysis, according to Barthes, can 
deconstruct it, but cannot demythify it, because the myth itself is an 
operational concept, it is the very condition o f the possibility o f social 
imagery. He made it explicit ten years after the Mythologies, in the 
Fashion System (1970 [1967]), when he analysed “described” fashion 
in specialized magazines as a realized myth, a structure o f meaning 
organized through the functioning o f a social discourse. In this 
analysis, he evoked the possibility for linguistics to address the
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“countless objects that inhabit and comprise the image-system of our 
time” (Barthes 1970: xvi) and become “by a second birth, the science 
o f every imagined universe" (Barthes 1970: xvi).
However, as he has warned us in his Elements o f Semiology, such 
reborn linguistics is not “quite that o f  the linguist” (Barthes 1974a: 
14). It is a kind o f linguistics that elaborates a “poetic project”, as he 
later retrospectively defined it in The Fashion System, consisting in 
creating an intellectual object out o f nothing, or very little, in 
fabricating under the reader’s eyes, little by little, an intellectual object 
emerging progressively in its complexity, in its overall relations. This 
multiplication o f universes allows a possibility o f a sort o f transcen­
dental reduction in a phenomenological sense, which Barthes re­
cognized many years after the Mythologies and The Fashion System, 
in his book on photography, Camera Lucida (1980). Why —  he asked 
him self in this text —  m ightn’t there be a new science for every 
object? A mathesis singularis and no longer universalis? A systematic 
approach to the singularity o f the objects o f knowledge, allowing a 
full involvement o f the inquiring “gaze”, and always taking into 
account, or looking for, the risk o f being wounded, involved, touched?
The myth always requires to be heard. Hearing means grasping its 
nuances, resonating together, exceeding the approximate and stereo­
typed knowledge o f endoxa, through knowledge, a savoir which is 
also saveur, “flavour” . If endoxa is the “mythical” in communication, 
the “flavour o f the myth” is to be found beyond communication. The 
myth is not simplistically the “bad thing” that has to be eliminated, the 
distorted material o f ideology. On the contrary, myth, inasmuch as it is 
connected to its own discursivization, as well as to imagination, to 
fantasy, which makes its systematic quality possible, exerts a peculiar, 
we might even say obtuse fascination on the inquirer. In this sense, 
mythological analysis, while producing the objects and the models for 
cultural criticism, resists every possible institutionalization, even the 
one that places the “critic” in a defined social or academic role. In 
Barthes there has always been a tension to overcome his own position 
as “analyst” who tries not to become neither the scholar of social 
sciences, uninvolved in his “object”, nor the self-referential critic who 
becomes his own parody. In The Fashion System he made it clear by 
stating that “the semiologist is a man who expresses his own future 
death in the very terms in which he has named and understood the 
world” (Barthes 1970: 296).
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Barthes’s constant reflection on the myth undoubtedly entitles us 
to connect his cultural criticism to the work that in those same years 
was being produced by the English forge o f cultural studies, more 
precisely the so-called “Birmingham school” . Stuart Hall (2006a 
[1981]) wrote that cultural studies drew inspiration from two theore­
tical paradigms. On one side there is “culturalism” as such (with 
authors like Williams, Hoggart and Thompson) that was inspired by 
Marxism and focused on the description o f culture as an activity 
woven into all social practices and forms o f life. The second paradigm 
is that of “structuralist” inspiration (via Goldmann, Althusser, Levi- 
Strauss) which paid attention to the internal relations o f  the practices 
that produce social meanings (Hall 2006a: 85). In regard to his back­
ground, Barthes should be placed in the second paradigm; but his 
position is clearly more complex and reaches beyond the limits o f 
structuralism tout-court (this is why the label o f “post-structuralism” 
was used also for Barthes, a label renowned in the North-American 
context, but less “fortunate” elsewhere, such as in Italy). Therefore the 
link between Barthes’s cultural criticism and Cultural Studies goes 
beyond these same paradigms and can be found rather between the 
lines and in the margins than in rigid readings both o f Barthes and o f 
Cultural Studies.
As Hall writes, cultural studies see culture as the “actual, grounded 
terrain of practices, representations, languages and customs o f any 
specific historical society” (Hall 2006b: 224). “Culture” in this case 
assumes the Gramscian meaning o f “popular culture”, whose 
“diffused and dispersed” features make up common sense. Gramsci, 
whom Cultural Studies explicitly refer to, wrote that common sense is 
to be mostly found in folklore (understood precisely as popular cultu­
re, Gramsci 1929-1935: 90), journalism, literature, especially popular 
literature and proverbs1. These are areas o f semiotic production par 
excellence because they are made o f language, images, customs, 
figurations and narrations o f “facts”; they are areas where myths are 
born, grow and reproduce. Myths are ambivalent, as Barthes teaches 
us. And common sense is ambivalent as well: it is “ambiguous, 
contradictory and multiform”, according to Gramsci (1929-1935: 
1399). Sometimes it can be interpreted not only as conformist, stereo­
typed and repetitive but also, on the contrary, as “good sense”, that is,
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Barthes (1974b: 233) also writes: “Myths tend towards proverbs” ,
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the ability to identify the “exact cause, simple and to hand”, accom­
panied to “a certain measure o f experimentalism”, and the ability to 
observe reality directly (Gramsci 1929-1935: 1334-1335). Therefore, 
in an ambivalent way, common sense codifies dominant values, but at 
the same time it is also able to express new ones.
Barthes’s notion o f myth introduces a complex, semiotic vision of 
what we call “ideology” . Even for Gramsci ideology was not simply 
the static structure o f a dominant thought, but also the strength capable 
o f creating the “terrain on which men [sic] move, acquire conscious­
ness o f their position, struggle, etc.” (Gramsci 1929-1935: 869). The 
semiotician and philosopher Ferruccio Rossi-Landi owes much to this 
Gramscian sense o f ideology. He distinguished between ideology con­
ceived as mere “false thought” and ideology as “social planning”, 
meant as a sign structure, both verbal and non-verbal (Rossi-Landi 
2005 [1978]). According to Rossi-Landi, we must differentiate 
between “programs o f communication”, based on conservative ideolo­
gies o f human alienation, and “social plannings” as the carriers of 
developing and transforming ideologies. The former mask their own 
discourses as non-ideological, thus giving rise to myths that claim to 
present some historically determined contents as extra-historical 
(Rossi-Landi 2005: 349), that is to say as natural and universal. The 
latter are permeated with the criticism of the already-given and are 
oriented towards open endings. Barthes’ myths are located between 
these two meanings —  a conservative and an innovative one — of 
ideology. And the persistent oscillation between the two also shows 
the instability o f the boundaries between “popular culture”, with its 
heroic epic o f the myth, and “mass culture”, the product of the 
“bourgeois as an anonymous society” (Barthes 1974b: 218).
Barthes’s “semioclasm”, just like cultural studies, has revolutio­
nized the study o f culture, by removing any biased hierarchy between 
“high” and “low”, and including in the concept o f “culture” even what 
English cultural studies at a certain point called “subcultures” (Heb- 
dige 1983 [1979]). In this sense an article by Barthes on hippies, 
written in 1969 and published in Communications, seems extremely 
relevant. In A Case o f Cultural Criticism (2006 [1969]) Barthes 
observes hippies in a peripheral context, rather than in “capital cities” 
like San Francisco or New York. From the standpoint o f a provincial 
European city where hippies o f various origins gather, Barthes 
describes them as contradictory figures. This contradiction is detected
through elements that may be defined as stylistic, that is to say aiming 
at grasping the “difference”, the “gap” between the hippie life style 
and the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois world. Barthes identifies seve­
ral oppositions: collective eating opposed to individual meals; 
roaming opposed to fixed abode; poor cleanliness in opposition to the 
American myth o f hygiene; the confusion o f the characterizing 
features of gender (hair, clothes and jewels) in opposition to the 
“natural” demarcation o f the two sexes (Barthes 2006: 125). More­
over, Barthes considers the hippie clothing as the specific marked sign 
of a group, expressed in two forms, sometimes even co-present: on 
one hand, there is an unbridled imagination (flowers everywhere, 
brocades, tapestry cloaks); on the other, the “indiscreet borrowing o f 
local costumes” (<djellabas, Hindu tunics dresses, veils) as Barthes 
calls it (Barthes 2006: 125). The clothed body is therefore recognised 
as a distinguishing feature o f hippy culture, one that can be considered 
as the symbol o f a life style, as we would call it today, that is to say 
those tastes, common sense, ideology and values shared within a 
social group that are aestheticized and are therefore mainly expressed 
through visual semiotics. From the inside (in a Lotmanian sense) o f 
hippie culture, these signs are not at all perceived as “fashion”. In fact, 
hippies explicitly rejected the institution o f fashion as a bourgeois 
system. But from the outside o f hippie semiosphere (always in a 
Lotmanian sense), it is evident that it was a form o f fashion, meant in 
a wider sense as the manifestation o f a complexity o f tensions, 
meanings and values that are not only confined to the vestimentary 
dimension (Calefato 2007: 13).
Barthes sees a reactive force in hippies —  in a Nietzschean sense 
(Barthes 2006: 126). “ If only hippies put a little more intelligence in 
their adventure and research”, wrote Barthes, they “could be one o f 
the prefigurations o f the Übermensch {Overman), the one that 
Nietzsche ascribed to the last o f the nihilists” (Barthes 2006: 126). 
Nietzsche’s “active nihilism” allows the possibility o f a transvaluation 
of all values, up to the point o f making their positive “recovery” 
impossible. Barthes rightly detected this potentiality o f transvaluation 
in the hippie movement (a potentiality that, in the following decade 
was to be expressed in Europe by punk culture, though in a totally 
different form), and he also recognized some historical reincarnations 
of nihilism, such as Christ and Buddha, in hippie symbols. However, 
the limit ol what might be called “imperfect nihilism” was precisely
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its cultural relativism. If, says Barthes, in the United States the hippie 
was really a reactive figure, in that his cultural protest clashed with the 
“good consciousness” o f the rich, elsewhere the distinguishing 
features o f  the hippie movement (poorness, frugal meals, common 
houses, rag clothes) were not “forces that helped fighting against the 
plethora o f  goods, but material forces that had to be fought” (Barthes 
2006: 127). Besides, we have to consider that one o f the essential 
myths o f this movement, namely the East, was nothing but the product 
o f the Orientalist vision (Said 1978) typical o f imperialism. Such 
values as pacifism, Buddhism, the aspiration to the “trip”, meant both 
as “hallucination” and as a real trip to the East, risked losing the 
authenticity through which they were shared and perceived within 
hippie culture, thus becoming petty-bourgeois values themselves.
In this way Barthes points out the distance between cultural and 
political criticism, but at the same time he criticizes the limits inherent 
in both o f them. The first one runs the risk o f following practices of 
cultural narcissism, assuming symbols that are no longer “reactive”, in 
the Nietzschean sense, that are no longer a “game” (“highest form of 
symbolic activity”), but counterfeiting (Barthes 2006: 127). The 
second is not able to detach itself from intellectualism. “The militant 
keeps living as petty-bourgeois, the hippie as reversed bourgeois” 
(Barthes 2006: 128). Let’s remember that it was the year 1969. The 
atmosphere o f May 1968 was still alive, especially in France, and as 
Barthes wrote in the article Mythology Today, published in Esprit in 
1971, any student was then able to demystify and to demythify the 
forms o f life, thought and consumption peculiar to mass society. But 
demythification had become, on its turn, a sort o f catechesis and a 
figure o f discourse (Barthes 1988 [1984]: 66).
We know well that in the history o f the growing cultures 
(subcultures) o f the second half o f the 20th century, especially after 
punk, everything has been absorbed and re-contextualized within the 
reproductive logics o f fashion and leisure wear industry. In the 1990s, 
for instance, precisely the punk was “sublimated” by Gianni Versace 
in a famous collection in which an evening black dress covered with 
safety pins —  albeit studded with diamonds —  stood out. And today 
we are witnessing a hippie revival, mainstream and “heroic”, 
expressed through the 1960s vintage fashion, in different fields: 
clothes, interior design, cinema, advertising, design, graphics, music,
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and so on. In the postmodern context, therefore, the ever-present risk 
is that “cultural criticism” may become itself a myth.
But society is still filled with a growing amount o f languages 
woven with habits, repetitions, stereotypes, set patterns, and key­
words. Their alienation still requires demythification, which already 
back in 1970, Barthes sought to achieve by including the myth into a 
general theory o f language that should be applied wherever stories are 
told — that is to say wherever discoursivity is found: from interior 
language to conversation, from newspaper articles to political ser­
mons, from novels to advertising (Barthes 1988: 65-68). Barthes 
called this semiotic practice “idiolectology” and its main keywords are 
“citation, reference, stereotype” (Barthes 1988: 67). The other possible 
names for this practice used by Barthes include “second birth” o f 
linguistics described in The Fashion System (Barthes 1970), or the 
mathesis singularis in Camera Lucida (Barthes 1980).
About 15 years after the Mythologies, Barthes realized that the 
science of mythology was now part o f common sense: it had become 
endoxa, that is to say an approximate knowledge, with its own 
mythological features. Today, on the contrary, it is no longer true that 
demythification is a form o f diffused knowledge, a common sense: 
actually, today more than ever, the myth exerts its primary function, 
that is to say to naturalize the social, the cultural, the ideological and 
history, through an endoxa that, though no longer transmitted through 
firmly established great narratives, keeps reproducing as stereotyped 
and trivializing knowledge. Now more than ever, there is the need for 
a sociosemiotics that would draw inspiration both from Barthes’s 
theoretical indications and from the cultural criticism that he fostered, 
together with cultural studies. It could introduce a method that would 
not perform the demythification through a nai've “unmasking” or 
Tightening” o f contemporary mythical discourse, but through the 
generation of paths “crossing” the semiotic matter, paths that would 
explicit the social discourses that produce its values and where new 
objects of research could be produced. As it was for myths and 
fashion, “a second birth” o f linguistics and o f semiotics is therefore to 
be hoped for: more generally, a transvaluation o f humanities realized 
through multiple and disseminated forms o f intellectual activism. This
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could be Barthes’s legacy to our times, his contribution to the rebirth 
o f a new cultural criticism today.2
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О мифах и о моде: Барт и культурология
Ролан Барт задал современной культуре вызывающий вопрос: что слу­
чится, если объект становится языком? Этот вопрос позволил Барту 
«конструировать» невиданным образом известные объекты культуры 
(от романов до музыки, визуальных образов, классической риторики, 
любви и театра), а также создавать новые, неизвестные объекты.
Данная статья рассматривает бартовскую критику культуры в 
связи с проблемами, возникшими в области культурологии. Постоян­
ные размышления Барта на тему мифа несомненно позволяют 
связать его критику культуры с идеями современной ему английской 
культурологии, точнее, с бирмингемской школой. И в наше время 
именно бартовское творчество позволяет семиотике быть, если поль­
зоваться словами Барта, «наукой всех возможных миров» и mathesis 
singularis (не universalis), то есть быть систематическим модусом для 
рассматривания особенностей объектов знания. На базе этой 
«трансцендентальной редукции» мы можем надеяться на «возрож­
дение» и переоценку лингвистики и семиотики благодаря их приме­
нению в разных формах интеллектуальной деятельности.
Müütidest ja moest: Barthes ja kultuuri-uuringud
Roland Barthes on esitanud kaasaegsele kultuurile väljakutsuva küsimuse: 
mis juhtub siis, kui objektist saab keel? See küsimus võimaldas Barthes’il 
“konstrueerida” seniolematul viisil tuntud kultuuriobjekte (romaanidest 
muusika, visuaalsete kujutiste ja klassikalise retoorika, armastuse ning 
teatrini välja) ning luua ka uusi, senitundmata objekte kaasaegsetest 
müütidest moe, Jaapani ja söögikultuurini välja.
Käesolev artikkel käsitleb Barthes’i kultuurikriitikat seoses kultuuri­
uuringute valdkonnas esilekerkinud probleemidega. Barthes’i pidevad 
mõtisklused müüdi teemadel lubavad tema kultuurikriitikat kahtlemata 
seostada oma kaasaegse Inglismaa kultuuri-uuringute, täpsemini selle 
Birminghami koolkonna, ideedega. Ka tänapäeval on just Barthes’i 
looming see, mis võimaldab semiootikal olla “kõigi võimalike universu­
mite teadus” — kui kasutada Barthes’i enda sõnu — ja mathesis singu­
laris (mitte universalis), see tähendab, olla süstemaatiline moodus 
teadmise objektide erilisuse käsitlemiseks. Nimetatud “transtsendentaalne 
reduktsioon” annab lootust lingvistika ja  semiootika “uuestisünniks” ning 
ümberhindamiseks tänu nende rakendamisele mitmesugustes intellek­
tuaalse tegevuse vormides.
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Abstract. Roland Barthes was suspicious about the ability o f music and voice 
to signify, as revealed in many o f his writings. However, his somewhat 
limited views on music and voice need not to restrain from profiting his 
semiotic theorising and his reasoning, which can be adapted for musical 
instances in ways not envisaged by Barthes. The Neutral (Le Neutre) is a 
recurrent topic in Barthes’s oeuvre from his first book, Writing Zero Degree 
(1953) up to his 1978 lecture series on The Neutral in College de France 
(published in 2002). This paper explores how Barthes’s Neutral may enhance 
a special kind o f listening. The enigmatic sonorities emitted by the Invisible 
Choir in Richard W agner’s Parsifal (1882) serve as the foil in this task, more 
precisely a phrase voiced by female altos and male tenors (“Nehmet hin 
meinen Leib [...]”, Act I). It is not its semantic content mediated by (written) 
language that is o f interest here but how this phrase has been voiced, and 
furthermore, how Barthes’s Neutral may be heard in and beneath it. Several 
commercially available live recordings made in Bayreuth have offered 
playground for listening to and for The Neutral. As my analysis shows, the 
audible Neutral is not a separate entity but works in conjunction with other 
modes of signification: visual, textual, biographical, spatial.
Roland Barthes is an interesting semiotician for a musicologist, 
because voice and music were his passions, and he wrote about them 
on several occasions. However, they remained for him much too 
enigmatic for the needs but also for a competence o f a music 
specialist. In his research, voice and music are in a continuous danger 
of being swallowed by an all-embracing jouissance, which undoes the 
culturally determined codes and liberates them from the burden o f 
signification (cf. also Välimäki 2005; Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 2007). In
this article I want to carry this burden a little further and argue for the 
possibilities o f audible voices to signify, not something in general but 
something specific: Barthes’s Le Neutre (2002; 2005). The enigmatic 
sonorities emitted by the Invisible Choir in Richard Wagner’s Parsifal 
(1882) serve as the foil in this task. A single phrase is sufficient for 
the needs o f this article. It is not its semantic content mediated by 
(written) language that is o f  interest here but how this phrase has been 
voiced, and furthermore, how The Neutral1 may be heard in and 
beneath it. Several commercially available live recordings made in 
Bayreuth (listed in the bibliography) have offered playground for 
listening to and for The Neutral.
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1. Tracing the Barthes’s Neutral
The Neutral has a curious history within Barthes’s own oeuvre. It 
surfaces in his literary production every now and then since his first 
book, Le degre zero de Vecriture (1953) where Barthes sets the neutral 
writing against the petit-bourgeois realistic tradition (Barthes 1984: 56- 
63). Neutral writing does not pretend to express or represent anything. 
Instead, neutral writing tends to free itself from social and historical 
contexts. In the chapter Writing and Silence there are manifesto-like 
formulations that idealize the neutral as a literary practice:
This transparent form o f  speech, initiated by Camus’s Outsider, achieves a 
style o f  absence which is almost an ideal absence o f style; writing is then 
reduced to a sort o f  negative mood in which the social or mythical characters 
o f  a language are abolished in favour o f neutral and inert state of form; thus 
thought remains wholly responsible, without being overlaid by a secondary 
commitment o f  form to a History not its own. (Barthes 1984: 64)
The Neutral has an entry in Barthes’s autobiography (Barthes 1994: 
132-133; 1995: 119). In its first sentence Barthes states that the 
Neutral is “[...] a back-and-forth, an amoral oscillation [...].” He also 
gives a short list for the Figures o f the Neutral, which includes white 
writing, exempt from any literary theatre, the principle o f delicacy, the 
empty, the vacancy o f the ‘person’ and jouissance. In the end of this
1 Le Neutre has been translated as The Neutral (cf. Krauss, Hollier 2005: xiv- 
xv).
entry Barthes asserts that the Neutral is not the third term —  zero 
degree — but the second term in a new paradigm where the primary 
term is violence (for instance combat, victory, arrogance). Many o f 
these figures and designations formulated by Barthes in the mid-1970s 
are later (Barthes 2005) elaborated at length. In fact, Barthes (2005: 
174) mentions that his course on The Neutral is a remake o f his 
Writing Zero Degree.
Beside these two examples mentioned above, The Neutral shows 
itself in many other instances in the Barthes’s ouvre (for instance in 
1977 and 1990). But the parading o f The Neutral takes place only late in 
Barthes’s literary career, in his lecture series on The Neutral, held in 
College de France during the spring term of 1978." In his first lecture 
Barthes allowed himself almost to define what his Neutral might be.
I define the Neutral as that which outplays {dejoue} the paradigm, or rather I 
call Neutral everything that baffles [dejoue] the paradigm. For I am not trying 
to define a word; 1 am trying to name a thing: I gather under a name, which 
here is the Neutral. The paradigm, what is that? It’s the opposition o f  two 
virtual terms from which, in speaking, I actualize one to produce meaning.
I... I My definition o f  the Neutral remains structural. By which I mean that, for 
me, the Neutral doesn’t refer to ‘impressions’ o f the grayness, o f  ‘neutrality,’ 
of indifference. The Neutral —  my Neutral —  can refer to intense, strong, 
unprecedented states. “To outplay the paradigm”, is an ardent, burning 
activity. (Barthes 2005: 6-7)
This quasi-definition echoes to a great extent what Barthes wrote 
some 25 years before in his Writing Zero Degree (Barthes 1984: 64): 
“[...] we know that some linguistics establish between the two terms o f 
a polar opposition (such as singular-plural, preterite-present) the 
existence of a third term, called a neutral term or zero element 
Curiously these two (1984 and 2005) descriptions o f the Neutral do 
not quite seem to match with the one given in his autobiography, 
where Barthes (1994: 33) does not equate the Neutral with the third 
term or degree zero. This “not quite matching” discloses Barthes’s 
Neutral at work; it pivots and oscillates about in such a way that 
hygienic classifications to neat paradigms are outplayed. These kinds 
of definitional discrepancies are not that uncommon in Barthes’s 
ouvre, for instance there is an ardent oscillation going on around
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1 he manuscript for the lectures was posthumously published in 2002, and 
translated into English in 2005.
pleasure and bliss (jouissance) in his The Pleasure o f the Text (s.v. 
Dire and Droit\ Barthes 1990: 19-20, 22).3
Barthes was not willing to give up his binarism even regarding The 
Neutral. So there is an anti-Neutral, which is not a Figure of its own 
right but unavoidably attached to the Figures o f the Neutral. Under the 
Figure o f Wou-Wei he describes the anti-Neutral as follows: “Pure 
expression o f the anti-Neutral: obligation to choose, no matter what 
side: the Neutral is more enemy than the enemy: it’s the beast to kill, to 
exclude: tyranny o f the paradigm in all its purity” (Barthes 2005: 183).
The Adjective is for Barthes “ [...] the anti-Neutral par excellence, 
as though there were a constitutional antipathy between the Neutral 
and the adjective” (Barthes 2005: 52). It is an aggressive tool for 
predication, setting up paradigms, and keeping them straight. 
Barthes’s dislike for the adjective is evident elsewhere, too (e.g. 
Barthes 1987: 29-36; see particularly footnote 124). His The Grain of 
the Voice (originally from 1972) begins with pouring out his mistrust 
with the predicative supremacy o f adjectives in describing music and 
Barthes (1997a: 268) asks: “Are we doomed to the adjective?” 
Barthes’s aversion towards adjectives is certainly methodological but 
perhaps also quite personal. In his lecture series Barthes (2005: 56) 
admits that “[...] 1 always receive the adjective badly, as an aggres­
sion, and I do so in all cases, no matter which value is attributed to it 
by the figure under which it is addressed to me”.
The relationship o f the adjectives and voice is particular for 
Barthes. The concept ‘Grain of the Voice’ was designated for 
addressing music, particularly voice, in a way that would avoid the 
adjectives and their predicative power (Barthes 1997a: 268-269). Also 
later Barthes regarded voice as an instrument that frustrates adjectives: 
“voice = ‘object’ that resists: sparks off adjectives (soft, startling, 
white, neutral, etc., voice), but nothing more” (Barthes 2005: 78).
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3 The oscillation between plaisir and jouissance  is further (and unintentionally) 
reinforced by translations, where their difference is not recognized. Also, 
signification (signification) and signifying (signifiance) are in the risk of being 
confused in translations. See also footnote 22!
4 I thank Maria O ’Sullivan for bringing this last mentioned adjective-list to my 
knowledge.
2. Androgyne as a Figure of the Neutral
The Androgyne is the last Figure o f the Neutral delivered by Barthes 
in his course. He had prepared three more Figures —  Intensities, To 
Give Leave and Fright —  which he did not have time to speak but 
they nonetheless have been published in the book. Barthes says that he 
could have begun with The Androgyne, had his aleatoric system o f 
arranging the order not thrown it the last (derniere), but not final 
(ultime) (Barthes 2005: 186).
Barthes (2005: 191-192) strongly distinguishes hermaphrodite 
from the androgyne. For him hermaphrodite is a kind o f farce mode o f 
androgyne, because it stays at the level o f  genitality. Androgyne 
proper is a metaphor, not a medical case, and in this metaphor 
genital ity has been dispersed to secondary attributes, from femaleness 
and maleness to femininity and masculinity:
The androgyne thus is the Neuter, but a N euter conceived as the complex 
degree: a mixture, a dose, a dialectic, not o f  man and woman (genitality) but 
of masculine and feminine. Or better yet: the man in whom there is feminine, 
the woman in whom there is masculine. (Barthes 2005: 193.)
Those Barthes connoisseurs familiar with his S/Z and particularly his 
essay Masculin, feminin, neutre (1970)5 —  both o f them addressing the 
castrato La Zambinella, a fictive character in Honore Balzac’s short 
story Sarrasine —  would probably have expected Barthes to discuss 
castrati as a typical case o f The Androgyne and o f The Neutral. 
However, he does not do that. In the beginning o f the lecture on The 
Androgyne, he briefly mentions a radio program where countertenors 
had been heard (Barthes 2005: 186), but there is no further elaboration 
of their possible interconnection. Here or elsewhere Barthes never really 
acknowledges the castrato’s voice, their raison d ’etre. Instead o f 
accepting castrati’s vocal (and aural) dimension, Barthes approaches 
them as visual phenomena, considering their costumes {distribution
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Barthes (1970: 899) erroneously claims that the two last castrati had died in 
1846 and 1861. Obviously he was not aware o f  Alessandro Moreschi (1858-1922) 
whose recordings from 1902-1904 have survived (see, e. g., Clapton 2004). Hear 
also Alessandro Moreschi: The Last Castrato. Complete Vatican Recordings. 
Opal CD 9823 (1984, 1987). The glorious vocal virtuosity o f the castrati should 
not be deemed on the basis o f  this recording.
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vestimentaire) and how to show their gender in a text (Barthes 1970: 
900, 905-907). Barthes emphasizes seeing when in the Balzac’s 
Sarrasine the sculptor Sarrasine witnesses an opera performance starred 
by La Zambinella. Yet in Balzac’s short story the musico’s voice is 
described at length (see below). Furthermore, Barthes doesn’t even 
mention the voice when he lists proofs for why Sarrasine deduces that 
(La) Zambinella must be a woman (Barthes 1970: 902, 904-905). (La) 
Zambinella’s three decisive feminine predicates6 for Sarrasine — 
according to Barthes —  are: (1) La Zambinella’s beauty; (2) her 
fragility and weakness; and (3) Sarrasine’s own passion which he can 
only imagine to be roused by a women.7
In S/Z, Barthes’s more extensive study on Balzac’s short story, he 
devotes some passages not actually for La Zambinella’s voice but for 
the effects it rouses. This is not quite in line with Balzac’s text where 
the singer’s voice is the most ravishing channel to Sarrasine: “When 
La Zambinella sang, the effect was delirium” (Balzac quoted in 
Barthes 1992: 238; fragments 230-231). In his interpretation Barthes 
(1992: 115) symptomatically again ignores the castrato’s voice. The 
voice and the act o f singing only refer to ‘Theater’ and to ‘Aria.’ 
Barthes’s reluctance or rather, refusal to address voice is even more 
salient in his comment on the following fragment (Nr. 243) in 
Balzac’s short story, which describes La Zambinella’s voice:
Last, this agile voice, fresh and silveiy in timbre, supple as a thread shaped by 
the slightest breath o f air, rolling and unrolling, cascading and scattering, this 
voice attacked his soul so vividly [...]. (Balzac quoted in Barthes 1992: 239; 
fragment 243.)
In his interpretation Barthes (1992: 118) completely bypasses the first 
part o f the fragment that concerns voice and concentrates on being 
penetrated by the voice. This is, besides being unfair to Balzac’s 
excellent sentence, yet another instance when voice alone, without tied
0 Unlike Barthes, Sarrasine was not suspicious about adjectives and predica­
tions and had to pay highly for his error.
7 This assertion is questioned by Dame (1994: 146-147) who claims that 
Sarrasine feels repulsion for every woman. I do not share her interpretation at this 
point: Sarrasine did have a sexual relationship for instance with Clothilde before 
his journey to Rome and his baffling encounter with La Zambinella in Teatro 
Argen to.
to a natural language, means practically nothing for Barthes. The 
castrato’s voice is a double nothing, because besides voice also castrato 
stands for a void or absence in signification (Barthes 1970: 900-901).
In order to make any progress, I had to drop the Barthesian lead on 
castrati, as it turned out to be a blind alley regarding voice and 
signification. But I did not drop Barthes. Instead, I read his chapter on 
The Androgyne further down and found his remarks on Leonardo da 
Vinci based on Freud’s famous study about Leonardo’s childhood 
memory (Freud 1984). Although they seemingly had nothing to do 
with voice, they nevertheless guided my aural perception o f the 
Neutral in the voices. And furthermore, Leonardo da V inci’s art forms 
a surprising bridge between Barthes (after Freud) and Wagner, which 
rests on the neutrum/Le Neutre.
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3. Bridging Leonardo da Vinci, Wagner, Freud, and 
Barthes through neutrum
Siegmund Freud’s famous study on Leonardo da Vinci’s childhood 
memory is a screen through which Barthes looks at Leonardo’s 
paintings and reads about his life. In The Neutral there is no reference 
to Leonardo without Freud (Barthes 2005: 168, 177, 194—195, and 
207-208). Both Freud and Barthes share an interest in Leonardo’s 
childhood memory: a vulture (or more correctly: a kite) had landed 
down to Leonardo’s cradle and stuck the infant several times with its 
tail (Freud 1984: 29, 33). For Barthes (after Freud) this scene depicts a 
fantasma of a maternal vulture deity, combining both masculine and 
feminine features, the phallus (tail) and the breast. Referring to Freud 
Barthes emphasizes the androgynous (and not hermaphrodite) nature 
of this kind o f mother. Like Freud, also Barthes brings in homo­
sexuality embedded in this scene, but Freud takes a longer detour than
8
Barthes’s indifference to voice as a significatory practice often remains 
unnoticed. For instance, Mary Ann Smart sums up S /T s meaning for opera studies as 
following: “Although Roland Barthes’s S/Z predates musicological interest in gender 
issues by nearly two decades and has only episodically had any influence on writing 
about opera, Barthes’s multifaceted reading o f Balzac’s story ‘Sarrasine’ marks out an 
attractive theoretical ground by showing how exploding the fundamental opposition 
male/female can lead to the collapse o f other epistemological categories, including that 
between systematic analysis and operatic jouissance” (Smart 2000: 8).
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Barthes into the Leonardo’s alleged sexual history, whereas Barthes 
keeps away from Leonardo the person and confines himself to this 
(textualized) scene only. (Barthes 2005: 194; cf. Freud 1984: 29-50.)
Barthes obviously chooses only few issues from Freud’s abundant 
essay. Unlike Freud (1984: 20-29) Barthes doesn’t address Leo­
nardo’s dual nature as an artist and researcher, which is a topic not far 
removed from Barthes’s own approach (cf. Barthes 2005: 64). This 
pivoting between art and research is for Freud yet another feature 
signalling Leonardo’s unstable (sexual) identity. Freud even mentions 
that homosexual men willingly would refer to themselves as a “third 
sex”, an interpretation not accepted by Freud him self (1984: 47); and 
again there is no reference to this in Barthes.
For me, the apical issue in Leonardo’s childhood memory is the 
mouth, as it is the locus o f voice and language. In many o f Leonardo’s 
paintings the mouth becomes a particularly active site when both 
feminine and masculine traits are androgynously intertwined in the 
oral zones: see for instance Mona Lisa, Leda (in Leda and the Swan), 
St. John the Baptist or Bacchus (Barthes 2005: 195; cf. also Freud 
1984: 57-68; Fig. 1). When I look at these paintings, I also recognize 
the pivoting o f femininity and masculinity. But even more titillating is 
to imagine what kind o f voices these figures would have had and how 
would they have spoken.
Figure 1. Leonardo da Vinci, St. John the Baptist (1513-1516, oil on walnut 
wood, displayed at Louvre) (from M annering 1987: 70).
* * *
Curiously, some thirty years before Freud, another German genius had 
discussed Leonardo’s certain painting as a case o f a neutrum, namely 
Richard Wagner (1813-1882).9 In March 1859, W agner had visited 
Milan and the nearby Santa Maria delle Grazie which houses Leo­
nardo’s famous Last Supper (1495-1498; Fig. 2). In his autobiography 
Wagner describes the event as follows:
Yet I gained a deeper insight into the effect produced by the purely artistic 
significance o f a painting when I stood before Da V inci’s Last Supper and had 
the same experience as everyone else. The original work has deteriorated so 
badly that the paint is almost entirely ruined, yet after one has examined more 
closely the copies reconstructing the original, which are placed perm anently 
alongside it, and then turns again from the copies to the ruin o f the original, 
everyone experiences, as I did, that one’s eye has become visionary, and one 
suddenly perceives with the greatest clarity what it is that cannot be copied. 
(Wagner 1992: 584-585; cf. also Glasenapp 1905a: 308)
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Figure 2. Leonardo da Vinci, Last Supper (1495-1498), a detail (from Mannering 
1987:43).
Here Freud makes no reference to Richard W agner. His name surfaces in 
Freud’s writings very seldom, mainly through the accounts o f  his patients. Freud’s 
silence o f W agner’s output has raised justified questions among scholars (see Diaz 
de Chumaceiro 1993). It is undeniable that in his operas and writings W agner 
processed issues that were to become topical in Freud’s research: father-son 
relationship, castration, love, dreams and fantasies.
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The subject matter o f the Leonardo’s painting, the Holy Communion, 
became topical to W agner when he was composing both the text and 
the music for his last opera, Parsifal10 During the composition 
process W agner needed to settle how to build up as music the Holy 
Communion, and particularly the Institution o f the Lord’s Supper, 
which according to Christian scriptures quotes Christ’s words. In 
W agner’s imagination Christ’s voice had to be something extra­
ordinary, as he had expressed to his wife Cosima:
But in order to impart the spiritual quality o f  C hrist’s words, their detachment 
from all material things, he intends to use a mixture o f voices: ‘A baritone 
voice, for example, would make it all sound material; it must be neither man 
nor woman, but neu ter" in the highest sense o f the w ord’. (Cosima Wagner’s 
diary entry 26 Sept 1877; W agner 1994: 289)
A couple o f years later W agner made a direct reference to Leonardo’s 
Last Supper in which he had been inspired by the almost womanly 
Christ with a beard. But, as he had mentioned to his wife, Christ’s 
head in Leonardo’s sketches for the Cena was too feeble (weichlich). 
Curiously, Nattiez underestimates the Leonardo connection:
The allusion to Leonardo da Vinci might suggest that we were in the presence 
o f that ambiguous androgyny typical o f the end or the nineteenth century and 
much prized by the pre-Raphaelites. But there is almost certainly no truth in 
this interpretation. Ambiguity is not sexual neutrality. (Nattiez 1993: 172)
W agner’s own words penned down by his wife Cosima Wagner testify 
the contrary o f what Nattiez claims:
10 Jean-Jacques N attiez’s Wagner Androgyne (1993) is not discussed here at 
length because it does not deal with voice but mainly W agner’s artistic person. 
N attiez considers Richard W agner to have two sides intertwined, the male 
(librettist) and the female (com poser o f  music). According to Nattiez, their 
emphases have varied during W agner’s long career in his person, his writings and 
operas. N attiez considers Parsifal to represent “asexual androgyny that transcends 
all racial differences” (1993: 171; emphasis in the original). See, however, for 
instance, Stein (1950), Gutman (1968) and W einer (1997) who convincingly 
argue for strong racist (particularly Anti-Semitic) currents in W agner’s writings 
and music dramas, including Parsifal. Elsewhere I have discussed Parsifal as a 
case for abjection (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam , forthcoming).
11 In the original, W agner uses the w ord neutrum (W agner 1982a: 1073).
Thereafter he [Ricahrd Wagner] plays the f irs t theme from Parsifal and comes 
to me explaining how he has the choir to enunciate the words, so that he 
[Christ] does not appear either as feminine or masculine; the Christ must be 
quite extraordinary, not woman or man. This has been also what Leonardo has 
tried to achieve in his Cena with almost a womanly [weiblich] head with the 
beard. He should not appear either old or young; the God in human. (Cosima 
W agner’s diary entry on 27 June 1880; W agner 1982b: 556; translation and 
emphasis mine —  A. S.-G.; cf. also Glasenapp 1905b: 363)
The words in question are as follows: '‘‘'Nehmet hin meinen Leib, 
nehmet hin mein Blut um uns ’rer Liebe Willen". This is not a verbatim 
quote from any o f the Gospels although it emulates closely the 
Institution o f the Lord’s Supper.12 A speciality o f the moment is 
further enhanced by having the Grail Cup radiate at the moment these 
sacred words are pronounced, as instructed in the score.13
Nattiez (1993: 171) erroneously connects Cosima W agner’s diary 
note (27 June 1880; see above) to the final chorus, which he claims to 
be the only mixed chorus in the work. First o f all, to be precise, there 
is not a single mixed chorus in Parsifal, because in the four-part 
choral writing the highest voices are occupied by boy sopranos (not 
female sopranos), which considerably bends the timbre. Therefore the 
mixed chorus is not a correct designation. Secondly, as the beginning 
of the diary entry clearly shows, the words to be voiced are connected 
to the first theme o f the Parsifal, which obviously is not located in the 
end. The final chorus is only partly associable to the first them e14 
whereas the theme in “Nehmet hin [...]” is exactly the same as 
Parsifal's first theme, so called Liebesmahl-Spruch (see, for example
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12 “Take my body, take my blood, in token o f  our love!” (cf. Luke 22: 17-19; 
Mark 14: 22-24; Matthew 26: 26-28). The order was reversed in the sketches; 
first was blood and thereafter came the bread (M inor 2005: 5, fn 9; Kinderman 
1995: 90). In the Gospels (except for Luke) and in St. Paul’s account (1 
Corinthians 11: 23-26) the bread is always the first, as it was to be also in 
Parsifal.
Heinrich Porges’s (2002: 37) observations confirm that this was actually 
executed in the first performance, 26 July 1882. The mom ent o f  G rail’s radiation 
was indicated already in first and the second versions o f the Parsifal libretto in 
1865 and 1877 respectively (Geek, Voss 1970: 72, 81).
For instance, the final chorus lacks the distinctive Schmerzenfigur motive 
embedded in the Liebesmahl-Spruch. Furthermore, the final chorus begins with a 
Thoren-Motive, not to be found in the Liebesmahl-Spruch. (W olzogen [s.a.]: 17, 
63,81.)
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Wolzogen [s.o.]: 17-18, 38-39, 80-81, and Fig. 4). Furthermore, it is 
false to equate the Invisible Choir with Christ (Sivuoja-Gunaratnam 
1993: 347) and consider all its utterances as originating from Him. 
The words in the final chorus are not to be attributed to Christ but to a 
less specific divine agent. As the author o f the Parsifal libretto, 
Wagner used quotation marks when an utterance should be considered 
as a quote. There are no quotation marks in the final chorus; but there 
are ones around “Nehmet hin [...] Liebe Willed.
W agner’s solution for achieving the neutrum for this particular 
phrase was quite extraordinary: mixture o f female altos and male 
tenors, which are close to each other in their timbre and vocal range. 
Their combination produces a strong chest resonance, because the 
tessitura o f the vocal line lies quite low (see Fig. 4). They sing in 
unison, which further enhances the intelligibility o f the text lines: the 
comprehensibility o f the divine words is not risked. Also, the unison 
unites many voices as a one voice.
In his St. Matthew’s Passion J. S. Bach has a bass singer (Jesus) 
sing the Institution o f the Holy Communion. Bach’s Jesus (not 
Christ!) is also visible, flesh and blood, and clearly a male, a human.1' 
In Parsifal, He belongs to the divine order, surpassing human and 
therefore W agner was struggling a special way to voice Him. Four- 
part choral texture, suggested by Nattiez (1993: 171) would be quite a 
standard choral writing whereas having altos and tenors in unison is 
not.
Had he wanted, W agner could have assigned the alto part to boy- 
altists, as the tessitura and vocal range o f the alto part would have 
been easily within their reach. This pondering is relevant because the 
Invisible Choir also include boy sopranos {Knaben) } b Why not boy 
altos, too? This would have led to a different timbre, as the boy altos 
would have less loud voice and much less chest resonance than female 
altos. Also it would have been a totally female-free choir, and as a 
result, the desired androgynous blending o f male and female voices, 
the neutt'um Wagner desired, would have been lost.17 But although
15 It is well known that W agner knew St. M atthew ’s Passion  as well as other 
Bach’s pieces (Gregor-Dellin 1980: 785).
N.B. The boy sopranos do not sing in this particular phrase. The next sung 
phrase in Parsifal with boy sopranos and female altos calls for another article.
1 Similarly, omitting all the tenors would destroy the chance for the vocal 
Neutrum , a point missed by M inor (2005: 4 fn 8) as he states that the “ inclusion of
Wagner employed the voices o f female altos, he made a linguistic 
travesty by casting the women altos as males: they appear as Youths 
(Jünglinge) along with the tenors in the list o f dramatis personae.
The Invisible choir is traditionally placed in the cupola o f the 
Bayreuth opera shrine, high above the stage, on two layers. In the first 
performance the boy sopranos and four altos were on the highest level 
in the cupola and the rest, tenors and altos on the middle high level 
(Geek; Voss 1970: 136). The layered choir remains invisible to the 
audience (see Fig. 3). The absence o f visual clues gives no support to 
the audience’s attempts to sex the voice(s), automatically ignited when 
one hears a human voice. When the gap between visible (absent) and 
audible (present) cannot be overcome, the distance o f the vocal source 
cannot be accurately defined (Dolar 2006: 67).18 M laden Dolar points 
out that these kinds o f acousmatic voices are typical representations o f 
deities in various religious rituals. He even proposes that there is
[...] a direct hidden link between the acousmatic voice and divinization. The 
voice whose source cannot be seen, because it cannot be located, seems to 
emanate from anywhere, everywhere; it gains omnipotence. Could we go so 
far as to say that the hidden voice structurally produces ‘divine effects’? 
(Dolar 2006: 62)
In this case the answer is yes. But the invisibility o f the choir is only 
one attribute o f the divine. In addition, the quasi-Biblical text, andro­
gynous voices and the acting out o f the Holy Communion contribute 
to the divine effects as well as the temple-like architecture o f the 
setting modelled after the Siena Cathedral (Skelton 1965: 56).19 The 
dimensions o f the sets are huge, which effect also how the voices 
sound. The vertical distance from the stage and reverberation caused 
by the cupola walls contribute to the ethereality and immateriality o f 
the voices (cf. also Minor 2005: 6-7  who focuses on the unique space 
created by the voices.) According to Porges (2002: 37), Wagner had 
described the desired timbre as a cloud traversing the sky.
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tenor voices in some o f the treble chorus’s music (at the same pitch level) is 
similarly unintelligible”.
4 This applies also to the layering, which cannot be deciphered either visually or 
audibly (Minor 2005: 4 fn 8).
Gutman (1968: 403-404) points out that also D resden’s Frauenkirche may 
have served as a possible model for the Grail temple.
96 Anne Sivuoja-Gunaratnam
r
i' j! li i 1 j ! il J ! 1: .
I % *  " и
1
Figure 3. The Hall in the Castle o f the Grail (Acts I and III). (Bie 1931, Nr. 74.) 
This setting was designed by the Russian painter Paul Joukowsky in a strict 
collaboration with R. W agner. It remained unaltered up to 1933. As can be seen, 
the choir in the cupola remains invisible, whereas the Knights of the Grail are 
seated around the table, Parsifal standing aside. The Vessel o f the Grail is in the 
middle.
4. Listening for the Neutral
In the previous chapters the Neutral was discussed in the contexts of 
Barthes’s semiotic theory and W agner’s Parsifal score, his auto­
biography and Cosima W agner’s diary. The analysis would remain 
deaf and incomplete without addressing the Neutral in its audible 
dimension. Therefore I have listened closely to several Parsifal 
recordings in order to trace the sonorous Neutral. The recordings are 
with one exception live recordings from the Bayreuth Festspielhaus 
performances. The only studio recording in my list is the oldest one, 
from 1927 by Karl Muck (1859-1940). It is most probably based on 
the Parsifal production given that summer in Bayreuth. It is also the 
first comprehensive Parsifal recording released commercially. In his 
times Muck was a considerable Parsifal authority as he conducted the
work in Bayreuth from 1901 to 1930. All the Parsifal performances 
up to 1933 followed Richard W agner’s original plan from 1882, 
which was modernised under the Nazi-regime by Hans Tietjen and 
Alfred Roller for the 1934 performance.
The Parsifal recording tradition cannot be discussed without the 
legendary Hans Knappertsbusch (1888-1965) who conducted the 
infamous 1951 performance o f Parsifal which exemplified W ieland 
Wagner’s new austere style o f staging, so called Neu-Bayreuth. This 
Parsifal remained in the Bayreuth programme from 1951 till 1973. 
Knappertsbusch conducted Parsifal every summer from 1951 till 1964 
(with one exception: 1953). He also made several Parsifal recordings 
from the live performances in 1951, 1952, 1954, 1956, and 1958— 
1964. The recordings listened to for this article are from the 1951, 
1962 and 1964 performances. After Knappertsbusch, Pierre Boulez, 
Eugen Jochum, and James Levine have both conducted and recorded 
Parsifal in Bayreuth. Closest to Knappertsbusch’s score comes James 
Levine (1943-) who has conducted Parsifal in 1982-1985 and 1988— 
1993; the 1982 marking the centenary o f Parsifal’s first performance 
with the new staging by Götz Friedrich. But he has made only one live 
recording o f Parsifal, in 1985. Pierre Boulez’s (1925-) Parsifal ac­
count contains the performances in 1966-1968, 1970 as well as 2004- 
2005, the last ones for the revolutionary staging by Christoph 
Schlingenschief. The two recordings, both considered here, are from 
1966 and 1970.
I have chosen to limit m yself to the live recordings from Bay­
reuth — the only exception being Karl Muck —  because the room 
acoustic as well as dimensions o f the stage, orchestra pit and cupola 
would remain the same. Also, the relatively slow pace o f new stagings 
gives some stability to the performances. What obviously has changed 
is the recording technique (e.g. a passage from mono to stereophony 
and to multi-channel digital technique), including microphones and 
their placement, editing and post-production. As the listening mode is 
not here hi-fi, this will not be addressed in detail. In order to help the 
close listening I extracted the short music examples from the original 
CDs, placed them on a sample CD and listened to the samples several 
times individually and in succession.20 Although I refer to recordings,
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1 have listened some o f  the excerpts with Hannu Norjanen, the Finnish 
conductor, and my American colleague Jose A. Bowen and want to thank them for 
sharing their expert opinion with me.
I want to stress that I have close-listened for this analysis only the 
phrase presented in Fig. 4. What I wanted to find out is whether the 
Neutral would in fact be audible and if yes, how.
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S e h r l a n t f s a
„N ehm et hin  m ei-nen  L eib , nehm et hin  m ein Blot 
"Take ye  th is  д о - d v  J f*ne. take ve th iя If и blood
------------------------------------------ , ne tunet bin mein Blut,
' Take ye tAis bo - dy  Mine, take  ye  th is My blood;
- k e iu d fbe-to -be our love
be - to -so be our lo te
le n !“
- jkened!“
(W ährend A m forta*  and ac h tsv o ll ш  
b tm a m e aG rb ttT O d u u  K elfbe aich  
n e ig t ,  v e rb re i te t s ich  eine ü te rd fc k . 
te re  f rä am en m g  ü b e r  d ie  H a l le .)
(Amforlaa Ыта devoutly 
p ra ter before the ckal ice, Ike light 
intke Bail gradually uonct to a 
mere du»A* gUmmer \
Figure 4. Music example: Richard Wagner, Parsifal, Act I (Piano score, p. 87- 
88). This Grail Motive also inaugurates the opera, but here it appears for the first 
time with the text. W agner conceived it as the kernel o f everything in Parsifal 
(Kinderman 1995: 88-91).
In Muck’s recording the tenors overpower to the extent that the 
maleness o f the sonority is firmly established and the female altos are 
not audible at all. Therefore there is no audible Neutral present. 
Although this might be an effect o f the recording conditions; equip­
ment, placing o f the microphone etc., the audible image is what 
remains and it does not even suggest the presence o f altos. M uck’s 
whole recording, including this excerpt, gives a curious testimony of 
unevenness in articulation and intonation as well as rhythmic inexact­
ness. In this excerpt the choir is hardly in unison, although it should 
be, and the rhythmic and timbral deviations are more than obvious. 
The singing body is so uneven that occasionally individual singers can 
be distinguished. In M uck’s version, Christ appears very male and 
very divided.
The Knappertsbusch 1951 recording sounds as if  the tenors did not 
sing at all. Besides the female altos what can be heard is the distance: 
the voices come from afar; they are not close by as are for instance the 
Grail Knights. Particularly the first word ‘Nehmet’ emerges as if from 
nowhere, barely distinguishable as a voiced sound invested with 
language. Unlike in Muck, here the articulation is exact producing a 
homogenous singing body, but devoid o f male timbre.
Also in Knappertsbusch’s legendary 1962 recording the female 
voices dominate but the distinct tenor timbre comes forward parti­
cularly in long held tones or where the tenors’ vocal line touches the 
high (= difficult) tones, for instance in the 'Leib, nehmet hiri or 
particularly in the last syllbale o f ‘Liebe Willen’. This occasional 
oscillation o f the female and male brushes the Neutral, without 
however allowing it to be fully present.
In Knappertsbusch’s last recording (1964) the tenors are over­
shadowed by female voices, but as a difference to the previous two 
versions considered, they are nevertheless audible. The darker timbre 
of the tenors is faintly present for instance in ‘um uns ’rer Liebe 
Willen’. This is not obvious though, and in order to capture this 
fleeting tenor timbre a version with even more pronounced female 
vocal presence needs to be called for comparison. Such a recording is 
Boulez’s first Parsifal (1966). Here the alto timbre is much brighter 
than in any o f the previous recordings, and the tenors are not audible 
at all except for a vanishing moment in ‘Liebe Willen’. Boulez was 
notorious for his fast tempi on Parsifal, and this applies also for this as
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well as the next excerpt, which are much faster than for instance the 
three Knappertsbusch versions considered previously.
In B oulez’s 1970 recording the female and male voices are melted 
into a curiously homogenous voice, as if  there were only one voice 
singing, a voice that is at the same time dark and bright, male and 
female. In Levine’s recording (1985) the phrase is voiced even more 
homogenously, and because o f its much slower tempo, the Neutral 
lingers longer. The vocal intensification in the word ‘Liebe’ is quite 
effective; however, this is against the prescription o f the score, which 
asks for a soft nuance (piano). Perhaps there is a touch of rapture in 
the otherwise perfect unison with the very last syllable ‘ Willen which 
lets through slightly more tenor timbre.
Both Boulez 1970 and Levine 1985 offer rare moments of as­
serting the Neutral by having tenors and altos intertwined to one voice 
with a balanced mixture o f both female and male timbres. The diffe­
rence between these two with Knappartsbusch’s 1962 recording is that 
while both Boulez 1970 and Levine 1985 unfold the Neutral in 
simultaneous oscillation, in Knappertsbusch 1962 the Neutral oscil­
lates in succession (and with dominating altos). Referring to Leo­
nardo, W agner spoke about seeing in Christ a woman and a man at the 
same time. This applies for my listening experience too. According to 
Barthes,
[...] w e might perhaps say that the Neutral finds its feature, its gesture, its 
inflection embodied in what is inimitable about it: the smile, the Leonardian 
smile analyzed by Freud: Mona Lisa, St. Anne, Leda, St. John, Bacchus: 
smiles at the same time o f  men and women, smiles-figures in which the mark 
o f  exclusion, o f  separation cancels itself, smiles that circulate from one sex to 
the other [...] . (Barthes 2005: 195)
Listening revealed that although the vocal Neutral had a clear 
grounding in W agner’s score, its audibility was not automatically 
assured; in the case o f Muck (1927) and Boulez (1966) it did not 
materialize at all. Perhaps they could be considered as examples of 
anti-Neutral because only one predominant vocal gender had to be 
chosen, in the M uck’s case it was the tenors and in Boulez’s pro­
duction the altos, voicing both a kind o f tyranny o f vocal paradigm, 
but in different ways. A visual metaphor, relevant in this particular 
case would be Richard W agner’s opinion about Christ’s head in the 
sketches for the Last Supper; it was too feeble (weichlich) or perhaps
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also effeminate Сweiblich); the point here being a kind o f tyranny o f a 
single gender paradigm.
Listening these pieces o f music as foils for the Neutral retuned my 
ears for the micro-differentiations o f vocal qualities in this choral 
passage. It enhanced a new kind o f listening that focussed on the 
intimate oscillation o f vocal genders. However, the more standard 
modes o f listening, e.g. the exactness o f the pitches, rhythms, tempo, 
melodic profile, phrasing, and harmonic progression were not exactly 
bypassed but they remained in the shadow o f the vocal Neutral. 
Beside passionate and engaged, my listening was also very focused 
and conscious. The edited examples offered a good chance for this. 
But, as this article concerns voice in a Barthesian context, a pivotal 
question remains: was there jouissance} And how does jouissance 
relate to the Neutral?
As mentioned above, Barthes’s autobiography lists jouissance as 
one possible Figure o f the Neutral. However, this is a line o f thought 
which he did not develop in his lecture series (Barthes 2005). Both 
jouissance and the Neutral situate in the threshold o f signification and 
signifying because they both outplay the paradigms. This is what they 
have in common. But whereas there are qualitative and significatory 
differences within the Neutral, as exemplified by Barthes him self 
(2005), jouissance unfolds as undifferentiated singular, as absence o f 
signification, loss o f self. Symptomatically, there is no headword for 
jouissance in Plaisir du texte (Barthes 1990) as it cannot be defined, 
but there is a whole lecture series about diverse shades o f the Neutral.
In my analytical working there were times that I did not have 
words for what I heard, and occasionally I had to reach for them with 
an effort. These absences o f language might approach the threshold o f 
jouissance. But it worked also the other way round; with the help o f 
words, concepts, naming and signification, my listening became more 
precise: the ability to reach for the audible Neutral emerged, not as a 
singular revelation but in conjunction with other modes o f 
signification; bodily, visual, textual, biographical, spatial.
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5. Conclusion: Signification and 
Voice reconsidered after Barthes
Beside voice and signification, Barthes was also suspicious about 
music and signification, and he did not recognise the semantic possibi­
lities o f  music or its enormous power to signify in a given culture 
(e.g., Barthes 1997b: passim). “Then what is music?” asks Barthes, 
and answers immediately relying on Panzera’s art: “я quality of 
language” (Barthes 1997b: 284; emphasis in the original). Therefore it 
is not surprising that there is not much said about music in Barthes’s 
lecture series; Barthes (2005: 103) for instance mentions that music is 
“a drug-consciousness.” For his defence it must be remembered that 
Barthes (1915-1980) died before the bloom of musical semiotics, 
particularly its semantic branch. O f this major corpus,21 only Tarasti’s 
Myth and Music (1978) had been published. Nattiez’s early pieces, for 
instance his seminal Fondements d ’un semiologie de la musique 
(1975) does not address the semantic dimension o f music.
As is well known, Barthes was a great admirer o f Charles Panzera 
(1896-1976), a French baritone singer. It is wrong to assume that 
Barthes loved Panzera’s voice per se. He loved something else: “I 
m yself have a lover’s relation to Panzera’s voice: not to his raw, 
physical voice, but to his voice as it passes over language, over our 
French language, like a desire: no voice is raw; every voice is steeped 
in what it says” (Barthes 1997b: 280). By this Barthes actually denies 
the existence o f voice disengaged from the language. Panzera’s way to 
articulate French ravishes Barthes, not Panzera’s voice [sa voix brute]. 
Similarly, Barthes’s dislike for Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau (1925-) is 
not caused by his voice but his way o f singing in German (!) language 
(Barthes 1997a: 269-273). Again, there is no voice alone for Barthes. 
Yet, in The Romantic Song, Barthes (1997c) acknowledges the 
familiar voice types in opera, bass, mezzo [contra-alto, sic!], soprano 
and tenor but here nor elsewhere does he address the voice pertaining 
to signification (see Richardson 1999 for a very different reasoning 
below). For Barthes, voice as a quality offers a highway to jouissance, 
beyond meaning and language. Adriana Cavarero, for one, has critized 
Barthes for this:
21 See also Grabocz 1986; Tarasti 1994; M onelle 1991; and Hatten 1994.
Indeed, in Barthes’s writing, the voice and body are categories o f  deperso-
22nalized pleasure [s/c/] in which the embodied uniqueness o f  each existent 
(something Barthes never thematizes) is simply dissolved along with the 
general categories o f the subject and the individual. In other words, Barthes 
encourages us to focus on a vocality that far from being pure and simple 
sonority, or a mere bodily remainder, consists in a pow er relating to speech. 
And, at the same time, he discourages every perspective that would find in 
uniqueness and in relationality the fundamental sense o f this power. (Cavarero 
2005: 15)
Cavarero’s own recipe is to address unique personal qualities in 
saying instead o f concentrating on the semantics o f what was said. By 
this she wants to free voices from the prison house o f logo-centrism 
where they have been given a subservient role in relation to the 
semantic dimension o f the language ( ‘m eaning’) while their unique­
ness has been ignored (Cavarero 2005: passim). Cavarero’s program­
me leaves me puzzled because it seems to entail that also for her voice 
alone would not signify except for its uniqueness and that it is always 
someone’s voice. For me this is not enough. When faced with voice 
and signification I refuse to back off and join the company o f Barthes 
and Cavarero. The voices do have the ability to signify, not just 
something in general and in theory, but also something specific and in 
lived-in practice.
Yet I do not wish to deny the enormous power o f music and voice 
to arouse, seduce or ravish, but this need not to be divorced from 
signification. In one o f the early pioneering studies on voice and 
gender, Elizabeth Wood (1994: 27) explores a mode o f listening that 
has a similar undercurrent to Barthes’s erotic listening related to geno- 
song, the materiality o f the body in voice (Barthes 1997a: 270-271). 
However, W ood’s theoretical approach stems from elsewhere, from 
feminism and gender studies (for instance, Cixous), and not from 
Barthes at all. W ood’s Sapphonics is a lesbian space for making 
emotional and erotic relationships among those who sing and listen 
singing. A Sapphonic voice resonates in and about lesbian difference 
and desire and it challenges the boundaries o f  voice types as well as 
sex and gender categories, refusing hence standard categorization
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There is a grave error in translation. In the Italian original (Cavarero 2003: 22) 
the term is godimento, which should have been translated as jouissance (or bliss). 
In her original Italian Caverero (2003) makes a systematic distinction between 
piacere (pleasure) and godimento (jouissance), not respected by the translator.
(W ood 1994: 28, 30). The binary division is surpassed in a Sapphonic 
vocal synthesis o f  female and male voices to a transvestic enigma 
(W ood 1994: 32). Such a synthesis may be found within one voice 
only. As exemplary cases for the Sapphonics and Sapphonic voice 
W ood mentions the low baritonisque register o f Pauline Viardot- 
Garcia (1821-1910), the castrato-like falsetto register o f Emma Calve 
(1858-1940), and their effects on the listeners (Wood 1994: 29-33). 
W ood’s Sapphonics and Sapphonic voice resonates strongly with 
Barthesian Neutral and more precisely with his Androgyne with that 
important (dare I say: essential) difference that Wood listens and 
desires unambiguously as a lesbian, and furthermore, she brings this 
into her apprehension. In Barthes the subject often (although not 
exclusively) has a male basis, even when he writes about his Neutral 
or Androgyne: “Neuter: “a man in whom there is feminine.” But 
perhaps not just any feminine (perhaps there are many of them)” 
(Barthes 2005: 194; cf. also Dame 1994: 146-147).
W ayne Koestenbaum (1993) listens and desires opera and operatic 
voices explicitly fuelled by homosexual desire, more precisely that of 
an Opera Queen. His surprising parallels o f gay and opera culture 
celebrate gay jouissance in every fold o f his exposition. In the end of 
the book he makes a long list o f  queer moments in the standard opera 
repertoire, which enhance gay sensitivity. For my purposes the chapter 
Queen ’s Throat, which in fact extends also to other vocal organs, is 
the most poignant. Falsetto voice, compared with chest voice, is 
deemed artificial, effeminate and unnatural (and Koestenbaum finds it 
parallel to homosexuality; 1993: 164-165). It is in the threshold of the 
registers, for instance head vs. chest, where the split within one voice 
between male and female occurs (Koestenbaum 1993: 166-167). I 
find this culturally coded division significant also when listening to a 
group o f voices, hearing female and male timbres and registers 
resonating either simultaneously or in a tight succession. Their 
inseparable intertwinement calls for the Barthes’s Neutral.
In his book on Philip Glass’s opera Akhnaten (1983) John Richard­
son (1999: 137-157) discusses the vocal gender o f  the main character, 
the Egyptian pharaoh Akhnaten, whom Glass has cast as a co­
untertenor, a possible vocal follow-up for castrati (Dame 1994: 149). 
In Akhnaten the vocal colour o f a countertenor is highly significant as 
an aural embodiment for a transgressive gender. The trio with 
Akhnaten, his wife Nefertiti (contra-alto), and his mother Queen Tye
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(lyrical soprano) is a vocal power play between these three characters, 
imbued with manifold erotic bondings. In the fourth and fifth stanzas 
of the trio Akhnaten is vocally capsulated by his mother from above 
and his wife from below which positions him in an in-between state in 
many ways:
Caught between what he perceives as divine and earthly love, Akhnaten elects 
to partake o f  both. What is more, he evidently views this equilibrium betw een 
the internal and the external, between inbreeding and outbreeding, as further 
evidence o f his own semidivine status. One who combines the masculine and 
the feminine; who traverses the path between the mundane and the eternal 
[...]. (Richardson 1999: 155)
What Richardson describes here would undoubtedly make a case for 
multiple Figures o f the Neutral, not just Androgyne (e.g. Ideospheres, 
Rites, Retreat, Oscillation). Voice and more precisely vocal registers 
are one significant factor in this, and as Richardson shows, they are 
inseparably intertwined with other modes o f signification (here for 
instance ideological, visual, and textual).
Välimäki’s (2005: 301-327) research on k. d. lang’s vocalism is a 
particularly nuanced criticism o f Barthes’s central concepts, including 
jouissance, geno-song, feno-song, signifying and the Grain o f the 
Voice which she combines with acoustic mirror. When put to strict 
scrutiny, the dividing line between geno-song (body as voiced) and 
feno-song (voice as communication) turns out to be much more 
problematic than Barthes’s article (1997a) would have it. On the basis 
of her analysis she concludes that no feature is purely pheno or geno. 
Also the very act o f researching turns any ‘genuine’ geno to feno, by 
naming it. The same notion concerns also signification and signifying 
in the act o f listening (Välimäki 2005: 326). Thus in the practice o f 
analysis their borderlines —  possible hideouts for the Neutral —  
remain in constant oscillation.
Koestenbaum, Wood, Richardson and Välimäki address voice in a 
way that combine erotic desire and signification. Their writings show 
that the binary splits between voice and body or body and language, 
signifying and signification need not to be permanently postulated. 
Thus they pave a way towards an understanding that bridges voice, 
language, meanings and desire in culture and in particular sub-cultures 
embraced also in this article. Their research, as I have above attempted 
to show how, also resonates with Barthes’s Neutral.
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Besides the famous jouissance, signifying etc., there are a myriad 
o f concepts and designations in Barthes’s oeuvre that may enhance 
sensitivity regarding voice and its modes o f signification. Barthes’s 
somewhat limited views on music and voice need not to restrain from 
profiting his semiotic theorising and his reasoning, which can be 
adapted for musical instances. This kind o f research can be further 
enhanced by combining Barthes’s semioticing with other more 
specific conceptions on voice and vocal cultures. Even though this is 
not a path taken by Barthes himself, it nevertheless is a valid option. 
The price to pay would be the loss o f  not-knowing, un-fetishizing 
sound, voice and music. As Susanna Valimäki puts it:
We may truly be looking for som ething as uncoded as possible (the 
signifiance evading the tyranny o f communication and signification) but the 
m oment we find it, it becomes coded. [...] For example, to hunt the grain of 
voice in [k.d.] lang’s music transforms our quarry into a code. Research 
cannot be done without a system and an explicated research setting. This is a 
problem that Barthes did not bother to address. (Välimäki 2005: 326)
Agreed. Within Barthesian frame all the music undoubtedly could be 
deluged into jouissance. But music and vocal qualities need not to be 
doomed to remain as jouissance only, despite what Barthes himself 
continuously postulates in writing. Rather than studying voice Barthes 
suggested another interesting approach: to study the resistances that 
prevent from addressing voice (Barthes 2005: 78-79). Such a project 
could well start from his own writings.23
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Озвучивание Нейтрального в Невидимом хоре 
«Парсифаля» Рихарда Вагнера
Многие работы Ролана Барта свидетельствуют о том, что Барт был 
скептичен в вопросах способности к означиванию музыки и голоса. 
В то же время его несколько ограниченное понимание музыки и 
голоса не значит, что мы не можем использовать его семиотические 
теории, поскольку неучтенным самим Бартом образом их можно 
применить и при анализе музыкальных произведений. «Нейтраль­
ное» (Le Neutre) является повторяющейся темой в работах Барта, 
начиная с его первой работы «Нулевая степень письма» (1953) и 
кончая серией лекций 1978 года в Коллеж де Франс, посвященных 
понятию «нейтральное». Данная статья анализирует, каким образом 
бартовское «нейтральное» способствует слушанию определенного 
типа. Материалом анализа являются загадочные звуки, произво­
димые Невидимым хором в «Парсифале» Ричарда Вагнера, точнее 
одна конкретная фраза в первом акте (“Nehmet hin meinen Leib 
[...]”). В данном случае нас интересует не столько семантика этой 
фразы, столько то, как эта фраза озвучена и как в этой фразе и на ее 
фоне доносится бартовское «нейтральное». Слушание этого «нейт­
рального» возможно по нескольким концертным записям. Мой 
анализ показывает, что «нейтральное» не является чем-то 
обособленным, а действует вместе с другими видами обозначения 
(визуальное, текстуальное, биографическое).
Neutraalsele hääle andmine Richard Wagneri 
Parcifali Nähtamatus Kooris
Mitmed Roland Barthes’i tööd annavad tunnistust sellest, et Barthes oli 
skeptiline muusika ja hääle tähistamise võime suhtes. Samas ei tähenda 
tema enda pisut piiratud arusaam muusikast ja  häälest seda, et me ei 
tohiks tema semiootilistest teooriatest ja  mõttearendustest inspiratsiooni 
ammutada, kuivõrd neid on võimalik muusikalistele allikatele rakendada
Barthes’i enda poolt ettearvamatutel viisidel. ‘Neutraalne’ (Le Neutre) on 
korduv teema Barthes’i töödes, alates tema esimesest teosest Kirja 
nullaste (1953) kuni 1978. aasta ‘neutraalse’ mõistele pühendatud loengu­
seeriani College de France’is (avaldatud 2002. aastal). Käesolev artikkel 
analüüsib seda, kuidas Barthes’i ‘neutraalne’ soodustab teatud sorti 
kuulamist. Analüüsi taustaks on mõistatuslikud helid, mille toob kuulda­
vale Nähtamatu Koor Richard Wagneri Parsifalis (1882), täpsemini üks 
konkreetne fraas altide ja tenorite esituses (“Nehmet hin meinen Leib 
[...]”, esimene vaatus). Antud juhul ei huvita meid niivõrd (kirja)keele 
abil esitatud semantiline sisu, vaid see, kuidas nimetatud fraas on 
kuuldavale toodud ja  täpsemalt, kuidas selle fraasi sees ja  taustal kostub 
Barthes’i ‘neutraalne’. ‘Neutraalse’ kuulamine on võimalik mitmes 
Bayreuthis tehtud kontsertiindistuses. Mu analüüs näitab, et ‘neutraalne’ 
ei ole midagi eraldiseisvat, vaid toimib koos teiste tähistamisviisidega 
(visuaalse, tekstuaalse ja biograafilisega).
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L ’effet de гёе1 revisited: 
Barthes and the affective image
Sirkka Knuuttila
Institute for Art Research, Comparative Literature, 
P.O. Box 3, 00014 University o f Helsinki, Finland 
e-mail: sirkka.knuuttila@ welho.com
Abstract. This article addresses Barthes’s development from a structuralist 
semiotician towards an affectively responding reader in terms o f ‘post- 
rational’ subjectivity. In light o f his whole oeuvre, Barthes anticipates the 
understanding o f  emotion as an integral part o f  cognition presented in 
contemporary social neuroscience. To illustrate Barthes’s growing awareness 
of the importance o f this epistemological move, the article starts from his 
textual ‘reality effect’ as a critical vehicle o f  realist representation. It then 
shifts to his attempt at conceptualising an affective reading which resists the 
universalising idea o f one ideologically determined signified. Barthes’s 
progress towards embracing the actual reader’s embodied self-feeling is 
prompted by two conceptual milestones: the obtuse meaning found in 
cinematic stills, and the experience o f  punctum  felt in photos. In light o f his 
lectures in the College de France, Barthes substitutes the Husserlian 
disembodied method o f introspection with the Chinese wu-wei as a reading 
practice. As a result, his Zen-Buddhist concentration on bodily feelings 
elicited by visual/verbal images becomes a method capable o f creating a 
fruitful link between language and wordless cognition. Finally, the article 
proposes an idea o f the ‘embodied reality effect’ by reading affectively two 
similar scenes interpreted by the early and late Barthes himself.
I have a disease: I see language.
Roland Barthes1
Barthes 1977: 161.
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When Roland Barthes in 1968 gave the description o f Charlotte 
Corday in prison as a typical example that conveys Veffet de reel in 
M ichelet’s Histoire de France,2 he left the problem of the lost 
signified open for further explorations. For Barthes, the peculiar effect 
o f a realistic discourse is a “direct collusion o f the signifier and the 
referent” (1986a: 147), while the signified is entirely turned out from 
the signification process. Seen in the perspective o f his whole oeuvre, 
for Barthes the nature o f the signified is a nodal centre in the 
mediation process o f ‘reality’,3 which he has approached ever since in 
numerous ways and theoretical frames. Especially when adopting the 
Kristevian notion o f signifiance in Le troisieme sens in 1973, he 
orients towards the bodily sensing o f images. Also his demand of a 
theory o f reading verbal and visual signs in Sur la lecture published in 
1976, supposes new answers to be found with a reformulated notion of 
a reading experience. But what is most exciting for the purposes of 
this essay is his proposed answer to the problem of the lost signi­
fied —  an absent content —  from a temporal perspective to reality in 
La chambre claire, published originally in 1980. He makes it, for 
instance, by musing affectively before the photograph of Lewis Payne, 
who was prosecuted for an attempted assassination o f the Secretary of 
the State W. H. Seward (Barthes 1981: 95-96). Strikingly, just like 
Corday, Payne is sitting in prison just before his execution and posing 
not for a painter, but for a photographer.
The similarity o f the two images o f Corday and Payne is the 
starting point for this essay by revealing for me the late Barthes’s deep 
devotion to the bodily experience in reading. My purpose is to illu­
minate Barthes as one o f those thinkers who, besides understanding 
the experience o f image/text as a culturally mediated rhetoric 
construction, challenges the very nature o f the notion of ‘rational’ by 
taking the corporeally lived, emotional aspect o f  the experience as an 
integral component o f signification.
Throughout his entire career, Barthes addresses the questions of 
body and affect in relation to the problem o f textual referential ity; the 
‘text’ referring extensively to all cultural signifying systems, including
2 The original scene can be found in Michelet, Jules 1967, Histoire de France, 
La Revolution, vol. V. Lausanne: Ed. Rencontre, 292 (Barthes 1986a: 141).
3 With ‘reality’ and the ‘real’, I refer to Barthes’s usage o f  these concepts in 
L 'effet de reel. There they denote the lived world as something, which in the end 
defies any representation and meaning (see Barthes 1986a: 146).
those where the body is presented as an erotic object o f consumption.4 
A gradual but clear development continues in his work: from a reader 
leaning on textual autonomy to a reader feeling affectively the 
movements o f and within the body. Parallel to acting in the realm o f 
the post-modern textual epistemology which tended to exclude signs 
of the lived body from semiotics, Barthes’s early ideas o f image as a 
mediated experience lay the basic concepts o f social semiotics for the 
ideological critique o f our everyday practices. Already then, when 
analysing the usage o f non-linguistic signs in social situations such as 
fashion and commercial advertisements, he often points to the role o f 
emotion in the signification process. This tendency increases towards 
the middle o f the seventies, when Barthes openly begins to celebrate 
his affective, multiple, bodily experience in and o f the world.
Finally, Barthes ends up with a systematic introspection o f his own 
intrinsic reactions to photography in La chambre claire (1980). This 
was made possible through his experiences in Japan where he 
developed an enthusiasm for Zen Buddhist concepts and their scope o f 
meaning beyond Western binary thinking systems. In my view, he 
later uses this orientation for an embodied seeing and reading o f 
cultural objects in an experiential presence, which leaves behind 
Western theorisation without losing scientific precision. More preci­
sely, as Barthes heads towards the pleasure o f aesthetic plenitude felt 
in a historical body, he moves from the lost signified and textual 
alienation towards a reading in which emotion is recognised as a mode 
of processing knowledge in an intimate connection o f cognition.
Drawing from this developmental trajectory, I will envision 
Barthes’s progress towards the concept o f a multisensory, affective 
body as the central historical site o f an experiential human being, be it 
a writer, reader or viewer. In the light o f  his late writings comprised o f 
the lectures held in the College de France in 1976-1979, and La 
chambre claire (1980), Barthes’s concept o f a textual ego pervaded by 
jouissance fuses with a Taoist, non-possessive, lived body in favour o f 
a synaesthetic, euphoric vision o f the world. This trajectory shows 
Barthes in search o f a concept o f subjectivity reminiscent o f the 
theoretical idea o f an embodied mind elaborated by cognitive 
psychology and social neuroscience from the beginning o f the nineties
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1 See, for example, ‘ Le Corps' in the essay Societe, imagination, publicite  
(Barthes 1994/ 1995: 514-516; originally published in 1968).
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on. On this basis, my goal is finally to propose a renewed inter­
pretation o f his ‘reality effect’ in terms o f our innate faculty o f expe­
riencing the world through sensory and perceptual routes in the 
presence o f a seamless cooperation o f emotion and cognition 
(Knuuttila [in press]). This process is included in the idea of a ‘post- 
rational’ subjectivity, which is characterised by an innate, immediate 
ability to mirror other people’s intentions and meanings.' Seen in this 
frame, anticipating a theory o f empathic reading/writing as a mode of 
witnessing the ongoing history o f ordinary people, and not a history of 
experts and scholars, Barthes stands with those thinkers who partake 
in the long project o f reformulating Cartesian rational subjectivity.
The missing emotion of the reality effect
One persistent thread in Barthes’s writings is his many-sided 
commentary on the relationship between connotation and referentiality 
in literature and historiography.6 Committed to analyse all types of 
representations as a vehicle o f political power, he systematically 
challenges automatic meanings elicited by verbal and visual dis­
courses by uncovering the processes o f mythologisation in the context 
o f everyday life. Two of his central, though extreme positions deal 
with such processes. First, the ideological critique of the sixties
My term ‘post-rational’ originates from Vittorio F. Guidano, who emphasises 
that "while thinking usually changes thoughts, only feeling can change emotions” 
(Guidano 1991: 96). As he states, rationality is intrinsically relativistic, while the 
self-organising, self-referential system o f  every subject continuously reorders 
‘‘immediate experiencing (“I”) into a conscious sense o f  self and the world 
(“M e”)” (Guidano 1991: 95-96). However, a “stable, and at the same time, dy­
namic demarcation between what is real and what is not in [a subject’s] ongoing 
praxis o f  living” (Guidano 1991: 95), is enabled only through distinguishing 
perception from illusion verbally in a social interaction with other people (Toskala
& Hartikainen 2005: 27).
6 Barthes’s early interest in an empty signifier which has no definite signified 
has its resonance in Roman Jakobson’s ‘zero signs’ in linguistics as well as in 
Louis H jelm slev’s non-signifying sign elements, figurae  (Chandler 2002: 74-75; 
Barthes 1994).
7 See Barthes’s model o f the mythologisation o f sign in the chapter o f “Myth today” 
in Mythologies (1994: 18); about its connection to Louis Hjelmslev’s preceding model 
in his Prolegomena to a Theory o f  Language, see Silverman 1983: 26-27.
attacks literary realism by claiming its signifier to be emptied o f all 
content in prosaic representations. Second, the visual explorations o f 
the seventies unveil the inability o f canonised analytic studies o f 
media to include the presence o f the embodied aspects o f  life. Already 
in Le degre zero de I ’ecriture (1953), Barthes juxtaposes the discourse 
of modernist poetry with classical realist texts, thereby foretelling his 
characterisation o f the aesthetic mission o f modernism as “challenging 
the age-old aesthetic o f ‘representation’” presented in L ’effet de reel 
(Barthes 1986a: 148). Starting from an obvious conflict between 
verisimilitude and truth, he iteratively calls for counter-narratives8 
which could put into effect the task o f modernist aesthetics: the 
“disintegration o f sign” (Barthes 1986a: 148). To shed light on his 
aspirations for alternative subtexts, I will concentrate on two o f his 
articles considering the details o f literary and cinematic mimesis: first, 
L ’effet de reel (1968), and second, Le sens obtus (1970). Together 
these texts illuminate his semiotic account o f the problems o f 
referentiality in the verbal and visual image.
The outline o f Barthes’s progress in thinking about referential 
aspects of image is roughly as follows.9 First, after laying the basis for 
his concept o f reality effect in 1966-1967,10 he gives in L 'effet de reel 
a concise analysis o f the process o f emptying the signified in realistic 
representations in favour o f his much debated “direct collusion o f the 
signifier and referent” (Barthes 1986a: 147). He uncovers the 
naturalising discourse o f the realistic novel and historiography as an 
ideologically marked chain o f signifiers, which rather points to the 
absence o f reality from realistic discourses than to the lived ‘real’ 
itself. In the mood o f his post-modern contemporaries, he tries to 
resist the normative, controlling, political practice o f  texts similar to 
that of classical rhetoric in France. But while seeing human 
experiential truth as reduced to a decorative rhetoric, Barthes does not
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For example, in Le troisieme sens, Barthes understands the sens obtus to be an 
“epitome o f a counter-narrative; disseminated, reversible, set to its own 
temporality” (Barthes 1982: 328).
For my description o f Barthes’s developm ent at the turn o f the decade I am 
indebled to Auli V iikari’s insightful article Ancilla narrationis vai kutsumaton 
haltiatar? Kuvauksen poetiikkaa [Ancilla narrationis, or an uninvited fairy? 
Poetics o f description] (Viikari 1993).
10 In the articles Introduction a Vanalyse structural de recit (1966) and Le 
discourse de I ’histoire (1967).
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reject the idea o f textually produced pleasure and embodied presence. 
Quite the contrary, his neglect o f the sensory and affective power of 
metaphor is temporary, even purposeful. Dazed by haiku poetry and 
the Zen Buddhist notion o f satori after his Japanese journey,11 he soon 
turns to analyse his own ephemeral feelings elicited by Sergei 
Eisenstein’s stills so as to transform them into the idea o f sens obtus in 
Le troisieme sens. While this move makes visible the emotional 
component o f image through Eisenstein’s theory o f the vertical 
reading o f the still, it lays the basis for the idea o f punctum as an 
affective practice o f seeing —  feeling —  a photograph. And while 
Barthes uses an introspective method he elaborated via an Eastern 
philosophical roundabout in order to avoid the terms o f Husserlian 
phenomenology, the development o f his ideas culminates in the 
practice o f  an embodied, affective reading o f images with the mind’s 
eye, textualised in La chambre claire.
In L ’effet de reel, Barthes crystallises the problem of normative 
content in realism in the concept o f an emptied signified. He finds it 
typical for all representative discourses, which try to mimic the truth 
o f reality, including the efforts to enliven the ‘real’ world with 
photographs or exhibitions o f authentic objects (Barthes 1986a: 146). 
Critical towards structuralism, he claims that the central devices 
transmitting a truthful world for a modem reader o f realism are 
narratologically meaningless and non-functional descriptions and 
details o f the everyday reality, termed the ‘reality effect’.12 To 
illuminate the effect o f this device in the long continuum of Western 
rhetoric as a contrast to medieval fantasy and classical eloquence, 
Barthes uses short passages that he understands as verbal efforts to 
create a feeling o f verisimilitude. They are, for example, the scene of 
Corday in M ichelet’s historiography mentioned above, or the bour-
11 Originating from Barthes’s visit to Japan, the parallelism of image and text 
presented in his L ’Empire des signes (1970) is one example of an invisible 
interconnection o f visual and verbal presentations meant to provoke a double 
signifying register o f the unconscious and conscious activities in the reader’s 
preconscious (see Silverman 1983: 72; Barthes 1994/1995: 745).
12 Barthes’s distinction between classicism and modernism lies between Balzac 
and Flaubert (Barthes 1967: 32), while the ‘real’ world signifies for him the 
historical ‘flesh w orld' we live in. And when he chooses Flaubert’s text as an 
example o f  literary realism, he emphasises its historical simultaneity with the 
tradition o f writing absolute History, which represents for him a rather short 
period o f  some decades in French historiography.
geois setting in Flaubert’s short story Un coeur simple where a 
barometer may play the role o f a meaningless object. For my purpose, 
however, the most telling example o f Barthes’s critical position to 
realism is his approach to Flaubert’s ekphrasis o f Rouen in Emma 
Bovary.u Making Rouen palpable by a few' verbal substitutions o f the 
historical place, the lyrical exactitude o f this passage is for him one 
“jewel o f a number o f rarely brilliant metaphors” o f the novel (Barthes 
1986a: 144). It reads as follows:
[L]es mats comme une foret d’aiguilles, les lies comme de grands poissons 
noirs arretes, les nuages comme des flots aeriens qui se brisent en silence 
contre une falaise [...]  Ainsi, vu d’en haut, le paysage tout entier avait Fair 
immobile comme une peinture. (Barthes 1994/1995: 482)
[TJhe masts like a forest o f  needles, the islands like huge motionless black 
fish, the clouds like aerial waves silently breaking against a cliff [...1 Thus, 
seen from above, the whole landscape had the motionless look o f  a painting. 
(Barthes 1986a: 144-145)
According to Barthes’ post-modern reading, the beauty o f the three 
impressive similes o f the passage is “subject to the tyrannical 
constraints o f what we must call aesthetic verisimilitude” (Barthes 
1986a: 145). When he prefers to read the image as a mimetic portrayal 
of the ‘real’ world, Flaubert’s heavy, threatening scene hardly seems 
to point to the ‘real’ world in itself. Rather, being a verbal copy o f a 
painting-like visual representation, the scene carries a functional chain 
of familiar connotations. It thus limits itself to a reduced signified 
whose sole denotative meaning is evoked by another, already thought- 
out signifier, whereupon the whole scene attains a status o f a mere 
“irrelevant” yet necessary excess in the construction o f the artificial 
world. As a result, producing an absence o f the signified o f the ‘real’, 
the signifier o f realism passes over all connotative signified by 
substituting them with one normative referent which tends to 
naturalise history (Barthes 1986a: 145).
Conspicuously, while refraining here from all explorations o f how 
a mental representation o f a past or fictional world is constituted in 
mind, Barthes puts aside the actual reader’s perceptual and affective 
responses to the atmosphere o f the image, which would characterise 
an act of creative reading. He discards deliberately the sensory charge
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(on the historical usages o f  the term, see Mitchell 1994: 151-152).
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of the multitude o f Flaubert’s modernist signified in favour o f his idea 
o f an obscure collusion o f the textual signifier and one normative 
referent. Thus the early Barthes seems to ignore the simultaneity of 
those direct and indirect figural devices which can “point to emotions 
and suffering without pointing at them”, using Philippe Roger’s words 
o f Barthes’s late writings (Roger 2001: 531). However, he fairly soon 
sketches out the analytical system of connotative codes in S/Z (1973), 
and the interpretative exercise of still —  a kind o f visual parallel to 
Flaubert’s ekphrasis —  by Eisenstein’s vertical reading in Le 
troisieme sens (1973). But at the historical moment of 1968, Barthes 
commits him self to deconstruct the naturalising tendency of realistic 
discourse as an ideological gesture. His ambition is to uncover its 
pretended nature as a representation, which is to persuade, assure, and 
convince the reader o f a predefined order in the world. As an outcome, 
the signified is conflated with the referent, while the signifier given is 
understood to evoke just one consistent, safe, and illusory world 
typical to the ideological goals o f bourgeois realism and the history of 
scholars.
Nevertheless, as Michael Sheringham points out, what typifies 
Barthes’s production from his early writings to the late is his aspira­
tion to a third level o f meaning formation that emerges by virtue of 
some unknown residues o f signification which exceed the normative 
ones (Sheringham 2006: 194). Indeed, Barthes’s cogent criticism of 
referential illusion proposes that whereas the signified o f denotation is 
erased from the realistic speech-act; the ‘real’ “returns to it as a 
signified o f connotation” (Barthes 1986a: 148, italics added). This 
statement leaves the door open for the whole spectrum of a signified 
arising from an actual reader’s personal flesh world and her/his 
specific cultural context. But while insisting on one signified as 
determined by the bourgeois context for canonised realist narratives, 
Barthes is not aware o f the impact o f post-modern ideology on himself 
which compels him to stick to an analysis o f automatic denotations 
creating fallible feelings o f  ‘reality’. He thus happens to ignore the 
indexical, affective and procedural, aspect o f the interpretant elicited 
by any discourse in the reader’s individual body.14 Therefore,
14 In my view, taking into account the embodied, historical indexicality of the 
interpretant, we can specify how discourses act as referential bridges from text to 
world in semiosis, an idea proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin, Paul Ricoeur, and 
Edward Said. Indeed, as Eelco Runia succinctly notes, Barthes’s theory points to
Barthes’s critique o f realistic discourse cannot yet be suggestive o f a 
theory of representation which recognises emotion as a (missing) 
component o f cognition in the long venture o f rectifying the Cartesian 
rational concept o f subjectivity. The result is that, while neglecting the 
sensing, affective body as a source o f knowing by his somewhat 
mystical collusion o f signifier and referent, Barthes’s interpretation 
seems to perpetuate the Cartesian idea o f a bodiless mind at this stage 
of his intellectual progress.
Towards a lived body in presence: 
The poetics of still
Today, as the relationship o f emotion and cognition in human intellec­
tual activity is under a profound re-evaluation, it is possible to see 
more clearly the limited role o f emotion in Barthes’s early writings. 
From the beginning o f the nineties, a revised concept o f an embodied 
subjectivity is gradually formulated by cognitive psychology, 
especially in its line o f radical constructivism, assisted and supported 
by the remarkable empirical evidence o f contemporary neuroscience.15
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the possibility o f presence in the absence o f  history/reality as a “stowaway” 
through common metonymies, which act as “temporal fistulae” between past and 
presence (Runia 2006: 1, 16). This idea is akin to Barthes’s own statement that 
vraisemblance is expressed merely through common opinion (Barthes 1986a: 
147). However, Runia does not consider our innate faculty to respond to 
perceptual material affectively as an embodied mirroring in the production o f 
mental representations o f other people and the world, nor does he discuss the 
evidence that such mirroring is evoked also by linguistic expressions (see Keen 
2006: 209).
|s The renewed concept o f  subjectivity is effectively formulated by the cognitive 
theorist Vittorio Guidano, who in his work S elf in Process (1991) lays a fruitful 
basis for a concept o f a processual self developing in a mutual affective and 
embodied connection with the m/other. The roots for G uidano’s and Gianni 
Liotti’s theoretical approach o f radical constructivism, developed in the 
Psychiatric Clinic o f the University o f Rome, are based on the ideas o f Francisco 
Varela and Humberto M aturana originating from the seventies, while the theory o f 
emotion is reformulated by Joseph LeDoux and, especially, Antonio Damasio and 
numerous other cognitive neuroscientists in the nineties. Moreover, despite doubts 
concerning the relevance o f neuroscience to psychoanalytical practice, an active 
international debate continues on the position and nature o f  Freudian 
psychoanalysis in this developing configuration, while a theoretical line called
The concept o f  a feeling, post-rational, subjectivity allows for the 
seamless cooperation o f emotion and cognition as a foundation for 
human intellectual activity and social capacity (Damasio 2003; 
LeDoux 1996). Currently, emotion is understood as ubiquitous and 
dialogical in all cognitive activity in the regulation o f our choices and 
reasoning. What is more, it is the basis o f our social capability, for it 
partakes in our innate mirroring o f the other person’s intentions and 
feelings through a continuous registration o f the flow of non-verbal 
signs (Rizzolatti et al. 2001; Gallese 2005; Iacoboni 2005; Keen 
2006).16 Furthermore, the theory o f an embodied subjectivity supposes 
that a wordless, visuo-spatial and procedural —  multisensory, 
visceral, and proprioseptic —  knowing is on an upper level in the 
functional structure o f human consciousness in relation to language 
(Toskala 2006; Guidano 1991; Damasio 2000). For literary and media 
studies this implies, for instance, that the affective and dynamic visuo- 
spatial component o f metaphor has to be taken along as an integral 
part o f information processing when reading cultural representations, 
whereupon a place for an embodied historical reader is prepared 
(Knuuttila [in press]; Miall 2006). On this ground, to introduce a con­
sistent theory o f reading, one has to postulate an embodied, affective 
historical reader, and embrace the role o f the indexical aspect of the 
sign as a component o f reading response.
In this theoretical frame, I follow how the sense o f a feeling body 
increases in Barthes’s theorising on image towards the end of the 
seventies. The embodied response he reports to have in face of visual 
material evokes the idea o f an indexical referentiality residing in an 
affective perception o f filmic and photographic images. An impressive 
prologue to this phase is a passage in Le degre zero de I ’ecriture, 
where Barthes indicates his enthusiasm for the violent autonomy of 
modernist poetry (Barthes 1967: 35-43). In contrast to the controlling 
economics o f classical realism, he experiences the verbal imagery of 
new poetry (since Rimbaud, not including Baudelaire) to be endlessly
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neuropsychoanalysis points to some important ideas relevant for a renewed 
concept o f transference.
16 The neural correlate o f  mirroring the other person’s intentions, feelings, and 
motivations seems to be a complex mirror neuron system, which, however, can 
never be equated with the system o f psychological functioning, while the 
incompatibility and incommensurability o f these two disparate representative 
systems is doomed to remain eternal (see Damasio 2000: 83).
liberating due to the explosive power o f its multiple signified. As if 
anticipating the idea o f obtus, Barthes views the intellectual and 
emotional condensation o f modernist poetry to give birth to a vertical 
discourse (Barthes 1967: 40),17 which opens the way for an un­
expected but ripened thought in and through a co-presence o f arbitrary 
words.
However, although it marks a revelation o f truth for Barthes which 
he expresses in one o f his most beautiful passages, he feels that 
modernist poetry excludes the reader by changing Nature into isolated, 
frightening objects without continuity. Reading modernist poetry 
seems for him to plunge one terrified into an existential thrownness in 
an estranged world, and leave one detached from social connections 
with other people (Barthes 1967: 42).18 This experience leads 
Barthes—  a future master o f poetic fragments —  to characterise 
modernist poetry as an unhistorical and unethical “climate” arisen 
from the fragmentary qualities o f a discourse where there is “no 
humanism” (Barthes 1967: 42^43). But what is more important, his 
own existential curiosity propels him towards the idea o f an ephemeral 
third meaning, the obtus. This quest compels him to ask the most 
relevant questions concerning the anti-Cartesian reformulation o f a 
feeling subjectivity.
It is surprising how clearly the absence o f emotion from the theory 
of mind can be seen in Barthes’s search for the essence o f the obtuse 
meaning when reading an image. In terms o f his triple division o f 
meaning presented in Le troisieme sens, Barthes was not interested in 
the first mode, information transmitted in communication. Rather, he 
wanted to scrutinise the fundamental nature o f the second, symbolic 
signification in relation to the third, the obtuse meaning. In contrast to 
the obvious, the obtuse meaning corresponds in the first place to Julia 
Kristeva’s term signifiance as a bodily process, which has more to do 
with the signifier than the signified (Barthes 1982: 319). Being con­
vinced that there exists a kind o f excess o f  visual content in Eisen-
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He writes: “Fixed connections being abolished, the word is left only with a 
vertical project, it is like a monolith, or a pillar which plunges into a totality o f  
meanings, reflexes, and recollections” (Barthes 1967: 40).
IH More precisely, while Nature becomes a “succession o f verticalities”, and 
“objects filled with all their possibilities”, the reader is left alone with “inhuman 
images o f heaven, hell, holiness, childhood, madness, and pure matter” (Barthes 
1967: 42).
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stein’s stills, Barthes observed that the signified o f this “evident, 
erratic, obstinate” meaning was extremely hard to explicate. He 
writes: “1 do not know what its signified is, at least I am unable to give 
it a name, but I can see clearly the traits, the signifying accidents of 
which this —  consequently incomplete —  sign is composed: a certain 
compactness [ . ..]” (Barthes 1982: 318).
Today this eloquent textual groping evokes a certain kind of 
embarrassment, for it seems to indicate symptomatically our huge 
ignorance o f the role o f  emotion in intellectual thinking throughout 
modernism. Strikingly similar to Barthes’s insignificant reality effect 
and the unknown obtus, emotion has been taken for an excess while 
still being the necessary opposite to reason in the Western concept of 
subjectivity in its long Cartesian history. This gap makes Barthes’s 
endeavour to identify the signified o f the obtuse meaning still more 
valuable, even when he draws on euphemisms in describing the 
essence o f this ‘something’ whose unknown existence he never seems 
to doubt, and which seems to imply a wordless, emotional mode of 
cognition occurring on the core level o f  the subject (see Damasio 
2000: 169, 174).
Barthes specifies the impact o f stills on him self by itemising his 
felt responses to a selected cavalcade o f images o f Eisenstein’s Ivan 
the Terrible. The third meaning is an emotional, evaluative process 
where the reader is dismantled by the sign —  the same procedure 
completed with the punctum in relation to photographs in La chambre 
claire. But how does this disarming take place? In a way, the problem 
o f obtus echoes the question in Rhetoric de I ’image (1964) of what 
remains in the image when all connotative messages o f the iconic sign 
are deleted, but when its literal denotation remains uncertain and 
without a symbolic code (Barthes 1977a: 36, 42—43).19 In the form of 
obtus, this uncertainty is defined as a “spasm o f the signified” which 
is not empty; rather, it accentuates some transition point o f desire 
emerging on the boundary o f before and past (Barthes 1982: 327). But 
importantly, Barthes argues that obtus is not the gestural or facial 
expression o f an emotion, which belongs to the realm o f obvious 
meaning o f a realist, decorative image (Barthes 1982: 322).
19 Already in 1964, Barthes speaks about the temporal double structure of the 
photograph: being-there and having-been-lhere, whose repercussions one can 
hear, again, in La chambre claire (see Barthes 1977a: 44).
This limit draws my attention to the most telling example 
illuminating the incipient transition typical to obtus: the still o f an old 
Russian woman just before emitting an open cry o f grief. I am prone 
to interpret this fleeting moment as that o f the non-cognitive appraisal 
occurring in the body at the kindling point o f  a strong affect. Here this 
ephemeral moment o f an emerging emotional feeling begins with an 
impediment o f breathing when a person is not yet aware o f the 
intrusive change o f her/his bodily condition, but which can be re­
cognised non-verbally by another sensitive person.20 An apposite 
theoretical tool for grasping such an embodied psychological change 
is the concept o f ‘felt emotion’ as defined by Don Kuiken. In accor­
dance to ‘felt emotion’, obtus supposes the “experience o f inner 
tensions related to the response-organising activities o f the basic 
emotions, such as fear, anger, and sadness” (Kuiken 1995: 142). 
Furthermore, obtus may essentially be related to the psychic pheno­
menon of ‘felt engagement’, defined as an “experience o f inner 
tensions related to positions and actions taken vis-ä-vis the environ­
ment” (Kuiken 1995: 142).21
Drawing on these psychological premises, I define obtus as a 
feeling o f wordless, embodied cognition that emerges during the 
transition from one emotional condition to another, supposing that this 
transition can come into consciousness only when not verbalised, as 
Daniel N . Stem observes. However, as he notes, only an awareness o f 
such a felt experience provides the material for a possible verbal
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The fleeting moment at the beginning o f  an emotional wave is termed the non- 
cognitive appraisal in the judgment theory o f emotion (see Robinson 2005: 4 1 ^ 2 ;  
Knuuttila (in press}). Yet, to speak about ‘beginning’ o f an emotional feeling 
implies that the emotional process is understood to be a continual phenomenon 
where the lower and higher waves o f embodied feelings tend to emerge in turn so 
as to form a temporal contour o f vitality affects (Stem 2004: 64).
21 Behind both these concepts is Rudolf Amheim’s aesthetic notion o f  ‘felt 
presence’ o f an image, which implies that outer objects themselves have 
perceptible tensions that have a direct effect on the experience o f the spectator 
(Kuiken 1995: 142-143). I propose that ‘felt presence’ could be a pertinent device 
to deal with Barthes’s obtuse emotional reacting to the visual details o f  
Eisenstein’s stills, such as the “tenuous relationships between the contrasting 
curves o f the woman’s low headscarf, her closed eyes, and convex mouth” 
(Barthes 1982: 322). And when the visual object represents a human being, felt 
presence belongs to the realm o f mirroring the other, which makes the whole issue 
more complex.
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recounting (Stem 2004: 32). This approach explains Barthes’s 
intention to stop at one certain still where the uncertainty o f the affect 
is at its height, and reveals the beginning o f a violent emotional pro­
cess in one bodily flash which normally is beyond conscious 
perception. But because the obtuse meaning “does not copy anything” 
like the obvious one, to describe the emotion value it carries is 
impossible (Barthes 1982: 326). But tellingly, Barthes finds a suitable 
verbal articulation for his experience o f obtus in the haiku (Barthes 
1982: 327).22 This might be the same experience o f embodied 
knowing that makes Barthes write later: “I can neither read nor write 
what you produce, but I receive it, like a fire, a drug, an enigmatic 
disorganization” (Barthes 1977c: 118; his italics).
Barthes’s elaboration o f a new method o f deciphering image 
through the third meaning is based on the idea o f vertical reading 
which Eisenstein adapted in his still frames. According to Eisenstein, 
being a passage from language to significance, obtus is a counter­
narrative which, with its “accentuation within the fragment” — “the 
element ‘inside the shot’” —  “creates another film” by “structuring it 
differently [from within] without subverting the story” (Barthes 1982: 
332; his italics). Most importantly to literary interpretation, this idea 
suggests a reading practice that is based on an undulation of wordless, 
directly felt, embodied micro-narratives occurring as emotional 
transitions at the core level o f a sensing subject (see Stem 2004: 58). 
Such a practice is put into effect in Barthes’s own version of vertical 
reading ten years later, which marks his first step toward a systematic 
usage o f introspection as a method o f exploring affects elicited by 
photographic details.
Vertical reading could also have relevance as a method in the 
interpretation o f literary ekphrasis, which is comprised of a palimpsest 
o f  affective metaphors, such as Flaubert’s verbal image of Rouen 
quoted above. This idea gets a good sounding board in Barthes’s 
reading o f stills which in a way responds to his request for a theory of 
reading in the seventies. Already La mort de I 'auteur (1968), longs for 
a theory o f reading with its concept o f a reader as an intertextual space
22 Barthes cannot explicate the effect o f the woman’s figure, except by the simile 
“like a fish out o f water” (Barthes 1982: 322). However, he finds a more subtle expres­
sion in the haiku by which he manages to bring about the co-presence o f visual details 
to create the emotional meaning in the experiencing reader: “Mouth drawn / Eyes shut 
squinting /  Headscarf low over forehead / She weeps” (Barthes 1982: 326).
where all multiple aspects o f the text meet in the experience o f 
reading. Going further, Le Plaisir du texte (1973) begins to express 
Barthes’s own responses to texts he desired to read along with his 
personal predilections and affections. In Sur la lecture (1976), he 
states at first: “Unfortunately, reading has not yet encountered its 
Propp or its Saussure” (Barthes 1986b: 34). Then, specifying his 
earlier demand concerning “the birth o f  the reader must be at the cost 
of the death o f the Author” (Barthes 1977b: 148), he describes the 
bodily disorder o f a feeling, desiring reader. With the benefit o f 
hindsight, I see these undertakings as calling for a theory o f reading 
where emotion has a recognised function in processing knowledge not 
only as a catalyst, but also as a dimension o f non-verbal, embodied 
cognition (Knuuttila [in press]).23
Affective introspection as a method: punctum
A flesh world begins to show up more clearly in Barthes’s orientation 
toward the indexicality o f the feeling body in Le Plaisir du texte, 
where he formulates his concept o f the mundane subject as an 
enjoying entity full o f erotic pleasure. With his dialectical style by 
alternating T  and ‘he’ in Barthes par Barthes, he incarnates the 
internal division o f a dialogical, plural body, whose dialectics he 
exemplifies by echoing some earlier discussion: “Which body? We 
have several” (Barthes 1977c: 60). Oscillating between suffering and 
pleasure, his body is “especially: emotive: which is moved, stirred, 
depressed, or exalted or intimidated, without anything o f the sort 
being apparent” (Barthes 1977c: 60-61, his italics). Being aware o f 
his own panic provoked by the language used in domestic quarrels in 
his childhood (Barthes 1977c: 159),24 he continues to underline the
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In empirical literary research, the episodic simulation o f a textual passage is 
called ‘expressive enactment’, where a felt emotion and felt engagement o f the 
reader work together with the felt presence o f the object, and produce in the reader 
an emotional shift between bodily enacted episodes. This reaction is individual and 
depends on the autobiographical experiences o f the reader (Kuiken et al. 2004: 269, 
281-284; on emotion in metaphor and reading, see also Miall 2006, passim).
In this connection, Barthes comes up with a paradoxical maxim: “[A] cessa­
tion of language is the greatest violence that can be done to the violence o f  
language” (Barthes 1977c: 159).
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role o f language in creating subjectivity. In the fragment o f “Nouvelle 
sujet, nouvelle science”, he claims: “He [Barthes] wants to side with 
any writing whose principle is that the subject is merely an effect of 
language. He imagines an enormous science, in the utterance of which 
the scientist would at last include h im self—  the science o f the effects 
o f language” (Barthes 1977c: 79, his italics). Is this daydream of 
drowning him self in scientific language ironic? Anyhow, to counteract 
the scientific “madness o f language”, he complains that we — 
Western researchers —  throw a shadow o f suspicion on every 
utterance by revealing their graded meta-levels, whereby we call this 
abyss o f language as an act o f  utterance. He notes: “I write: this is the 
first degree o f language. Then, I write that I  write; this is the second 
degree o f language” (Barthes 1977c: 66, his italics).
Barthes’s weariness with meaningless theorising and his active 
search for the immediacy o f presence is finally concretised in the 
lectures o f College de France. He begins to explore certain Eastern 
concepts as substitutes for a number o f Western ones that cannot 
easily mediate the subtle qualities o f his craved, “antirelevant” 
experiences o f  Zen (Barthes 2005: 117). I find this turn a necessary 
pathway to the introspective method o f image whose indispensable 
results are seen in the verbal jewels o f La chambre claire. In Le 
Neutral (1977-1978), Barthes prepares himself this pathway towards 
a new research technique by exploring two key notions: Greek kairos 
and Chinese wou-wei (Barthes 2005: 169-171). Only then was he 
ready to adopt introspection as a systematic method of analysing his 
own affective reactions to photographs in a contemplative awareness 
o f his own body. Emphasising the Taoist wou-wei as an attitude of 
non-involvement, he completes it with the kairos o f the philosophical 
Sceptics o f the ancient Greek Academy to underline the non-dogmatic 
nature o f an “а-power” o f wou-wei (Barthes 2005: 170).25 From these 
elements, he develops a variation o f Husserlian phenomenological
25 Ho kairos refers to a right, appropriate measure, an appropriate, timely mo­
ment or opportunity. It points to the right, relaxed moment o f an occasion (Barthes 
2005: 169). Wou-wei implies non-action which guides one not to direct one’s 
strength, but rather to “suspend his judgment in cases where it is a question of 
arriving at the truth”. Its deepest attitude is “not to choose” (Barthes 2005: 176). 
Together, these two form an Eastern analogue to Husserl’s introspection, where 
unconscious or subconscious experiences may unfold into consciousness (see, 
e.g., Vermersch 1999).
reduction, however, with the difference that he substitutes its term 
epoche —  the gesture o f suspension —  with the non-action o f wou- 
wei combined with kairos —  the right moment (o f acting).
In this frame, Barthes’s last period can hardly be characterised as a 
time o f laziness (Saint-Amand 2001); by contrast, he purposefully 
propagates an active non-action as an alternative to the capitalist, 
commercialised, and hectic routines o f Western life. Similar to 
Husserlian epoche, but seldom using this term (see Barthes 2005: 
118), Barthes uses wou-wei to imply an abstinence from all judgments 
in order to find a lived, experiential presence in the corporeal 
awareness o f (his) personal existence. Thus, instead o f dealing with 
the abstract Husserlian transcendental ego, Barthes promulgates a 
contextual and temporal bodily presence in flesh. And when turning 
inwards, he does not forget an outward movement which guides him 
implicitly toward a renewed concept o f  indexical referentiality o f 
perceived objects transmitted through a sensing and feeling body (see 
Knuuttila 2007: 40-46, 49).
Eventually, during his mother’s terminal period o f life, Barthes 
touches the unresolved nature o f human procedural and emotional 
memory by exploring his bodily feelings evoked by photographs. The 
detailed self-reflexive response to these feelings presented in La 
chambre claire completes his lengthy philosophical predilection for 
visual historical objects. In the light o f his last lectures, La chambre 
claire can be identified as a result o f an introspective epoche: a 
standstill with photos in deliberate submission to the affective power 
of punctum: “desire, repulsion, nostalgia, euphoria” (Barthes 1981: 
21). When verbalising his mental movements, Barthes reads photo­
graphs as if exemplifying the method o f an empathic reading. 
Yielding himself to the image, he lets the visual sign dismantle him­
self through the ‘expressive enactment’ o f  a multitude o f sensations 
and affects (Kuiken et al. 2004: 269, 281-284; see note 23). He writes 
it down poetically, thanks to the free acceptance enabled by the Zen 
Buddhist state o f satori (Barthes 1994/1995: 745). But still more 
fruitful is the distance he takes from the Western phenomenological 
reduction, which tends to decontextualise the subject. Assuming a 
position o f wou-wei, as he surrenders to the insecure awareness o f all 
his affects and thoughts, Barthes relates them to his culture in studium 
by going through all those subconscious details o f  his autobio­
graphical existence that are elicited by the procedural, perceptual, and
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visceral memory o f punctum. Hence, the intentional object of 
Barthes’s introspection is twofold: when attempting to become 
conscious o f  his unconscious material, he also wants to be aware of 
the act o f  introspection itself. In other words, as he observes the 
structure o f  emerging affect with all its multisensory and perceptual 
components, he simultaneously explores the spontaneous verbalisation 
o f these emerging components.
As a result, the Barthesian combination o f two signifying practices 
o f Studium and punctum shows the subject as a continuous process 
between preconscious and conscious: the embodied, implicit memory 
and the symbolic, explicit memory.26 According to the radical 
constructivism o f embodied subjectivity, non-verbal, multi-sensoiy 
cognition precedes our verbal constructions o f the world, while 
emotion ubiquitously pervades the cognitive activity o f a socially 
competent, empathic subject. I interpret the late Barthes to exemplify 
this capability on the core level o f subjectivity. Following logically 
from this idea, his method o f introspection and its verbalisation as a 
viewer o f historical documents indicates his strong protest against a 
monological, possessive Western mind in favour o f a subjectivity 
which is continually reconstructed in human relationships and cultural 
contexts. This method is most fruitful in Barthes’s finding that the 
noema o f the photo is the temporal double structure “this will be” and 
‘this has been’, which fuses into an existential experience of the 
view er’s own mortality (Barthes 1981: 96). The duality o f this noema 
is profoundly historical to Barthes who wants the temporal paradox to 
continue in effect through touching figures. And being visual and 
verbal images o f historical individuals, such affective figures may 
remain in force by exciting our bodily memory by virtue of their 
interactional, indexical power.
26 A detailed analysis o f  this procedure is presented in Knuuttila 2007. The tension 
between Studium and punctum is similar to the tension which prevails between the 
experiential T  and self-reflexive ‘M e’ in Guidano’s cognitive terms, and to the 
Freudian fundamental dynamic tension between enactment and representation. A 
functional bridge between these two poles, as Kaja Silverman proposes, could be the 
early Freudian preconscious which is the potential source o f our figural talent, for it 
mediates between unconscious and conscious in the double-signifying register of 
thing-presentations and word-presentations (Silverman 1983: 72, 86).
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Conclusion: L ’effet de гёе1 revisited
To sum up, in light o f La chambre claire, I will reinterpret Barthes’s 
example o f Charlotte Corday compared with that o f Lewis Payne, who 
are in the same position as they are committed to death and will soon 
be executed due to their political actions. As presented in this essay, 
Barthes’s later writings offer a model o f multisensory affectivity in 
reading images with an awareness o f one’s own bodily and emotional 
reactions. This model prompts me to suggest a renewed notion o f an 
embodied reality effect when reading verbal portrayals o f  persons and 
milieus. Earlier, as Barthes questions the meaning o f “insignificant” 
textual details in L ’effet de reel, he claims their ekphrastic role in the 
creation o f a truthful sense o f the lived world to be conventional and 
naturalising in the realistic novel and historiography in the sense o f 
mere “luxury” or excess (Barthes 1986a: 141). He then passes over, in 
terms o f lost signified, the immersing signifiance o f the visuo-spatial 
and affective details o f the setting for a philosophical interpretation o f 
the image, such as Corday’s posture between the painter and the small 
door through which Corday is soon going to be executed. However, 
twelve years later, when mindfully regarding Lewis Payne’s 
photograph taken by Alexander Gardner in 1865 in a similar situation 
in prison, Barthes feels affectively the double temporal structure o f a 
historical document: the simultaneity o f “this will be” and “this has 
been”, but reversed into an existentially touching combination o f “77 
est mort et il va mourir’’ (Barthes 1994/1995: 1177). Extrapolating 
from the parallelism of these two images, 1 show the significance o f 
an embodied reading to M ichelet’s concise —  one sentence long in 
Barthes 1968 —  but visuo-spatially and affectively effective ekphrasis 
of the historical figure o f  Corday.
As Michelet indicates, just as Payne for the photographer, Corday 
poses for a painter who is completing her last portrait before her legally- 
planned execution —  a sign o f man-made trauma. Similar to Payne’s 
posture and direct gaze at the photographer, the text on Corday evokes at 
one verbal swoop a mental image where the prisoner is supposedly 
looking at the painter when sitting in the front o f the small door that leads 
to her only possible destiny: death. This scene is doubly compelling to the 
reader in terms of the sensory and affective perspective o f a post-rational 
subject. According to the theory o f wordless cognition and mirror neuron 
functioning, the viewed as well as the narrated gestures and qualities o f
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the object activate the recipient’s body, which exhibits the feelings and 
intentions o f that object in an inner drama of their embodied simulation.2' 
But this act is fundamentally dialogical, for when the reader adopts 
unconsciously the position o f the painter or the photographer, s/he also 
identifies her/himself with the role o f the posing prisoner through her/his 
mind’s kinaesthetic and affective, multisensory eye —  a “second sight” 
(Barthes 1981: 47). Being the route to the reader’s individual embodied 
memory, such a response implies unavoidably the creation of “another 
(emotional) film” o f the scene in the body: an embodied simulation of the 
wordless dialogue emerging from the dramatic tension between both 
accomplices o f the still as based on their mutual ‘felt engagement’.
Furthermore, as Barthes mentions, the careful knocking on the 
prison’s small door enhances the reader’s dramatic sense o f reality. But 
besides announcing the moment of death, the knocking increases the 
reader’s emotional confusion in her/his imagined place of a third 
person —  a witness —  as s/he is oscillating between the opposite roles 
o f the painter and the prisoner. The result is a persistent ambiguity: 
while the spatial and objectifying identification with the painter offers 
the reader an important role as an observer in relation to Corday who is 
soon to be executed, the identification with Corday tends to immerse the 
reader in the obtuse ‘felt emotion’ o f her/his own definitive death.2* The 
compelling outcome from this embodied reality effect is that the reader 
is to bear testimony o f historical atrocities from an ethically evaluative 
position o f a living, yet mortal historical person.
In conclusion, Barthes’s emphasis on experiential truth in reading 
these items o f cultural media can be seen as a foreshadowing of a 
theory o f empathic reading and the coming formation of the concept 
o f emotionally knowing subjectivity. Regarding his examples, since 
death through a planned execution is posed in the absolute past in the 
visual example o f Payne, Barthes finds his experiential self in the fear 
o f  a historical “catastrophe which has already occurred" (Barthes 
1981: 96).29 The trembling textual Barthes then manages to shift the
27 See Keen 2006: 209, 225 n3.
28 As presented earlier in this essay, ‘felt emotion’ refers to an “experience of 
inner tensions related to the response-organising activities o f  the basic emotions, 
such as fear, anger, and sadness” (Kuiken 1995: 142).
29 This experience points to an adaptive psychic process where the dissociated 
emotional part o f  the personality is integrated with the apparently normal part of 
the personality in the act o f  embodied viewing/ writing/ reading (cf. Howell 2005:
feeling o f the double temporality o f “this has been'’ and “this will be” 
into the flesh o f the viewer in La chambre claire. Likewise, the 
realistic portrayal o f Corday as a potentially dead person is not merely 
to produce a sense o f referential illusion by saying “I am reality” in a 
frame of one dominant and unique emplotment (Jay 2001: 473, 475). 
Instead o f one temporal signified —  that o f the imminent arrival o f 
death/executioner —  for an embodied recipient o f a documentary, a 
multitude o f signified may open up in the experiential truth o f her/his 
own corporeality through the awareness o f the living body at the 
moment o f reading. Finally, this is indicative o f  the return o f a 
multiple, multisensory, though disquieting, signified to a realistic 
representation, traced originally by Barthes himself.
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Еще раз об «эффекте реальности»: 
Барт и аффективное изображение
Настоящая статья посвящена развитию Ролана Барта из структура­
листского семиотика в чутко реагирующего (сверхчувствительного) 
читателя в смысле «пост-рациональной» субъективности. Рассмат­
ривая творчество Барта как одно целое, можно его считать пред­
шественником современной когнитивной науки, так как Барт считает 
эмоцию неразрывной частью познания. Чтобы показать, как осознан­
ность Барта этого эпистемологического изменения постепенно 
углублялась, данная статья начинает свой анализ с бартовского 
понятия «эффекта реальности», который является основным носи­
телем реалистической репрезентации. Далее Барт обращает свое вни­
мание на образование понятия аффективного чтения, которое проти­
востоит общепринятому пониманию об одном, идеологически заранее 
определенном обозначаемом. Дорогу Барта к пониманию чувств 
реального читателя поддерживают две идеи: «бесчувственность»
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значения кинокадров и опыт punctuma в фотографии. В лекциях, 
прочитанных в Коллеж де Франс, можно наблюдать, как Барт 
заменяет в своей читательской практике гуссерлевский метод бесте­
лесного внутренного наблюдения китайским методом wu-wei. Бла­
годаря этому из бартовского дзенбуддистского интереса к чувствам, 
вызванным визуальными/вербальными образами, вырастает отдель­
ный метод, который может создать плодотворную связь между 
языком и внеязыковой перцепцией. В конце статьи предлагается 
понятие «бестелесного эффекта реальности», поддерживаемое при­
мером аффективного чтения двух похожих сцен, которые сам Барт 
истолковывал в ранней и поздней стадии своей карьеры.
Taaskord ‘reaalsusefektist’: 
Barthes ja afektiiv ne kujund
Käesolev artikkel on pühendatud Barthes’i arengule strukturalistlikust 
semiootikust tundeliseks lugejaks ‘post-ratsionaalse’ subjektiivsuse mõis­
tes. Vaadates Barthes’i loomingut tervikuna, võib teda pidada moodsa 
sotsiaalse neuroteaduse eelkäijaks, kuivõrd Barthes peab emotsiooni 
tunnetuse lahutamatuks osaks. Illustreerimaks, kuidas Barthes’i teadlik­
kus sellest epistemoloogilisest muutusest järjest süvenes, alustab käesolev 
artikkel analüüsi tema tekstianalüütilisest mõistest ‘reaalsusefekt’, mis on 
realistliku esitusviisi põhiliseks kandjaks. Edasi pöörab Barthes oma 
tähelepanu afektiivse lugemise mõiste kujundamisele, mis astub vastu 
valitsevaks muutuvale arusaamale ühest ja  ainulisest ideoloogiliselt 
määratud tähistatavast. Barthes’i teed reaalses lugejas kehastunud tunnete 
mõistmise poole sillutavad kaks ideed: filmikaadrite tähenduse tuimus ja 
punctum‘\ kogemus fotograafias. College de France’is peetud loengutes 
võib näha, kuidas Barthes asendab lugemispraktikas husserlliku kehatu 
sisevaatluse meetodi hiina wu-wei meetodiga. Tänu sellele saab Barthes’i 
zen-budistlikust huvist visuaalsete/ verbaalsete kujundite tekitatud tunnete 
vastu eraldiseisev meetod, mis suudab luua viljaka sideme keele ja 
keeletu taju vahel. Artikli lõpuosas pakutakse välja ‘kehalise reaalsus- 
efekti' mõiste, esitades afektiivse lugemisnäite kahest samasest stseenist, 
mida Barthes’i ise karjääri varases ja  hilises järgus tõlgendanud oli.
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Abstract. The article is based on theories o f meaning creation and the 
concepts o f archaic mind o f Juri Lotman and Giambattista Vico. It compares 
the notions fantasia, ingegno, memoria and poetic logic by Vico with 
Lotman’s concepts o f  text, memory and modelling systems. Donald Phillip 
Verene’s and Marcel Danesi’s interpretations o f  Giambattista V ico’s work are 
also taken into consideration in the analysis. The article aims to bring out the 
characteristic features o f archaic meaning creation. The archaic mind is 
considered to be fundamentally poetic. Its main mechanism o f generating new 
meaning is metaphorical identification o f  two otherwise separate elements. 
The creativity o f this act lies in the presumption that imagination is needed to 
bring these two elements together —  they cannot be identified with each other 
by the means o f syllogistic logic. The archaic mind does not operate mainly 
with generic concepts, as rational mind does. It forms imaginative universals 
instead, which are based on the sense o f identity between objects or their 
parts, not on the sense o f similarity/ dissimilarity o f  distinct features o f  
objects. This process forms the basis o f poetic modelling, which is primary in 
relation to verbal modelling.
We find not Occam ’s razor, but Vico ’s magnet.
Donald Phillip Verene
Introduction
The aim of this article is to bring out some specific features o f the 
archaic mind based on the works o f two rather different authors: the
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18th century Napolitanian philosopher Giambattista Vico and Juri 
Lotman, a semiotician of the Tartu-M oscow school. The works of 
Giambattista Vico and Juri Lotman have previously been compared 
only once —  by Marcel Danesi (2000) in his article A note on Vico 
and Lotman.
According to Giambattista Vico, the archaic people organized their 
world in a principally different way from the bearers o f modem mind. 
V ico’s main premise is that the archaic mind is poetic. He maintains 
that the poetic principle also has an important role in the modem 
mind, especially in the process o f meaning creation. Juri Lotman and 
Boris Uspenskij (1978b) also proposed a form o f thought that operates 
differently from descriptive thought in their article Myth — Name — 
Culture.
There are many views on the concept o f archaic mind. Lucien 
Levy-Bruhl with his notion o f “savage mind” is usually considered to 
be the first who saw the archaic thought to be essentially different 
from the modem (Harkin 1998: 365). The best known treatment of the 
matter is Claude Levi-Strauss’s The Savage Mind (1969 [1962]). The 
present article takes it that the notion o f poetic thought sets 
Giambattista Vico to be the first who saw the so-called primitive mind 
as typologically different. More than two hundred years before Levi- 
Strauss, Vico described a mind that operates on the basis of poetic 
logic instead o f syllogistic logic. According to Vico, the archaic mind 
is essentially poetic and metaphorical, it has the capacity to generate 
language due to a primordial imagination. In Vico’s system, human 
thought began with, as Danesi (1993: 52) puts it “[...] primordial mind 
that would have had the capacity' to generate language. The essential 
feature o f this mind is imagination. It was therefore a mind that did its 
work on the basis o f  bodily experience, not analysis and deduction”.
Vico’s treatment o f  the matter bears much resemblance to 
Lotm an’s notion o f mythological thought as a type o f consciousness. 
Both authors base their analysis on the proposition that by analysing 
the structure o f culture, it is possible to define the structure of 
consciousness. Vico sees imagination as the nexus o f the beginning of 
human semiosis, Lotman (2005: 162) claims that “at first there was 
semiotic experiment” .
The concepts o f primordial knowledge and meaning creation of 
Vico and Lotman will be viewed here as partly coinciding and 
complementary. We treat the primordial poetic mind as an indepen­
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dent and specific type o f consciousness, but do not presuppose its 
actual occurrence in “pure” form.
Outlining his concept o f the archaic mind, Vico claims that we 
cannot access the primordial thought directly. “It is beyond our power 
to enter into the vast imagination o f those first men” (Vico 1984: 378). 
Trying to make sense o f it, “we had to descend from these human and 
refined natures o f ours to those quite wild and savage natures, which 
we cannot at all imagine and can comprehend only with great effort” 
(Vico 1984:338).
The incapability to imagine the archaic world means that the 
modem mind is not able to model it completely —  although it is 
possible to recognize the existence o f a basically different type o f 
consciousness and acquire adequate knowledge o f it to some extent.
The Tartu-Moscow school’s view on mythology is compatible 
with this approach.
Consistently mythological stage should pertain to a period o f  development 
that is so early that it cannot be observed both for chronological reasons and 
because o f the basic impossibility o f coming in contact with it [...] 
mythological consciousness in principle cannot be translated into the level o f  
a different description, is in itself closed. (Lotman, Uspenskij 1978b: 2 18 -  
219)
Linking mythological thought with primordial knowledge, the primal 
form of semiotic thought, and approaching the workings o f the mind 
through the analysis o f the semiotic world it creates, The New Science 
of Vico has inspired several interpretations by semioticians in the past 
two decades (Danesi 1991, 1995a, 1995b, 2000; Sebeok 2001; Verene 
1991, 1995). The semiotic interpretation o f Vico is relatively coherent, 
probably partly because only two authors —  Donald Phillip Verene 
and Marcel Danesi —  have so far aimed to apply V ico’s concepts 
directly to semiotic theory.
Vico’s approach to the notion o f metaphor contains views that 
have been considered innovative even in the last two decades. Frank 
Nuessel (1995) notes in his essay Vico and Current Work in Cognitive 
Linguistics that, for example, George L akoff s view on metaphor, 
language and imagination is Vichian in its nature, although having had 
no direct influence from Vico.
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In V ico 's mind, the beginning o f human world is linked to the 
appearance o f language. Vico describes the genesis o f linguistic capa­
city, not o f speech. Language appears as poetic characters (caratteri 
poetici) (Vico 1984: 34), which are not verbal. According to Vico, the 
primal language was mute (Vico 1984: 401, 434; also Ponzio 2006: 
238). Although Vico considers verbal speech to be neither the first nor 
the only expression o f the capability o f language, he approaches the 
question with a philological-philosophical m ethod—  by trying to 
discover the primordial iconic nature o f words in etymology. Verbal 
expression, although not uniquely, mirrors the modifications of the 
mind. V ico’s apprehension o f consciousness and culture has a 
common base with Lotman —  they both believe that the structure of 
consciousness can be described through the structure o f culture, and 
use the analysis o f texts to draw conclusions about the human mind. 
Obviously, the materials Vico uses when modelling the archaic 
consciousness are products o f a more contemporary' mind —  the epics 
o f Homer, for example, are texts that mirror the archaic mind, 
although they were bom in the process o f translating myth into poetry. 
The only way to understand the archaic mind is through such kind of 
translation.
Lotman and Uspenskij propose that from the standpoint of 
mythological consciousness, poetry is impossible (1978b).
On the other hand, Lotman concedes that “the functional confron­
tation o f art and myth is bom on the account of the possibility to 
‘read’ mythological texts in a non-mythological way” (Lotman, Mints 
1981c: 46). For Vico, myth is poetic and at the same time it is 
primordial. In The New Science, ‘poetic’ signifies certain firstness, a 
category7 prior to logical abstraction. “In Vico’s view the poetic, or 
what in more modem terms we would call the myth, is the beginning 
o f knowledge” (Verene 1995: 203).
Lotm an’s cultural-typological discrimination that excludes poetry 
from mythological world is grounded on defining poetry as free art of 
words. But Vico sees the poetic creation as a kind o f true narration, 
rather than as free art o f  words (Vico 1984: 401) —  as myth in 
modem terms.
Thus, in describing primordial meaning creation, Vichian tradition 
has used the term ’poetic', whereas the Tartu—Moscow school uses the
1. The elements of poetic meaning creation
Vico and Lotman: poetic meaning creation 141
term ‘mythological’. Both approaches discriminate between the 
modem and archaic culture by distinct features o f the meaning 
creation mechanism. In the current treatment, the term ‘poetic’ will be 
favoured. Both terms have many meanings that have little to do with 
this discussion, but ‘poetic’ is —  for its connection to metaphor 
theory —  more apt for the sense intended here.
1.1. Lotman’s notions ‘memory’ and ‘text’ in connection 
with Vico’s ‘fantasia % ‘ingegno ‘ memoria ’
Vico’s view on meaning creation can be presented through the notions 
of fantasia, ingegno, and memoria. For Vico, these terms signify 
primordial capabilities that allow for the primary operations o f  the 
human mind. (Vico 1984: 494^197). In Vico’s mind, all primary 
cognitive functions are attached to imagination. The three terms 
describe three main functions o f the primordial mind: fantasia —  the 
ability to imitate and change; ingegno —  the ability to create 
correspondence between things; memoria —  the ability to remember 
(Vico 1984:819).
Fantasia, ingegno and memoria integrate through identification, all 
of them being forms o f imagination.
Imagination however, is nothing but the springing up again o f reminiscences, 
and ingenuity or invention is nothing but the working over o f what is 
remembered. [...] since the human mind at the time we are considering [...] 
had not developed its powers o f abstraction by the many abstract terms in 
which languages now abound, it exercised all its force in these three excellent 
faculties which come to it from the body. (Vico 1984: 699)
1.1.1. Textuality
Individual human mind can be seen as a text. It is at least bilingual 
semiotic monad (Lotman 1997: 10). No text can exist in isolation. A 
text functions only in reciprocal relations with external elements, 
which means that the text is continuously in the situation o f 
translation. “The very existence o f culture implies the construction o f 
a system, o f some rules for translating direct experience into text”
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(Lotman, Uspenskij 1978a: 214). In V ico’s treatment o f the primordial 
mind, this system is formed in the activity o ffantasia and ingegno.
Fantasia as the ability to imitate is interpreted by Marcel Danesi as 
the capability to form mental images. “The fantasia's image-making 
capacity is a primordial power o f the human mind that makes 
cognition itself possible” (Danesi 2000: 103). The creativity of 
fantasia lies in its ability to separate an object from its direct context, 
so that it can be included in the process o f thought as an arbitrary 
image and can as such serve as the basis for creating new mental 
entities by entering freely into new connections (Danesi 2000: 102). 
Fantasia, ingengo and memoria are the powers necessary for creating 
and preserving mental images —  they are the foundation of human 
meaning creation and free combining. This view on the peculiarity of 
anthroposemiosis is in accordance with John Deely’s conception, 
where uniquely human capability o f creating textuality is characte­
rised by
signs whose relation to what they signify, over and above associations among 
perceptible objects, is grounded in the codes o f an apprehension socialized 
through free play among objects understood in their detachability from the 
perceptible means whereby they are brought into experience in the first place 
or any given case. (Deely 1991: 545)
Fantasia's nature and function, as described by Danesi, are also 
compatible with Lotman’s view on the premises o f the appearance of 
semiotic world:
The transformation o f the world o f  objects into the world o f signs is founded 
on the ontological presupposition that it is possible to make replicas: the 
reflected image o f a thing is cut o ff  from its natural practical associations 
(space, context, intension, and so on), and can therefore be easily included in 
the modelling associations o f  the human consciousness. (Lotman 2001: 54)
Human being is able to make replicas owing to fantasia — he/she 
imitates, creates mental images based on perceptional information; 
uses ingegno to relate images to each other; and is able to preserve the 
images by memoria. According to Danesi, ingegno is the power that 
allows for the appearance o f entirely new entities within the mental 
space (also Verene 1991: 105):
the ingegno is a derivative o f  fantasia —  a kind o f “epiphenomenal” activity, 
stimulating the mind to carry out its creative handiwork. It is thus not 
connected directly to neural processes, operating totally within mental space 
as it configures and creates models o f world events. (Danesi 2000: 104)
Similarly to the model based on the terms ‘fantasia ‘ingegno ’ and 
‘memoria ’, Lotman describes text as an intellect-like mechanism, the 
main characteristics o f which are that: “it has memory, where it can 
concentrate its previous meanings, and, at the same time, it has the 
ability to produce new nontrivial messages when connected to a 
communicative chain” (Lotman 1981a: 7). Ingegno produces imagina­
tive structures —  new units o f meaning —  presupposing the existence 
of perceptually obtained images {fantasia) and the capacity to save 
them (memoria).
Text functions as a meaning creating mechanism if the process o f 
associating the so far incompatible, translation in the situation o f 
untranslatability, takes place (ingegno’s function in Vichian system). 
“The asymmetrical relationship, the constant need for choice, make 
translation in this case an act o f generating new information and 
exemplify the creative function both o f language and o f the text” 
(Lotman 2001: 14-15).
The archaic human mind was not a passive system that suddenly 
obtained the capability o f language and rational thought —  these 
faculties appeared as an extension o f bodily experience. For Vico, 
imagination is a primordial innate power that is strongly attached to 
body and senses. “It is true that these faculties (fantasia, ingegno, 
memoria) appertain to the mind, but they have their roots in the body 
and draw their strength from it” (Vico 1984: 819). Primary textuality 
that enables to recognize a stimulus as semiotic, originates from the 
body. So for Vico meaning creation departs from body and individual 
consciousness. For Lotman individual consciousness is central: “the 
intersection of meaning-spaces, which gives birth to new meaning is 
connected to individual consciousness” (1992: 36).
1.1.2. Memory
It is clear that for Lotman, one o f the necessary properties o f text/ 
intellect is memory (Lotman 1981a: 7; 1995: 9; 2001: 18 and else­
where). Memory also has a special place in Vico’s system. He
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understands memory not as some passive storage space, but as an 
imaginative faculty. Nevertheless, Vico does not analyse memory 
explicitly in The New Science; he only mentions that memory is the 
mother o f muses (Vico 1984: 699; 819). Another point o f departure 
analysing the Vichian notion o f memory is its identifiability with 
imagination. Vico calls fantasia, ingegno and memoria the three 
aspects o f  memory (Vico 1984: 819). In V ico’s system, which allows 
identity between the elements, such a statement is not in the least 
paradoxical. In a certain sensq, fantasia, ingegno and memoria are one 
and the same and they can be seen as three aspects o f the same 
phenomenon. Still, it is necessary to discriminate between memoria 
and memory that embraces all the three above-mentioned terms. 
Memoria is more specific and signifies “memory when it remembers 
things” (Vico 1984: 819). To avoid mix-up between the two forms of 
memory, Verene proposes the notion “recollective fantasia”.
Each term o f V ico’s “three memories” —  memoria, fantasia, and ingegno — 
is inseparable from others. They are a totality. [...] I wish to use “recollection” 
for this composite sense o f  memory [...], more precisely —  recollective 
fantasia. (Verene 1991: 101)
Recollective fantasia is a form o f imagination that makes it possible to 
reflect over images. It comprises memoria, primal imagination 
(fantasia) and invention (ingegno), but it is not just a sum of them — 
it is formed by imaginative universals created by the three faculties. It 
is the level o f primal reflection —  reflection by images, not by con­
cepts. It can be considered the primordial cultural memory that is 
structured imagistically, that is by imaginative universals (Verene 
1991:99).
Memory gives us the opportunity o f going back and reflecting over 
the initial state, the point o f  departure. If we are dealing with a new 
unit o f  meaning, the moment o f its appearance can never be defined 
conclusively —  memory constructs it over and over again with each 
attempt o f return, at the same time never really losing contact with the 
primal sensational stimulus.
In V ico’s view memory [...] has the power to take the knower back toward the 
level o f  sensation, to place the mind back in touch with the original powers of 
sensation. Memory is corrective o f  the mind in its thrust toward conceptual 
abstraction. (Verene 1991: 103)
Memory thereby ensures, re-controls the operation o f the mind. 
Undoubtedly, this leads to creating new links between elements, while 
the primal imaginative structure may persist besides the new one. This 
situation can be characterized as one, where consciousness is semiotic 
“food” for itself (Lotman 1997: 10). Lotman also describes the 
function of memory as the ability to turn back:
Memory connects into the mechanism, allowing us to return again to the 
moment preceding the explosion and go through the whole process once more, 
but already in retrospect. Now it is as if  there are three layers in the 
consciousness: the moment o f the original explosion, the moment o f  editing it 
in the mechanisms o f conciousness, and the moment o f  its new duplication in 
the structure of memory. (Lotman 1992: 232)
The corrective function o f memory appears in Lotman’s conception as 
well. The moment o f new duplication may be understood as the 
moment when saved images enter into new connections and the 
above-mentioned process o f self-transformation o f the semiotic 
monad is initiated. Although Verene claims that memory in Vico’s 
view allows us to return to the level o f sensation, it is clear that the 
process is retrospective —  memory is turning back to the sensory sign. 
Memory in Vico’s sense has the peculiarity o f being preconceptual 
and imagistically structured —  so the relatively direct connection 
between the image and the percept makes access to the primal 
situation, the moment o f saving the images, more immediate. Lotman 
and Uspenskij describe the process o f  saving an element in memory as 
follows: firstly, the object must be recognized as existing; then it has 
to be identified with a certain element in languages in order to be 
connected to memory. Next, the element is evaluated according to the 
hierarchical relations o f language. When set into the hierarchy o f 
language, the image turns into an element o f memory as text (Lotman 
and Uspenskij 1978a: 214).
1.2. Metaphorical identification as the base 
for creating imaginative universals
In The New Science, Vico describes imaginative universals (universali 
fantastid, generi fantastici) that differ principally from the generic 
concepts used in conceptual thinking.
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the first men [...] not being able to form intelligible class concepts o f things, 
had a natural need to create poetic characters; that is, imaginative class 
concepts or universals, to which, as to certain models or ideal portraits, to 
reduce all the particular species which resembled them. (Vico 1984: 209)
Vico discriminates between generi intelligibili and generi fantastid 
typologically. Poetic thought is organized in a specific way and it is 
not merely a simplified form o f conceptual thought —  poetic thought 
is an independent form o f organizing the world. The notion of 
imaginative universals is difficult to interpret in standard philoso­
phical terms, because it is a theory o f image rather that a theory of 
concept in traditional sense (Verene 1991: 68).
The generic concepts o f  traditional Aristotelian logic are formed by the 
mind's power to select from a multiplicity o f particular things those features 
that are common to all. Objects are collected into classes in terms of their 
possession o f  some common property. (Verene 1991: 72)
The basis o f imaginative universals is metaphorical identification, 
which is not based on dividing the objects into properties. The role of 
tropes in language has been o f interest for many scholars in the last 
decades and the number o f publications on metaphor is enormous, as 
Danesi (1993: 122) indicated already more than ten years ago. But the 
assertion that archaic consciousness structured itself primarily 
metaphorically is not at all trivial. Direct parallels to this argument of 
V ico’s may be found not sooner than in the metaphor theory of 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who assert that it is hard to find a 
general subjective experience, which would not be conceptualized 
metaphorically (Lakoff, Johnson 1999: 45). In addition, Lakoff and 
Johnson describe, similarly to Vico, primary conceptualization as an 
outgrowth o f bodily experience (Lakoff, Johnson 1999: 6).
Imaginative universal is a particular kind o f metaphor. Vico does 
not understand metaphor in its usual sense, but as an image-creating 
process, that conveys identity not similarity (Haskell 2000: 354; 
Verene 1995: 206). “Every metaphor [...] is a fable in b rief’, writes 
Vico (1984: 404). At the basis o f metaphor is
the principle o f  the true poetic allegories which gave the fables univocal not 
analogical meanings for various particulars comprised under their poetic 
genera. They were therefore called diversiloquia; that is, expressions
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comprising in one general concept various species o f men, deeds, or things 
(Vico 1984: 210).
So we are dealing here with a process, where there is no analogy in its 
ordinary similarity based sense and the particular is connected to the 
general not by common features, but by identity. This peculiar feature 
of imaginative universals —  being based on “a primordial sensory 
identity"’ (Haskell 2000: 354) —  is the key to their primacy. “The verb 
‘to be’, ‘is’ always points at once in two directions —  to the being or 
existence of the thing and to its sense as copula, as the relation o f two 
orders” (Verene 1995: 206). When the archaic people created the first 
imaginative universal, two things emerged —  the ability to sense 
something as existing (a mental image brought to consciousness by 
fantasia) and its relation to something else.
“When men are ignorant o f the natural causes producing things, 
and cannot even explain them by analogy with similar things, they 
attribute their own nature to them” (Vico 1984: 180). Thus inter­
preting the world started with attributing bodily nature to the 
surrounding environment —  foremost to the sky, which came to be the 
first imaginative universal Jove. “Jove as an imaginative universal is 
the first expression o f ‘isness’. Something now is where before only 
momentaryness reigned. Jove both is in the sense o f being something 
and is in the sense of being related to something” (Verene 1995: 206). 
All through The New Science Vico speaks o f Jove as the first 
imaginative universal. He assumes that Jove appeared induced by fear: 
"It was fear which created gods in the world; not fear awakened in 
men by other men, but fear awakened in men by themselves” (Vico 
1984: 382). In Vico’s view the stimulus for the first identification was 
an individual bodily experience —  fear o f thunder. This had to be 
strong enough, so that the momentary perception o f thunder would be 
connected persistently to the emotion and the experience would be 
preserved outside its context in consciousness as an image (Haskell 
2000: 353). The first universal is a starting point for the formation o f 
social institutions.
Jove is a kind o f sensory topos (topica sensibile) from which they can draw 
forth all the further meanings their surroundings and create the sensus 
communis or il senso comune, the “communal sense” that is the basis o f  
human mentality and society. (Verene 1995: 206)
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For Vico the first god is created in fear and at the same point rises il 
senso commune. Lotman describes the appearance o f the phenomenon 
o f thought as well as a moment o f extreme incertitude that conditions 
the need for religion and culture.
On the one hand, it would be natural to compensate the increase of uncertainty 
and lack o f knowledge with turning to protective beings, who are omniscient. 
The emergence o f  religion, coinciding with the stadium o f the genesis of 
thought, is, without a doubt, not a coincidence. [...] The second means for 
overcoming the emerging difficulties was appealing to a collective mind, that 
is, to culture. (Lotman 1978: 16)
In the article Myth — Name — Culture, Lotman and Uspenskij 
(1978b: 219) understand metaphor as an entity that belongs to the 
sphere o f descriptive thought and that is impossible in the mytho­
logical consciousness. They define metaphor differently from Vico: as 
tied to similarity —  to a mechanism that also in Vico’s view does not 
belong to primordial poetic consciousness. Vico’s understanding of 
the metaphor finds a parallel in the notion of mythological identifi­
cation —  isomorphism. “Mythological identification is in principle of 
an extratextual nature, arising on the basis o f the inseparability of the 
name from the thing” (Lotman, Uspenskij 1978b: 224). As a result 
“mythological identification presupposes the transformation of the 
object, which occurs in concrete space and time” (Lotman, Uspenskij 
1978b: 226). In mythological thought, the copula does not mark a 
relation based on descriptive logic, but direct identification (Lotman, 
Uspenskij 1978b: 212). So the two orders that are connected do not 
relate to each other as object-level and metalevel, but can replace each 
other in the consciousness by means o f transformations.
Describing mythological consciousness, Lotman notes that: “This 
powerful identification that lies in the base of this type of conscious­
ness forces to see signs o f One phenomenon in the different pheno­
mena o f the real world and view a Single Object in the diversity ol 
objects belonging to one class” (Lotman 1978: 6). What seems to be a 
set o f similar objects to the bearer o f modern consciousness, is an 
expression o f one object for the bearer o f archaic mind.
Lotman and Uspenskij (1978b: 221) describe mythological cogni­
tion as such, “where signs are not attributed, but recognized and the 
act o f  nomination itself is identified with the act o f cognition”. Thus 
the first time cognition is at once the first time nomination — and the
whole process is apprehended as recognition —  at this level o f 
consciousness there is no discrimination between the sign and the 
object, they appear simultaneously in the consciousness.
Vico phrases the thought process o f the archaic mind as follows: 
“By their logic they had to put subjects together in order to put their 
forms together, or to destroy a subject in order to separate its primary 
form from the contrary form which had been imposed upon it” (Vico 
1984: 410). The archaic mind operated with units that were not 
dividable into distinct features; bringing the meaning units o f  poetic 
logic to the elementary level, we do not get a list o f features, but a part 
of the unit that is a whole in itself. Imaginative meaning units were 
formed by combining the parts or understanding the primal image as a 
universal: “particulars were elevated into universals or parts united 
with the other parts together with which they make up their wholes” 
(Vico 1984:407).
Coming back to the faculties o f the archaic consciousness: meta­
phorical identification is made possible by the workings o f fantasia 
and ingegno.
For Vico metaphor is a mental capacity that results from the interaction o f the 
fantasia and the ingegno. As these two deep-level faculties perform their 
function in tandem, they generate metaphor, which can be defined as a kind o f  
epiphenomenal amalgam offantasia and ingegno. (Danesi 1995b: 72)
In Danesi’s interpretation the cooperation o f fantasia and ingegno 
takes place wholly in the mental space. Perceptual images are restruc­
tured and the entities that result in this process have no direct relation 
to perception (Danesi 1995b: 72). Although it is clear that the human 
mind allows for noncontextual free combining and genesis o f new 
units of meaning purely within the mental spacz, fantasia understood 
as a bodily imagination can be seen as a bridge between body and 
consciousness.
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2. Poetic logic as the deep structure 
of a primary modelling system
2.1. The theory o f modelling systems
‘M odelling system s’ is originally a term o f the Tartu-M oscow  school. 
M odelling systems were described as primary or secondary. In the 
original conception natural language was the primary modelling 
system. Secondary modelling systems were superlinguistic systems 
with two or more layers, which were translatable into natural language 
(Ivanov et al. 1998: 80-81; Lotman 1967: 131). In his theses Art 
Among Modelling Systems, Lotman (1967) describes modelling 
activity and modelling systems in the following way:
Modelling activity is human’s activity in creating models. In order for the 
results o f this activity to be received as the analogies o f an object, they have to 
comply with certain (intuitively or consciously defined) rules o f analogy and. 
consequently, correlate to one or another modelling system.
Modelling system  is a structure o f elements and rules o f  their combination, 
existing in a state o f fixed analogy in relation to the whole domain o f the 
object o f cognition, recognition or organisation. For this reason, a modelling 
system may be regarded as a language. (Lotman 1967: 130-131)
The two main characteristics o f modelling systems can be found here. 
Firstly, it expresses itself as a structure based on a number o f elements 
and a set o f rules for linking them. Secondly, a modelling system has a 
fixed relation to its object, which is expressed in certain rules of 
analogy.
Apparently, Lotman understands language here in a more general 
way —  not in the narrow sense o f verbal semiosis. In some cases, 
Lotman uses ‘language’ in the sense o f an organization o f whatsoever 
kind. For example, he defines trope as a phenomenon appearing at the 
point o f contact o f two languages (Lotman 2001: 44) and describes the 
usage o f tropes in zoosemiotic communication, where the two 
‘languages’ in contact are in fact animal communication systems 
(Lotman 2001: 38). Thus, it would be unadvisable to conclude that in 
Lotm an’s view all modelling systems, that is, languages, are related to 
verbal code.
The relation between a modelling system and an object is tied to 
the nature o f  the model:
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A model differs from a sign as such in that it does not simply substitute a 
denotatum, but substitutes it in a useful manner in the process o f  cognising or 
organising the object. This is why if the relation o f  language to the denotatum 
in a natural language is historical-conventional, then the relation o f  the model 
to the object is determined by the structure o f  the modelling system. In this 
sense, only one kind o f signs —  ic o n ic  s ig n s  —  may be equated to models. 
(Lotman 1967: 131)
Therefore, models are created in the process o f cognizing and orga­
nizing the object. The model and the object are not connected con­
ventionally but iconically. Information that the iconical sign carries is 
inseparable from the modelling language and the structure o f the 
model (Lotman 1967: 131).
Lotman has been criticized for his concept o f the natural language 
as a primary modelling system, mainly by Thomas A. Sebeok. In fact, 
Lotman did not rule out the possibility that nonverbal systems could 
function as primary ones.
Primary coding, according to Lotman (1990: 58 [here 2001: 58]), is not 
restricted to verbal language. Much o f  the reality o f  human life evinces 
primary coding, which begins with the perceptual act o f  filtering cognitively 
significant from nonsignificant elements, a process which takes place at each 
level o f coding, but separates the semiotic from the nonsemiotic world at the 
lowest level o f semiosis. (Nöth 2006: 257-258)
In his article “In what sense is language a ‘primary modelling 
system’?” Sebeok (1988) interprets Lotman differently. He bases his 
modelling system theory on the discrimination between verbal and 
non-verbal communication systems. At the same time, he mentions 
that it is very likely that the Homo habilis had the capability of 
language without any verbal expression (Sebeok 1988: 75; also 
Danesi 2000b: 127). Thus, the differentiation between verbal and 
nonverbal does not coincide with the distinction between linguistic 
and nonlinguistic. In the current discussion, the emphasis is on the last 
one, because it is more directly related to the subject o f mental 
processes involved in creating universals. Therefore, Sebeok’s con­
ception o f nonverbal modelling as the primary one does not fit in this 
treatment.
The Forms o f Meaning by Sebeok and Danesi (2000) has remained 
the only thorough treatment o f the subject o f modelling systems. The 
authors base their analysis on the thesis that modelling is proper to all
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life forms: modelling is a derivate o f semiosis (Sebeok, Danesi 2000: 
5). Sebeok and Danesi divide the modelling systems into three groups 
according to the Percian three types o f sign relations: firstness, 
secondness, thirdness —  primary modelling systems are iconical, 
secondary indexical, and tertiary symbolical (Sebeok, Danesi 2000: 
10). Thus the differentiation is based on the types o f  signs, even 
though the peculiarity o f anthroposemiosis is not determined by the 
types o f signs we use, but how we create and organize them (Ponzio 
2006: 240). Sebeok and Danesi (2000: 52, 95, 121) themselves note 
that other animals use symbols just as well as icons and indexes. Thus 
in their discussion they are forced to use the terms ‘artificial’ and 
‘verbal’ (Sebeok, Danesi 2000: 60) to indicate phenomena belonging 
exclusively to human semiosis, and the term ‘natural’ (Sebeok, Danesi 
2000: 60, 95) to indicate modelling systems proper to all species. Such 
differentiation does not allow for the specification o f how human 
modelling systems are different from zoosemiotic modelling systems. 
Putting the emphasis on verbality leads to phonocentrism; the contra­
distinction artificial-natural is quite useless if  not theoretically 
specified.
2.2. Poetic modelling
Modelling systems that are proper to all life forms are a part o f anthro­
posemiosis. ‘'M ore fundamentally and inclusively, anthroposemiosis 
comprises all o f the sign processes that human beings are directly 
involved in” (Deely 2005: 33). Human beings are influenced by all 
sorts o f  sign processes —  from the cellular level to interpersonal 
verbal communication. Although there is no reason to doubt that the 
human biological being and the capability o f language are intertwined, 
it may not be useful to consider language as secondary or tertiary 
among the bio- and zoosemiotic systems. In the original different­
iation o f primary and secondary modelling systems, there was no 
ambition o f universality. In his article Yuri Lotman on Metaphors and 
Culture as Self-Referential Semiospheres, Winfried Nöth (2006) notes 
that the terms were relational:
[...]  primary vs. secondary is never a categorical but always a relational
opposition. What is primary at a higher level may be secondary from the
perspective o f  a lower level and even twice secondary from the point o f view  
o f  a still lower level. (Nöth 2006: 259)
Not trying to determine the absolutely primary modelling system, 
Lotman defined cultural phenomena as secondary modelling systems 
for the reason that they need to be translated into natural language at 
some stage (Lotman 1967: 131). In the context o f this discussion, it is 
not useful to transfer the relational opposition to an absolute scale. In 
addition, it is impossible to deny the particular role o f linguistic 
thought in the human conception o f the world. “However, insofar as 
that sensory system or any other biological system is articulated and 
described in language, its priority and transparency would be 
compromised and undermined” (Chang 2003: 11).
Therefore, we can speak o f the primary level o f language and the 
primordial poetic mechanisms o f meaning creation as primary 
modelling —  as far as we are dealing with specifically human mo­
delling systems and bear in mind their relation to biosemiotic 
processes. Similarly, Augusto Ponzio argues in his article Metaphor 
and Poetic Logic in Vico that language is a modelling capacity spe­
cific to humans, which has its roots in the body and is to be considered 
primary (Ponzio 2006: 238-239). The first scholar to note the parallel 
discussed here between Lotman’s notion o f modelling and V ico’s 
concept o f meaning creation was Marcel Danesi, who marked: 
“Essentially, as I read Lotman with ‘Vichian eyes’, I see his notion o f 
creative modelling as fantasiaГ (Danesi 2000: 103). However 
intriguing, the comparison o f the two great semioticians in Danesi’s 
article A Note on Vico and Lotman: Semiotics as a “Science o f the 
Imagination ” (2000) remains somewhat unsatisfactory for it suggests 
many parallels, but discusses almost none o f them explicitly.
2.2.1. Poetic modelling activity
The work o f V ico’s fantasia, ingegno and memoria can be seen in 
Lotman’s terms as primary modelling activity —  an activity that has 
certain rules o f analogy for creating models and that is connected to a 
certain modelling system (Lotman 1967: 130-131).
According to the definition by the cognitive scientist Robert E. 
Haskell, the poetic logic produced by fantasia, ingegno and memoria 
is “a nonconscious set o f primitive ‘metaphorical’ cognitive
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operations which only later become abstracted into what we now 
understand as logic” (Haskell 2000: 352). The term 'lo g ic’ itself 
presupposes the existence o f some operational rules, at the same time 
taking into account that when Vico speaks o f primordial 
consciousness, it is clear that ‘logic’ is not understood directly in his 
notion o f poetic logic. In V ico’s words, “That which is metaphysics 
insofar as it contemplates things in all the forms o f their being, is logic 
insofar as it considers things in all the forms by which they may be 
signified” (Vico 1984: 400). In V ico’s view, logic occupies itself with 
the forms o f signification. The rules that direct the process o f signi­
fication are based on metaphorical identification, not on syllogistic 
operations. Generally speaking —  the elements o f the modelling 
system that are produced by poetic logic are imaginative universals.
Poetic logic is not a means for objective perception o f the world, it 
is a means for creating the world, that is, modelling activity. The 
notion o f modelling can be linked to the verum-factum principle of 
Vico. Verum-factum signifies the affinity o f the truth and meaning 
creation. This principle is first expressed in an early work o f Vico On 
the Most Ancient Wisdom o f the Italians as “verum (the true) and 
factum  (what is made) are interchangeable, or [...] they are 
convertible” (Vico 1988 [1710]: 45). The true and the made are one 
and the same. Humans can gain no direct knowledge about the world; 
as Vico sees it, they have an external relation to the world created by 
god. Trying to make sense o f this world, people produce images of it. 
These images are those that people have an inner relation with; they 
are an expression o f an accessible truth (Verene 1991: 36-37). By 
making sense o f the world, by giving it signification, people create 
their world and true knowledge about this world is to be found in the 
modifications o f the human mind.
And they should have begun with metaphysics, which seeks its proof not in 
the external world but within the modifications o f the mind o f him who 
meditates it. For since this world o f nations has certainly been made by men. it 
is within these modifications that its principles should have been sought. 
(Vico 1984: 374)
Humans are capable o f creating a realm that is to a certain limit 
independent o f the physical reality as it forms the mental space of 
possible worlds. “The species-specific trait o f the human being is a 
modelling device capable o f inventing many worlds, differently from
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other animals” (Ponzio 2006: 238). This capability is a derivate o f 
imagination (fantasia) and Vico believed it to be provided by 
nature —  its roots are in the human body People were “furnished by 
nature with these senses and imaginations” (Vico 1984: 375). Augusto 
Ponzio (2006: 238) interprets this statement in terms o f evolution and 
concludes that the humans were furnished with the capability o f 
language when they appeared as a species. Thus the human beings 
have an Umwelt just like all other life forms do, but they have a 
peculiar relation to it. Their Umwelt is a ground for exclusively human 
mental processes that lead to multiplicity o f  imaginative structures and 
choices. According to Deely, the essence o f the different nature o f 
human Umwelt is ‘idea’ in a specific semiotic sense —  that is:
the relationship itself constituting signification, grasped according to the being 
it has as distinguishable both from a given signified and from a given sign- 
vehicle, and therefore as detachable from any given vehicle and attachable to 
any other vehicle, and as directable to some other object as well, or to the 
same object only, in its new attachment. (Deely 1991: 544)
Thus human beings are capable o f cognizing sign relations and the 
arbitrariness o f signs. Therefore, “the mind can, with a little clever­
ness, turn every element o f experience and discourse into a plaything 
ad infinitum" (Deely 1991: 561).
For all organisms, the contact with external reality is mediated and 
selective as such. The selection is determined biosemiotically, but in 
case of humans, imagination interferes in this process —  as it forms 
poetic meaning, creating connections between some perceptual 
images, thus multiplying their importance, and declares some images 
nonexistent. This process is characterized by the modelling potential 
of culture:
[...]  that is, either the ability to describe as wide a range o f objects as possible, 
which would include as many as yet unknown objects as possible, this being 
the optimal requirement for cognitive models, or it should have the capability 
to declare these objects which it cannot be used to describe as nonexistent. 
(Lotman, Uspenskij 1978a: 222)
The modelling potential o f a system depends on how many objects it 
is able to describe. Poetic logic is flexible and prepared for creating 
new relations. Imaginative universals, considering their openness to 
entering into new unpredictable connections, have a bigger modelling
156 Tuuli Raudla
potential than descriptive class concepts. At the basis o f cultural 
modelling, there is the selective inclusion o f phenomena in meaning 
creating processes.
The first and most important act o f  any semiotic modelling o f a culture is to 
pick out the layer o f culturally relevant phenomena in the surrounding world. 
To do this there has to be some primary encoding. This primary encoding may 
be realized by identify ing real-life situations with mythological ones, and real 
people w ith the people o f myth or ritual. (Lotman 2001: 58)
Lotman no more than describes the elements and the processes already 
existent in the mythological mind. Vico tries to find the beginning of 
them.
2.2.2. The iconicity o f models
Poetic forms created by fantasia may be seen as models. It is 
important to repeat here that according to Lotman (1967: 131), only 
iconic signs may be seen as models —  as signs that relate to their 
object in a way determined by the modelling system they belong to.
Danesi equalizes the Vichian poetic forms with iconic signs — 
units o f  thought that stand for their referents in a direct way (Danesi 
2000: 102). Vico describes Vulgar Latin1 as a language “which has 
formed almost all its words by metaphors drawn from natural objects 
according to their natural properties or sensible effects” (Vico 1984: 
444). As mentioned above, models follow certain rules o f analogy as 
they stand for an object in a system. In the case o f primary modelling, 
it may be presumed that these rules were based on iconic 
representation.
In the article Myth — Name — Culture, Lotman and Uspenskij 
claim that “although iconic signs are to some extent closer to mytholo­
gical texts, they are, just like conventional signs, a phenomenon of a 
principally different type o f  consciousness” (Lotman, Uspenskij 1973: 
294)". This argument is probably based on the narrower definition of 
the icon as similarity (see Lotman 2001: 54). As Lotman and
1 The terms ‘vulgar' and ‘nations’ are used in The New Science in the sense of  
culturally primordial.
: I refer here to the Russian original o f the article, since the passage has been 
omitted from the English translation (Lotman. Uspenskij 1978b).
Uspenskij (1978b: 219) exclude metaphor from the mythological text, 
there cannot be any icons either. As shown above, in the Vichian 
tradition, the metaphor is not based on similarity. The icon is 
understood as a perceptual relation o f whatever kind between the sign 
and the object. In spite o f the differences in terminology, both Vico on 
one hand and Lotman with Uspenskij on the other, suggest that the 
archaic mind did not operate by means o f  similarity relations.
Although the iconic signs used in modem culture are more or less 
arbitrary and based on similarity, it is theoretically still possible to 
construct the primal iconic signs —  images based on sensory identity 
that were part o f the early poetic consciousness.
Vico says about the primal mute signs that they were “in their own 
right the best emblems, for they carried their meaning in them selves” 
(Vico 1984: 484). The origin o f those signs was, in V ico’s view, the 
human body: meanings were fixed by natural relations; that is by 
identity relations based on perceptual information (Vico 1984: 444). 
The senses are the sole way o f knowing something (Vico 1984: 374). 
Danesi divides the iconic processes taking place in the poetic logic 
into two. Internal iconicity “presents an imagistically modelled 
referent to perceptual memory for appropriate storage” (Danesi 1993: 
69). External iconicity represents “the imagistically modeled referent 
outside the mind through some form o f visual mimesis” (Danesi 1993:
69). The concept is somewhat simplified for it seems to presuppose 
that the iconic units are visual and not related to any other sensory 
channels.
Lotman does not describe the relation between iconic signs and 
perception, but he mentions the possibility that the binary organization 
of an intellectual unit could be the result o f the need to integrate 
perceptual information from different sensory organs.
While transforming the external irritations in a similar way, paired sense 
organs are spaced apart and “see” the world from different angles. This 
renders the constructed image stereoscopic. The next step in structuralisation 
is the formation o f structurally contrasted pairs: unifying two visual aspects of 
an object is easier than the integration o f visual and auditory images o f the 
world. But exactly for the reason that these images are rationally 
untranslatable into each other and an effort is required for their integration, 
they represent an important phase in the genesis o f the asymmetry o f the brain 
hemispheres. The structure o f other meaning generating systems is analogical. 
(Lotman 1981a: 10)
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Vico and Lotman have quite a different starting point: Vico is 
interested in the formation o f the image and trope based on sensory 
information, Lotman suggests that the activity o f sensory organs is the 
basis for the appearance o f translation mechanism. But both turn to 
body and senses in order to explain essential intellectual phenomena.
The peculiarity o f the model is that because o f its iconic nature it is 
able to stand for an object in a useful way in the process o f structuring 
the world. Iconic modelling brings to the world o f signs partially the 
structure o f  the perceptible object —  the structure o f the sign is in 
accordance with the structure o f the object. This is the key to the 
usefulness o f the icons —  they are as if  objects, and at the same time 
they are free from any physical restraints.
2.2.3. Bilingualism
In Lotm an’s conception, the binary organization o f a unit is a pre­
condition for any semiotic creativity in it. In Lotm an’s view, all intel­
lectual units have an invariant structure.
An invariant for all these will be a bipolar structure, with a generator of 
discrete texts located on one pole and a non-discrete texts on the other. In the 
output o f  the system, these texts interfuse, forming a unified, multi-layered 
text where the mutually untranslatable codes intertwine in a multitude of 
ways. When gating a text through such a system, we get an avalanche-like 
self-reproduction o f  meanings. If a block o f  new messages is integrated into 
the system, that are declared “appropriate” in accordance with certain rules, 
and a memory mechanism for saving these messages, we get the structural 
invariant. (Lotman 1981a: 10-11)
Although the translation between the discrete and the continuous texts 
is the main mechanism o f  meaning generation, it is not the only one. 
“The opposition ‘discrete-continuous’ is merely one possible form, an 
extreme one, o f  producing tropes o f  semantic untranslatability” 
(Lotman 2001: 38). The precondition for the activity o f an intellectual 
unit is, as mentioned above, the integration o f two or more structures 
that model the external reality differently (Lotman 1981a: 10). In the 
archaic mind, the verbal-discrete thought was not fully developed. In 
Danesi’s view, the primordial signs are iconical continuous images 
(Danesi 1993: 84) that are connected by the mechanism of 
metaphorical identity. As the images are linked together and so are in
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turn the images formed in this way, the structure becomes more and 
more complicated, until it calls for an organization o f a different kind.
As it [metaphor —  T. R ] proceeded to generate more abstract concepts by 
connecting those o f the second order, the rational mind, with its syntactic 
abilities, emerged to stabilize the increasingly complex surface-level system. 
(Danesi 1993: 121)
As Danesi sees it, syntactic organization could not have been the 
discrete language in the meaning creating translation processes in the 
archaic consciousness. Apparently, Danesi understands syntax as a 
linguistic-verbal entity.
Ponzio, on the other hand, does not tie syntax to verbal language; 
he claims that the syntactics o f language is the capacity that allows for 
the combination o f a finite number o f elements in infinite number o f 
ways, so that a new meaning arises in each combination (Ponzio 2006: 
241). He uses the term syntactics on purpose, rather than the term 
syntax, in order to avoid associations with the linguistic-verbal 
meanings o f the latter. For Ponzio, the syntactics o f language can be 
described as writing —  a procedure o f combination that precedes 
verbal language and is a precondition for it (Ponzio 2006: 241).
To signify with the same elements through different positions is already 
writing, and articulation o f  verbal language and through verbal language [...] 
takes place on the basis o f this type o f signification through position. (Ponzio 
2006: 241)
The existence o f discrete units and the possibility to position the same 
unit differently is the precondition for free combination. In V ico’s 
system, fantasia creates the images that can be separated from the 
context, and ingegno arranges them into different relations. The primal 
capability o f combining (Ponzio’s writing) is the basis for the 
emergence o f linguistic-verbal syntax.
Poetic meaning creation process is based on metaphorical identity. 
The meaning units arising from this identification can in turn be 
identified with each other. In order to identify two units so that a new 
meaning arises, there has to be some dissonance between them —  it 
need not be the opposition of discrete-continuous. The creativity o f 
primal metaphors lies in the fact that they juxtapose two or more 
independent elements that could not have been connected without
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using imagination. In a state where the fixed associations are scarce, 
almost all acts o f identification have to be metaphorical and creative.
In his article On the Semiosphere, Lotman claims that elements of 
the iconic and verbal language cannot be directly isomorphic, but 
“each o f them, in a variety o f ways, is isomorphic in the extra- 
semiotic world o f  reality, which they represent in a given language” 
(Lotman 2005: 216). In V ico’s terms, the isomorphism with reality is 
a product o f  fantasia and the isomorphism between images is a 
product o f  ingegno. The relations established by ingegno would be 
meaningless if  they were not based on perceptual images.
Danesi also interprets V ico’s theory o f primordial images in terms 
o f the cognitive functions o f hemispheres. The left hemisphere is 
responsible for rational analytical thought, the right hemisphere for 
spatial memory, intuition and the capability o f  synthesis (Danesi 1993: 
97). Danesi presents the results o f  neuropsychological studies that 
support the hypothesis o f  the iconic nature o f the archaic conscious­
ness: the brain centres occupied with perception and mental images 
are the same; right hemisphere functions are iconic in their nature; 
right hemisphere is active in understanding and saving new informa­
tion; right hemispheric capability to produce images is phylo- 
genetically prior to left hemispheric capability o f abstract conceptua­
lization; the flow o f information goes “from right to left” in case of 
acquiring new information —  from image-based to abstract (Danesi 
1993:98).
If archaic thought was iconic, then it had to be the right hemi­
sphere that controlled the main primordial mind processes and only 
later the role o f the left hemisphere increased as the power of 
abstraction grew (Danesi 1993: 85). Still, both hemispheres had to be 
involved from the beginning: complex thought only arises when both 
hemispheres work in tandem (Danesi 1993: 97). In the process of 
metaphor both hemispheres are involved:
In the case o f  MLP [metaphorical language programming —  T. /?.], the RH 
[right hemisphere —  T. /?.] can be said to control the iconic context-structure 
o f  metaphor and the LH [left hemisphere —  T. /?.] its form-structure and 
ultimate conceptualization. (Danesi 1993: 138)
Lotman (2001: 54-62) emphasizes the meaning creating potential of 
iconic representation. The primacy o f iconic signs in Lotman’s 
concept is proposed in the claim that iconic signs are close to mytho-
logical texts (Lotman, Uspenskij 1973: 294). Iconicity is considered to 
be the dominating organizing principle in the mythological 
consciousness: “a living myth is iconic-spatial and is realised as a sign 
in activities and the panchronic being o f drawings, in which, for 
instance, in cave- and petroglyphic drawings, there is no linearly fixed 
order” (Lotman, Uspenskij 1978b: 7). At the same time, in the mytho­
logical consciousness as in any other type o f consciousness, there has 
to be a discrete language to oppose the continuous one. The dialogue 
between the two hemispheres, one o f which creates continuous 
organization and the other discrete organization, is in the focus o f 
Lotman’s understanding o f meaning creation (Lotman 1981b: 9-10; 
1978:8).
Lotman derives the invariant structure o f a meaning creating unit 
from the comparison o f the dual organization o f the human brain and 
the principles o f  functioning o f the structure o f  text and culture.
The left and right hemisphere o f  the human brain, different language subtexts 
o f a text and the principal polyglotism o f culture (bilingualism being a 
minimum model) form a single invariant model: any intellectual unit consists 
o f two (or more) integrated structures. (Lotman 1981a: 10)
Danesi ends up interpreting Vico through the functioning principles o f 
the hemispheres, on the ground o f V ico’s assertion that image based 
thinking is primordial. Generally, linguists have in most part been 
interested in the functions o f the left hemisphere, but following the 
Vichian line o f thought, it is inevitable that the workings o f both 
hemispheres have to be considered. This type o f approach leads to 
understanding the consciousness as a dialogical phenomenon. As 
Lotman remarks on the co-existence o f verbal-discrete and iconic 
languages:
Although on different stages o f human history one or the other o f  these 
universal language systems pretends for globality and may indeed achieve a 
dominant state, the bipolar construction o f culture is not thereby destroyed, 
but takes more complicated and secondary forms. (Lotman 1978: 6)
Lotman states that translation and dialogue are the preconditions o f 
meaning creating processes. Vico has never explicitly made such a 
claim, but developments o f his theories easily come to the same 
conclusion.
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Conclusion
The primordial images and textuality arise in the course o f a process 
o f poetic translation. The dominant type o f models in the archaic 
consciousness is icons that are formed on the basis o f  sensory 
information. Iconicity dominates also in the organization o f the 
models themselves. At the same time, these iconic and iconically 
organized images can be positioned and combined in an infinite 
number o f ways —  this feature, the primal syntactics or writing as 
Ponzio puts it, plays the role o f discrete organization in the meaning 
generating translation process. The primal syntactics does not follow 
the rules o f  descriptive logic as it generates texts. The distinctive 
characteristic o f archaic consciousness is using the mechanism of 
identity rather than that o f similarity, and dividing the object into parts 
rather than into features.
The identity-based poetic logic is at the basis o f primary 
modelling, the linguistic-verbal modelling being secondary to it. It 
may be claimed that at some point, linguistic-verbal texts need to be 
translated into the language o f images, that is, into the language of 
some poetic modelling system. The language o f images does not only 
form one counterpart in a bilingual (continuous-discrete) meaning 
generating unit —  although at a higher level it functions as such — it 
is also capable o f acting as an independent heterogeneous meaning 
generating system.
The Vichian-Lotmanian approach does not only give us the 
elements and rules o f the poetic modelling system, it also presupposes 
its bodily origin. It inevitably includes body as a primary source of 
meaning creation in the description o f consciousness and thus brings 
forth the derivative nature o f the dualistic mind-body conception.3
3 Acknowledgement. The author wishes to acknowledge the help o f  Tanel Pern 
in translating the citations with quotes from Russian. The work has been 
accomplished in the Centre o f  Excellence in Cultural Theory.
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Вико и Лотман: поэтическое смыслообразование и 
первичное моделирование
В статье рассматриваются идеи Юрия Лотмана и Джамбаттиста 
Вико о смыслообразовании и архаичном мышлении. Сравниваются, 
с одной стороны, такие понятия Вико, как fantasia, ingegno, memoria 
и поэтическая логика, и с другой — концепция Лотмана о тексте, 
памяти и моделирующей системе. При рассмотрении идей Вико 
автор статьи основывается во многом на работах Дональда Филипа 
Верена и Марселя Данези. Цель статьи —  показать характерные 
черты архаического смыслообразования.
Архаическое мышление по существу является поэтическим. Глав­
ным механизмом его смыслообразования является метафорическое
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отождествление двух отдельно стоящих элементов. Такая деятель­
ность генерирует новые смыслы значения —  элементы, отож­
дествляемые с помощью воображения, не могут отождествляться 
средствами логики силлогизмов. Архаическое мышление не опери­
рует абстрактными понятиями, как рациональное мышление а 
создает имагинативные универсалии. Имагинативные универсалии 
основываются не на подобии/различии свойств объекта, а на тож­
дестве объектов или их частей. Процесс отождествления является 
основой поэтического моделирования, что первично по отношению к 
вербальному моделированию.
Vico ja Lotman: Poeetiline tähendusloome ja 
primaarne modelleerimine
Artikkel põhineb Juri Lotmani ja Giambattista Vico arusaamadel tähendus- 
loomest ja  arhailisest mõtlemisest. Võrdluse alla tulevad ühelt poolt Vico 
mõisted fantasia, ingegno, memoria ja  poeetiline loogika ning teiselt 
poolt Lotmani teksti, mälu ja modelleeriva süsteemi kontseptsioon. Vico 
käsitlemisel arvestatakse olulisel määral Donald Phillip Verene’i ja  
Marcel Danesi käsitlusi tema töödest. Artikli eesmärgiks on tuua välja 
arhailise tähendusloome iseloomulikud jooned.
Arhailine mõtlemine on põhiolemuselt poeetiline. Selle põhiliseks 
tähendusloomemehhanismiks on kahe eraldiseisva elemendi metafooriline 
samastamine. Taoline tegevus on uut tähendust loov —  elemendid, mis 
samastatakse kujutlusvõimet kasutades, ei ole süllogistilise loogika abil 
samastatavad. Arhailine mõtlemine ei opereeri üldmõistetega nagu ratsio­
naalne mõtlemine, vaid loob hoopis kujutluslikke universaale. Kujutlus­
likud universaalid ei põhine mitte objektide omaduste samasusel/ erine­
vusel, vaid objektide või nende osade omavahelisel samasusel. Samas- 
tamisprotsess on aluseks poeetilisele — verbaalse modelleerimise suhtes 
esmasele — modelleerimisele.
Sign Systems Studies 36.1, 2008
Towards a semiotic theory of hegemony: 
Naming as hegemonic operation 
in Lotman and Laclau
Peeter Selg, Andreas Ventsel
Institute o f  Political Science and Public Administration, Tallinn University 
25 Narva St, 10120 Tallinn, Estonia 
e-mail: pselg@tlu.ee;1 
Department o f  Semiotics, University o f Tartu 
78 Tiigi St. 50410 Tartu, Estonia 
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Abstract. The article concentrates on the possibilities o f bringing into dialo­
gue two different theoretical frameworks for conceptualising social reality and 
power: those proposed by Ernesto Laclau, one o f  the leading current theorists 
o f hegemony, and Juri Lotman, a path breaking cultural theorist. We argue 
that these two models contain several concepts that despite their different 
verbal expressions play exactly the same functional role in both theories. In 
this article, however, we put special emphasis on the problem o f naming for 
both theorists. We propose to see naming as one o f  the central translating 
strategies in the politico-hegemonic discourse. Our main thesis is that through 
substituting some central categories o f  Laclau’s theory with those o f Lot­
man’s, it is possible to develop a model o f  hegemony that is a better tool for 
empirical study o f power relations in given social formations than the model 
proposed by Laclau, who in his later works tends more and more to ground it 
in psychoanalytic ontology.
1 Also: Faculty o f  Humanities, Tallinn University o f Technology; 21 J. Sütiste 
St, 13419 Tallinn, Estonia; e-mail: peeter.selg@ttu.ee
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The term “political semiotics” finds more and more usage among 
scholars in the field o f social sciences. Yet seldom if ever does it refer 
to a discipline with clearly defined aims and scope. Rather it is a 
somewhat vaguely applied synonym for expressions like “political 
signs” or “political images” etc. Our purpose in this article is to 
address the problem o f what would political semiotics as a discipline 
require. We are o f course well aware that for a discipline to arise it 
takes much more than a single article, monograph or conference. 
Providing an elaborated conception o f that discipline (or even some 
“grounding principles” for such an elaboration) is not the task we set 
for ourselves. Instead we try to make a contribution to the dialogue 
between political science and semiotics by way o f introducing Juri 
Lotm an’s categories from theory o f culture to one o f the most ad­
vanced conceptions o f hegemony in contemporary political theory — 
the one proposed by Ernesto Laclau.
The general problem our article deals with is that o f political 
power. We strive to give some hopefully fruitful hints for dealing with 
this issue from the semiotic point o f view. Political power has gained 
much theoretical and methodological attention among disciplines such 
as philosophy, sociology and political science, but has occurred 
somewhat sporadically along the field o f semiotics. The theses we 
propose are very much preliminary in nature —  they form no coherent 
research report or conception, but are more like glimpses o f the future. 
Our theses stem largely from what we see as a set o f apparent 
theoretical congenialities between Juri Lotman, a semiotician, whose 
interests moved more and more towards issues usually governed by 
social or political theory,2 and Ernesto Laclau, a political theorist 
whose conception o f hegemony has had several stages o f development 
ranging from Marxist tradition to post-structuralist discourse theory.
Our general idea is that the theoretical frameworks or metalan­
guages that these two eminent thinkers propose for conceptualizing 
social reality contain several concepts that despite their different 
verbal expressions play exactly the same functional role in both
Introduction
2 It is interesting to refer in this connection to a quite recent volume o f essays 
that is largely dedicated to the theoretical resources that Lotman’s semiotics of 
culture provides for conceptualizing power, hegemony and social reality as such 
(see Schönle 2006).
theories. By this we mean that the central categories o f each theory 
can be substituted with each other without losing any theoretical cohe­
rence or epistemological value o f either o f the theories in question. 
For example, if we substitute the vocabulary o f “logic o f equivalence” 
in Laclau with Lotman’s idea o f “continuous coding” (see below), we 
would not lose the point that Laclau is making by his theory. And the 
reason is that these two notions bear the same functional role in each 
theory. O f course, which conceptual matchings are there between 
those two approaches, is a matter o f  analysis, and this article tries to 
enlighten some o f its aspects. But an important thing to stress in this 
connection is that despite their resemblances, the two theories have 
important differences that make mutual combination between these 
approaches a fruitful undertaking. Otherwise we would just reiterate 
the same points with different words.
In this article, however, we chose only to focus on Laclau’s con­
ception o f “empty signifier” as a name that functions as a precarious 
and hegemonic ground for a discourse. Our intention is to complement 
this conception with Lotman’s fundamental idea o f rhetorical transla­
tion between discrete and non-discrete coding systems and to view 
naming as one o f the translation strategies through which hegemonic 
relations are established. This way we can avoid the psychoanalyti- 
cally oriented conception o f ‘radical investment’ that is the basis o f 
Laclau’s conception o f naming (see Laclau 2005a: 112-117), and 
substitute problems of affect, desire, and drive with the problems o f 
translation. And our main thesis is that through this substitution it is 
possible to develop a model o f hegemony that is a better tool for 
empirical study of power relations in given social formations than the 
model proposed by Laclau, who in his later works tends more and 
more to ground it in psychoanalytic ontology.
The first task for us, therefore, is to give a brief sketch o f the 
theoretical steps that lead Laclau to that direction. After that we can 
introduce some basic ideas o f Lotman and bring them into dialogue 
with Laclau. In this article we dedicate a little more room for 
discussion on Laclau than to that on Lotman, because the latter’s 
positions are assumingly better known among semioticians than are 
Laclau’s ideas.
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Laclau’s conception of the political: 
some background remarks
What are Laclau’s theses concerning political power? Addressing this 
question calls first for a very brief sketch o f Laclau’s major theoretical 
affinities with a family o f political thinkers. The most apparent of 
them is, o f course, Antonio Gramsci, a M arxist theorist and political 
activist. His main contribution to political theory consists in elabora­
ting a concept o f hegemony as a form o f power that is very different 
from mere force, coercion or domination (dominio) and depends 
largely on the so called spontaneous consent o f those who are in the 
subordinated position. From the perspective o f those groups who 
subordinate others in a society, we can say with Gramsci that
The supremacy o f  a social group is manifested in two ways: as “domination” 
and as “intellectual and moral leadership”. A social group is dominant over 
those antagonistic groups it wants to “liquidate” or to subdue even with armed 
force, and it is leading with respect to those groups that are associated and 
allied with it. (Gramsci 1975: 2010, quoted in Fontana 1993: 141)
The latter form o f supremacy is, o f  course, what Gramsci calls “hege­
mony”. It should be noted, however that the terms “alliance” and 
“association” he uses when writing about “hegemony” refer “to a 
system o f reciprocal links and relations whose common elements are 
consent and persuasion [...] In other words, the “alliance” is based on 
mutuality o f interests and an affinity o f values” (Fontana 1993: 141). 
So we can agree with Steedman when he argues, using more 
traditional vocabulary for political scientists, that, when there is public 
or state control “the control must also be seen as legitimate. Gramsci’s 
hegemony is what the ruling class achieves when it can secure popular 
consent for the state’s use o f coercion” (Steedman 2006: 139). But we 
have to add that this hegemony is not purely a result o f propaganda or 
brainwashing, nor is it just a matter o f  rational selfinterest or values, 
but has to do with everything in this list. This is what opens up in 
Gramsci the possibility o f conceiving a relation o f hegemony as a 
certain type o f formation o f contingent meanings or discourses in
culture and society. Gramsci, however, did not take this step __at
least according to some theorists, Laclau among them.
Despite many advantages o f Gram sci’s approach, the main short­
coming for Laclau is his tendency to ascribe the ultimate unifying
power in hegemonic formations to an economically defined funda­
mental class (Dallmayr 2004: 38). That is the main remnant o f 
essentialism in Gramsci for Laclau and his coauthors (Laclau, Mouffe 
1985: 137-138). So, one o f the aims o f Laclau’s theorizing o f 
hegemony is to totally reject any ontological class unity and to 
acknowledge on the theoretical level the proliferation o f very different 
and often incommensurable political struggles in the late capitalist 
society. That is one set o f theoretical steps taken by Laclau in his 
conception o f hegemony. Following his advice, we could call it a 
movement from Marxism to /?as/-Marxism (Laclau, Mouffe 2001: ix).
But another very important family o f steps needs to be highlighted 
in this conception. And that we could call: the movement towards a 
notion of discourse as the primary terrain o f objectivity, hegemonic 
and power relations. Important parallels can first, be drawn with 
Michel Foucault whose emphasis on the positive or productive aspects 
of power, especially its ability to produce discourse has reoriented the 
whole corpus of power studies. “What makes power hold good,” for 
Foucault, “what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t 
only weigh on us as a force that says no, but it traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” 
(Foucault 1980: 119 —  italics added). The general reorientation in the 
conception of power is that “It needs to be considered as a productive 
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than 
as a negative instance whose function is repression” (Foucault 1980: 
119 — italics added). The general methodological precaution that 
follows from this reorientation is
that we should direct our researches on the nature o f power not towards the 
juridical edifice o f sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which 
accompany them, but towards forms o f subjection and the inflections and 
utilizations o f their localized systems, and towards strategic apparatuses. We 
must eschew the model o f  Leviathan in the study o f Power. (Foucault 1980: 
102)
The old questions like “who has power?” or “who is repressed by 
power?” make no sense anymore. The focus o f studying political 
power moves away from the sovereign forms o f power like state or 
administrative apparatuses and the hitherto systematically concealed 
forms o f power —  especially the power o f discourses —  enter the 
center o f attention in the social sciences.
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This, o f course, means disavowing the liberal tradition o f con­
ceptualizing power that informs the lion’s share o f current political 
science. This is a tradition that starts with philosophies o f Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke and moves through several quasi-philo- 
sophical steps to the sociology o f M ax Weber, and through his 
influence it becomes a common sense view among the political 
scientists in the United States. And the main message o f the liberalist 
tradition concerning power is something like this: power is — 
ontologically speaking —  a thing. It is something that can be 
possessed or distributed. But what kind o f thing is it? A thing that can 
be used to make somebody do something that he would not otherwise 
do. In other words: power is a means o f repression.3
One o f the indications o f how influential this liberalist tradition is, 
is the fact that even the most well-known critics o f liberalist political 
philosophy —  most notably the Marxists and the so called 
communitarians —  use the same vocabulary when it comes to the 
notion o f power. Even Louis Althusser, the most eminent Marxist 
theorist o f  our time, despite his theoretical attempt to ease up the 
determinate nature o f the relations between the basis and super­
structure, had to concede that to his knowledge, “ио class can hold 
State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its 
hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses” (Althusser 
1993: 20, italics by the author). As for the "‘communitarians” —  a 
family o f political theorists who oppose the notion o f abstract or 
“unencumbered” self (see Sandel 1998) that supposedly underlies the 
liberalist conception o f society —  we can cite Michael Walzer, the 
most quoted among them, as a way o f illustrating their vocabulary for 
grasping power. “Politics is always the most direct path to 
dominance,” he indicates in his book Spheres o f Justice, and conti­
nues: “and political power [...] is probably the most important, and 
certainly the most dangerous good in human history” (W alzer 1984:
172 Peeter Selg, Andreas Ventsel
3 It should be noted that the liberal tradition has entertained conceptions o f “soft 
power”, “power o f non-decision” or o f  “agenda-setting” that purport to indicate 
the alternative forms o f power. Though this makes the liberal tradition seem more 
ambivalent on this question, we believe that these notions o f  power are 
nevertheless reducible to the old question o f  who gets whom to do what the latter 
would not otherwise do. In other words, they are reducible to the problem o f  
repression.
15, italics added). And the talk o f power as some sort o f  “good” is 
very extensive in this classic book.
Now, this is the notion o f power that we have to dismiss if  we take 
seriously the methodological instructions o f  Foucault. Laclau certainly 
agrees with Foucault in this respect. But what is problematic for him 
is Foucault’s conception o f discourse. For Laclau the discourse is not 
an object among many, as it is for Foucault (see Foucault 1969; 1984), 
but the primary terrain o f objectivity as such (Laclau 2005a: 68). 
Laclau refers to W ittgenstein’s idea o f a ‘language gam e’ (see Laclau, 
Mouffe 1985: 108; Laclau 2005a: 106) and Jacques Derrida’s notion 
o f ‘undecidability’ (see Laclau, Mouffe 2001: xi; cf. Norval 2004: 
142) when he characterizes his concept o f discourse.
For Laclau, nothing is constituted outside the discourse. Yet this 
has nothing to do with the debate between realists and idealists. 
Laclau does not deny that earthquakes and other physical phenomena 
exist. But whether an earthquake is constituted in terms o f the “wrath 
of God” or in terms of “natural disaster” depends on discursive 
structurations (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 108).
So the problem of the constitution o f social and political reality 
becomes for Laclau the problem o f the constitution o f discourse. We 
concentrate on the general logic o f discourse that he proposes in terms 
of the Saussurean idea that a signifying system or discourse is a 
system of differences, and try to sketch out the main ways in which he 
complements this idea in terms o f ‘empty signifiers’ and ‘nam ing’.
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Laclau’s concepts of discourse, hegemony and naming
For Laclau, hegemony is to be understood only on the terrain o f dis­
course: a hegemonic relation is a certain kind o f articulation o f 
meanings, namely an articulation that takes place “in a field criss­
crossed by antagonisms and therefore suppose[s] phenomena o f 
equivalence and frontier effects” (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 135-136). 
This articulation requires that a particular difference loses its 
particularity and becomes a universal representative o f the signifying 
system as a whole. Why is this kind o f representation needed at all? 
Because through that a closure for that system is provided. Since 
every system of signification is essentially differential, its closure is 
the precondition o f signification being possible at all (Laclau 1996a:
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37). But any closure requires the establishment of limits, and no limit 
can be drawn without, simultaneously, positing what is beyond it.
But how can you posit what is beyond the limits of the system of 
all differences? Laclau’s answer is: only through radical or anta­
gonistic exclusion (Laclau 1996a: 37). To put it in more simple terms: 
you have to exclude “them” radically or antagonistically in order to 
fully form “us” as a coherent system. For example: “ it is through the 
demonization o f a section o f the population that a society reaches a 
sense o f its own cohesion” (Laclau 2005a: 70). But this exclusion 
operates through two contradictory logics: on the one hand it makes 
possible the system o f differences as a coherent totality:; but, on the 
other hand, vis-a-vis the excluded element, the differences that now 
form a totality are no longer merely different but also equivalent to 
each other. To put it another way, their identity that is based on their 
more or less clear difference from each other tends to be corrupted or 
subverted by their being also equivalent to each other (Laclau 2005a:
70).
This insurmountable tension between the logic o f difference and 
that o f equivalence is unavoidable in the constitution o f every dis­
course. But a very important conclusion from this tension is that 
discourse or systemic totality o f differences is an object that is, at the 
same time, impossible and necessary. First it is impossible, because 
there cannot be a final victory o f one logic over the other: purely 
differential discourse would be just meaningless noise or “discourse of 
the psychotic” (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 112); and purely equivalential 
discourse would be just silence. And since tension between those 
logics is insurmountable, there is no literal object corresponding to a 
discourse. You cannot recognize the “True” meanings. But the totality 
o f discourse is not only an impossible object, it is also a necessary 
one: it has to be created because without that object there would be no 
signification whatsoever. And this in turn implies that “Any ‘closure’ 
is necessarily tropological. This means that those discursive forms 
that construct a horizon o f all possible representation [i. e. signifi­
cation] within a certain context, which establish the limits o f what is 
‘sayable’ are going to be necessarily figurative” (Laclau 2006: 114).
And in explaining this logic o f figural construction, Laclau coins 
the category o f “empty signifier” (Laclau 1996a: 36-^6). The idea is 
roughly this: in the formation o f discourse the differences lose their 
identity based on differentiality —  in other words: the signifiers that
form the discourse tend to get emptier and emptier from the point o f 
view o f their specific meaning. Consider the signifier “Bronze soldier” 
or “Bronze night”4. Its meaning is far less specific at the end o f the 
2007 than it was a year earlier. Now, this emptying o f the signifier 
takes place through proliferation o f different meanings that are 
attributed to it (cf. Laclau 1996b). But some signifiers tend to get 
emptier than others. O f course, in practice no signifier can lose its 
differential meaning altogether, yet Laclau’s idea is that the one that 
does it the most —  the so called “empty signifier” —  can also, in 
some circumstances, represent the discourse as a whole and incarnate 
the totality o f the whole system o f differences. Which o f the signifiers 
assumes this function, is contingent in the sense that it cannot be 
determined a priori, but is constituted through hegemonic operation. 
If it could be determined a priori, the relation between the empty 
signifier and all the other differences would be a conceptual relation: a 
relation where the empty signifier would express a common core o f all 
the particular differences belonging to the discourse. But that is 
exactly what Laclau denies (see Laclau 2006: 108-109). The 
relationship between the empty signifier and the discourse as a totality 
is the relationship between a name and an object (Laclau 2006: 109).
So, the problem o f naming is at the center o f his theory o f 
discourse and hegemony. Through the act o f naming the hegemonic 
relations are established. But how are names and objects related to 
each other? Laclau takes here a radically antidescriptivist stance 
(Laclau 2005a: 101-110; Laclau 2006: 109). Antidescriptivism as it 
stems from the works o f Saul Kripke holds that naming does not 
involve any conceptual mediation but is a primary baptism through 
which a name is assigned to an object (see Kripke 1980). But Laclau 
with his references to Slavoj Žižek (1989) goes even further and 
asserts that the object is not something pre-given, not something that a 
name can be assigned to. Rather the unity or identity o f the object is 
the result o f naming it. Objects are (so to speak) created through 
naming. The name is the ground for the thing —  not the other way 
round!
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4 “The Bronze Night” (Estonian: pronksöö), also known as the April unrest 
(27-29 April, 2007), refers to the riots and controversy surrounding the 2007 
relocation o f the “Bronze Soldier”, the Soviet World War 11 memorial in Tallinn, 
Estonia.
This means that the study o f naming strategies is o f utmost 
importance for political analysis. For example: names like “Bronze 
night” and “Bronze Soldier”, “war against terror” or “struggle against 
fascism” function as grounds for certain political discourses —  not 
just as some ancillary labels. They, o f course, change the differential 
nature o f signifiers that might end up being part o f the corresponding 
discourses.
But a very important question arises concerning this logic of dis­
course: what are the forces behind these operations that enable naming 
to be the ground for discourse? And this is the point where our view 
starts to distance from Laclau’s answer, which draws mostly from 
Lacanian psychoanalytic conceptions o f affect, desire and drive. We 
do not think psychoanalytic approach to be illegitimate in itself; in 
fact we even believe that it is a coherent general speculative ontology. 
But our aims are more empirically oriented. That is why we believe 
that we should dismiss the vocabulary o f affect, desire and drive from 
the model o f hegemony, and substitute it with Lotman’s cultural 
semiotic vocabulary o f translation and bilingualism.
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Lotman’s ontological background
According to Lotman it is characteristic to all thinking mechanisms — 
starting from the structure o f the brain to the organization o f culture in 
all its levels —  that they are heterogeneously structured. Every 
meaningful structure consists “o f (minimally) two semiotic mecha­
nisms (languages), which are mutually untranslatable and yet similar 
to each other, since each models, with its own means, the same extra- 
semiotic reality”5 (Lotman 2004f: 641) Therefore, every meaningful 
totality (Lotm an’s text, Laclau’s discourse) is at least bilingual and 
this also implies that semiotic meanings do not get their full consti­
tution through correspondence to some monolingually graspable 
“reality”.
[...] состоящую (минимально) из двух семиотических механизмов 
(языков), находящихся в отношении взаимной непереводимости и одновре­
менно подооных друг другу', поскольку каждый своими средствами модели­
рует одну и ту же внесемиотическую реальность.”
Lotman speaks about discrete and non-discrete (or continuous) 
coding systems. According to him, the mutual untranslatability o f 
those coding systems is due to their fundamentally different struc­
turing principles. In a discrete system, “the basic bearer o f  meaning is 
the segment (= sign), while the text or the chain o f  segments (= text) is 
secondary, its meaning being derived from the meanings o f the signs” 
(Lotman 2001: 36). In the discrete coding systems the signs are linked 
to signs. Linear, causal, logical or chronological sequences charac­
terize texts o f this type (Lotman 2004d: 572).
In the continual (or non-discrete) systems, the primary bearer o f 
meaning is the text “that does not dissolve into signs, but is itself a 
sign or isomorphic to a sign. Here, not the rules o f linking signs are 
active, but the rhythm and symmetry (or arrhythmia and asymmetry, 
respectively)”6 (Lotman 2004d: 577). The sign is transformed into its 
other manifestations or becomes equivalent to the corresponding blur 
of meaning on some other level. Phenomena that appear different gain 
ability to become equivalent; various analogies, homomorphisms and 
isomorphisms become possible that are characteristic to poetic texts 
and partly also to mathematic and philosophical texts (Lotman 2004d: 
572). Using Jakobson’s distinction we could say that in the non­
discrete linkage the paradigmatic pole o f language prevails, and in the 
case o f discrete linkage the same holds for syntagmatic pole (Jakobson 
1971 [1956]: 239-259).
And here a problem arises: how is this antagonism or tension 
between the two types o f coding systems (temporarily) overcome? In 
fact the situation is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, these two 
languages are mutually untranslatable. Yet, on the other hand, this 
bilingual antagonism is constitutive (as is the tension between the 
logic o f difference and that o f equivalence in the formation o f a 
discourse in Laclau’s sense), because bilingualism is the condition for 
any thinking structure. According to Lotman this “minimal structure 
contains a third component: a block o f contingent equivalences, a
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6 “который не распадается на знаки, а сам является знаком или изоморфен 
знаку. Здесь активны не правила соединения знаков, а ритм и симметрия 
(соответственно аритмия и асимметрия).”
metapborogenous device that makes possible operations o f  translation 
in the conditions o f untranslatability” (Lotman 2004f: 641).
This mechanism o f rhetorical translation integrates the antithetic 
semiotic structures (the discrete and continuous coding systems) into a 
unified whole. This unity is necessary for translation to occur and 
produce positive results, despite the apparent impossibility of any 
translation (Lotman 2004d: 573). As an elementary condition for 
semiotic communication, these antithetic tendencies have to disappear 
in a unified structural totality. Otherwise, any positive meaning- 
generation would be impossible. And it is important to notice that it is 
a two-way (and simultaneous) movement: the continuous text (= sign) 
is translated by way o f setting the discrete units into regular 
sequences, and the discrete sequences can also be conveyed through 
continuous texts (Lotman 2004e).
The function o f Lotm an’s mechanism of rhetorical translation is 
analogous to the one attributed to empty signifier in Laclau’s 
conception: it links the different signifiers into a chain o f equivalence. 
And through that operation the signifiers lose their differential identity 
and become dominated by the logic o f equivalence. Using Lotman’s 
vocabulary for making the same point, we could say that in the 
political discourse there prevails the non-discrete strategy of 
translation. It means that discrete and clearly differentiated signs are 
translated into non-discrete totality'. “The main feature o f such a world 
is universal resemblance o f everything to everything; the main orga- 
nizing structural relation that o f  homomorphism” (Lotman 2004d: 
570). This continuous translating strategy “makes one see mani­
festations o f  the One phenomenon in the various phenomena of the 
real world, and observe the One Object behind the diversity o f objects 
o f  the same type“9 (Lotman 2004d: 571).
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7 “Минимальная структура включает в себя и третий элемент: блок 
условных эквивалентностей, метафорогенное устройство, позволяющее 
осуществлять операцию перевода в ситуации непереводимости.”
Универсальным законом такого мира является подобие всего всему, 
основное организующее структурное отношение —  отношение гомео­
морфизма.”
9 “заставляет видеть в разнообразных явлениях реального мира знаки Од- 
h o i  о явления, а во всем разноооразии ооъектов одного класса просматривать 
Единый Объект.”
Yet one question concerning this strategy still remains un­
answered: in what way is this One all encompassing phenomenon 
represented? In other words, the question is: through which act is the 
discourse closed as a meaning-bearing totality? This problem leads us 
directly to Lotman’s semiotic concept o f naming.
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Lotman on naming as a translating strategy
As is well known, Lotman’s answer to the previously posed question 
is: naming. As soon as the outside world (and that can also be a world 
that is coded in some other language) is set forth, it is also named, in 
other words: it is semiotized at least on the surface level (Lotman 
2004f: 646).
The pure act o f naming (uttering the words “Bronze Night”, for 
example) is discrete in nature. But the meaning o f the name can 
function as a representation o f a continuous totality or in the extreme 
case —  it can become that totality. This extreme case, as is observed 
by Lotman, is the logic o f mythological naming or identification: 
“Mythological identification is in principle non-textual in character, 
emerging from the inseparability o f the name and object. What may be 
at stake in such cases is not substitution o f equivalent names, but 
transformation o f the object itse lf’10 (Lotman 2004c: 541).
In Laclau’s sense it would be a case o f not just equivalence 
between the name and the object it names —  but one o f identity. In 
such a case, the altering o f the name would imply altering the object 
that is named. The name “Stalin” in the Soviet Union o f 1940s did not 
just stand for the “Soviet people” —  in the official discourse, it was 
the Soviet people.
At the other extreme we could imagine the act o f  naming a 
completely discrete unit. That would be a completely conventional 
naming. In that case no transformation takes place in the object when 
its name is changed into something else.
10 “Мифологическое отождествление имеет принципиально внетекстовый 
характер, вырастая на основе неотделимости названия от вещи. При этом 
речь может идти не о замене эквивалентных названий, а о трансформации 
самого объекта.”
In neither o f  the extremes is politics or hegemony possible, 
because “We have an end o f politics when the community conceived 
as a totality [the object], and the will representing that totality [the 
name], become indistinguishable from each other. In that case [...] 
politics is replaced by administration and the traces o f social division 
disappear” (Laclau 2005b: 48). And “the asymmetry between com­
munity as a whole and collective wills is the source of that 
exhilarating game that we call politics, from which we find our limits 
but also our possibilities” (Laclau 2005b: 49).
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Conclusion: Laclau and Lotman in dialogue
Let us try to summarize our discussion. We have tried to show that the 
political discourse is always constructed as a bilingual system. Its 
main specificity consists in the tendency towards translating discrete 
elements into a non-discrete totality in the Lotmanian sense or 
difference into the chain o f equivalence in the Laclaudian sense. The 
main operation that provides the closure o f discourse is that of 
naming. And every closure is more or less hegemonic depending on 
the degree to which the name functions as the ground for continuity.
And we can combine Laclau’s insights on hegemony as an act of 
grounding a unity between differences through naming with Lotman’s 
insights on mythological naming through which the name and the 
thing that is named have a tendency to become indistinguishable. As a 
way o f illustrating this point with concrete examples, we could 
indicate the proliferation o f expressions like “accused o f organizing 
the Bronze night” or “during the Bronze night” etc in the current 
Estonian mass media. The “Bronze night” is not a conventional name 
for certain events, it tends to become more and more inseparable from 
the object it names (no matter how fictitious or abstract that object 
might be). And this means that the Estonian media has a tendency 
towards the prevalence o f mythological-continuous consciousness 
over the logical-discrete one. But we can problematize the name 
“Bronze night” itself and think o f alternative names. I f  the prevalent 
name for the events o f April 26-27 was, for example, “The Tallinn 
spring” or just “The April riots” the discursive articulation o f those
events would be o f very different sort. In other words the meaning o f 
those events would be very different.11
And finally we arrive directly at the tasks for empirical re­
searchers. For Juri Lotman, different tendencies towards discreteness 
or non-discreteness form the ground for a typology o f cultures12. 
Through a combination o f Lotman’s work with the theoretical frame­
work developed by Laclau and others, an immensely rich typology for 
empirical studies o f political communication opens up. All those 
possibilities need theoretical as well as empirical consideration. And 
this is the task we intend to engage with in our future work.13
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К проблеме семиотической теории гегемонии: 
называние как «гегемоническая операция» 
у Юрия Лотмана и Эрнесто Лакло
Настоящая статья явлется попыткой спровоцировать диалог между 
двумя разными теоретическими системами концептуализации со­
циальной реальности и власти: это теория гегемонии Эрнесто Лакло, 
одного из ведущих современных ученых в области политической 
теории, и семиотико-культурологический подход Юрия Лотмана. 
Более отдаленная цель — выработать концептуальные средства для 
более ясного освещения соотношения между социальной реаль­
ностью и властью. Несмотря на различия в плане выражения этих 
двух авторов, мы видим в их разработках существенные содержа­
тельные и функциональные точки пересечения: понятие границы, 
антагонизм, называние и т. п. В данной статье мы сосредоточиваемся 
на функции номинации в процессе конструирования политической 
реальности. Мы предлагаем возможность замены некоторых главных 
теоретических категорий Лакло категориями семиотики культуры 
Лотмана. Это позволило бы лучше эмпирически изучать стратегии 
конструирования социальной реальности и избегать привнесения 
психоаналитических трактовок, характерных для поздних работ 
Лакло.
Towards a semiotic theory o f hegemony: Lotman and Laclau 183
Semiootilise hegemooniateooria poole: 
nimetamine kui hegemooniline operatsioon Lotmanil ja Laclaul
Käesolev artikkel on katse arendada dialoogi kahe erineva teoreetilise 
lähenemise vahel — need on kaasaegse poliitilise teooria ühe juhtiva 
teadlase Emesto Laclau hegemooniateooria ning Juri Lotmani kultuuri- 
semiootiline lähenemine —  mille kaugem eesmärk oleks välja töötada 
kontseptuaalsed vahendid hõlmamaks selgemini sotsiaalse reaalsuse ja 
võimu vahekordi. Hoolimata nendevahelisest verbaalse väljenduse erine­
vustest, näeme nende käsitlustes olulisi sisulisi ja funktsionaalseid lõiku- 
mispunkte — piiri mõiste, antagonism, nimetamine jne. Antud artiklis 
keskendutakse nimetamise funktsioonile poliitilise reaalsuse konstruee­
rimisel. Me pakume välja võimaluse asendanda mõned Laclau peamised 
teoreetilised kategooriad Lotmani kultuurisemiootika kategooriatega. See 
võimaldaks paremini uurida empiiriliselt sotsiaalse reaalsuse konstruee­
rimise strateegiaid ning vältida psühhoanalüütilise käsitluse sissetoomist, 
mis on Laclau hilisematele töödele omane.
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Semiotics of the 20th century
Vyacheslav V. Ivanov
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e-mail: ivanov@ucla.edu
Abstract. Semiotic and linguistic studies o f  the 20th century have been 
important mostly in two senses —  (1) they have opened a road for compa­
rative research on the origin and development o f  language and other systems 
of signs adding a new dimension to the history o f  culture; (2) they have shown 
a possibility o f uniting different fields o f humanities around semiotics 
suggesting a way to trespass separation and atomisation o f  different trends in 
investigating culture. In the 21st century one may hope for closer integration 
of semiotics and exact and natural sciences. The points o f  intersection with the 
mathematical logic, computer science and information theory that already 
exist might lead to restructuring theoretical semiotics making it a coherent and 
methodologically rigid discipline. At the same time, the continuation o f  
neurosemiotic studies promises a breakthrough in understanding those parts o f  
the work o f the brain that are most intimately connected to culture. From this 
point o f view semiotics may play an outstanding role in the synthesis o f  
biological science and humanities. In my mind that makes it a particularly 
important field o f future research.1
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My presentation consists o f the three parts: in the first I discuss the 
results o f the study o f cultural prehistory and history of mankind 
viewed through the sign systems that were used at different periods; in 
the second I am giving a survey o f the development o f the science of 
signs in the 20th century; in the last part 1 am offering some sugges­
tions about the possible nearest future o f the science.
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1. The origin and development of semiotic systems
The history o f the achievements o f human thought and culture is inti­
mately connected to the rise and elaboration o f signs and texts through 
which they have been expressed. Understanding o f our language and 
other sign-systems constitutes a part o f self-recognition necessary for 
our consciousness. Modem science is asking questions concerning the 
beginnings and evolution o f the Universe, o f our planet and o f the 
self-conscious life on it; an interest in the origin and development o f 
human sign systems is consistent with this general tendency to search 
for the roots. The main trends o f semiotic research o f this century have 
enriched our view o f cultural history by enlarging the perspective on 
the development o f signs. A brief summary o f the most important 
results o f these evolutionary investigations and o f the problems still to 
be solved follows.
1.1. Biological com m unication system s
To understand the initial stage and the main direction o f the 
development o f human sign systems, it is necessary to study their 
evolutionary origins as seen in the pre-sign forms o f the behavior o f 
animals2. A particularly interesting case is presented by the social 
insects. It is understandable that a large society needs some cybernetic 
network o f control and information. The behavior o f social insects that 
offers extremely interesting parallels to human societies is governed 
mostly by chemical signals. Signalization system o f social insects 
rests on transmission o f a restricted set o f chemical substances 
(pheromones), which may be compared typologically to primitive 
forms o f chemical regulation (perfumes, alcohol, drugs) in human 
societies.
But in the same societies that are controlled by the pheromones 
much more refined special systems o f transmitting information 
evolved. Brilliant experiments by Frisch have shown the way dances
2 Although designation Zoosemiotics as well as its alternative Biosemiotics 
became widely spread, it lacks sufficient scientific ground. It is still not proven 
whether really one can speak about signs (signifier, signified etc.) in respect to the 
systems o f  signals used by animals, see below on apes that might constitute an 
important exception (as probably also some marine mammals).
are used by bees to encode the information about a source o f food 
(Frisch 1976)/ This language is specialized. It can transmit only 
information about a source o f food, a direction o f the flight towards it 
and a distance between it and the bee-hive; the message is never 
directed to a concrete individual, it is always addressed to everybody 
in the bee-hive4. There are two main types o f dance. The general 
message about a rich source o f food being available not far away from 
a bee-hive is given by a round dance: a bee is turning around, first to 
the right, then to the left and is repeating circles now and again for 
some time. To inform about a distant source o f food a “tail-wagging” 
dance is used: a bee is running a short distance straight ahead wagging 
the abdomen rapidly from side to side, then makes a 360-degree turn 
to the right, again running in a straight line for some time and then 
turns to the left repeating the same pattern again. The distance to a 
bee-hive is rendered by a number o f turns the bee makes.
The dance may be called a total performance addressing to several 
senses. It transmits an audio-visual message as the movements of a 
dancing bee produce sounds.' But the odour o f the food a specimen of
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Such a writer o f the beginning o f the 20th century as Maeterlinck who was 
interested in the bees (and other social insects to each group o f which he 
dedicated a special book) wrote also about 'the intellect o f flowers’ (intelligence 
des fleu rs) in connection to the bee-flower interaction. From this point o f view the 
signalizing role o f the colors and smells o f plants (much later used in the human 
culture as a part o f  human sign systems) might be studied. But a systematic 
research on the pre-sign aspect o f the world o f plants might belong to the goals of 
sociobiological and semiotic experiments o f the future century.
4 Principal differences from human natural language were examined in an 
article by Benveniste (1952) as well as in Hockett’s works (Hockett 1960).
5 An attempt to come to an equation connecting different values o f the bees’ 
dances led to a formula in which the speed o f sound appears. At one of the 
American cybernetic conferences o f the time o f  the Sturm und fhng of 
cybernetics a remark was made that to a hypothetical bee-scientist this speed 
might have had an importance comparable to the speed o f  light in human physical 
theories. The interesting side o f the joke refers to a probable link between the size 
o f an organism and the speed limitations. In any case the bee is considered to be 
an example o f  a smallest (and particularly successful) flying creature already in 
the Hattic-Hittite myth o f  the God Telepinu (2nd mil. BC) in which it is opposed 
to the eagle as a large one. A particular role is ascribed to bees and honey not 
only in Greek mythology (where the influence o f  Ancient Oriental images seems 
possible), but in the other parts o f  the world as well. Here (as in many other 
cases) modem scientific interests were anticipated by the myths.
which is brought by a bee is transmitted directly during the tactile 
contact between the bees and the followers. It is like some types o f 
advertising in modem society. O f all the different senses used during a 
dance, the optical one is the most important. The direction o f flight is 
indicated with respect to thee position o f the Sun.6 During the running 
part of the tail-wagging dance the bee takes such a position that it sees 
the Sun at the same angle as during its previous flight to the feeding 
place. If  a bee dances on a perpendicular honeycomb inside a hive, it 
is usually quite dark there. The bees cannot see the Sun, but rely 
instead on the direction o f gravity. They orient the straight portion o f 
the dance at the same angle to the direction o f the gravitational force 
as the angle they have flown with the respect to the Sun in their 
previous flight to the source o f food. In this sense one may speak 
about rudimentary applied astronomy and geometry among the bees. 
But this knowledge as well as the communicational possibilities are 
used only in connection with the specific goal o f this system o f  trans­
mitting information.
Among the animals that are considered to be on a higher level o f 
evolution and have a much more complicated nervous system there 
are many who live mostly in large groups (like wolves or elephants). 
Communication between the members o f such groups is important for 
the survival. In most known cases the systems o f such signals (calls) 
are predominantly vocal (birds, marine mammals and primates are 
particularly important for a comparison with human sign systems).
1.2. Origin and developm ent o f hum an prim ary sign system s
By primary sign systems those that are directly realized by the signals 
perceived through senses (vision, hearing etc.) are understood as 
different from secondary sign systems encoded by the signs o f another 
system7 (see on different types o f secondary systems below, 1.3). As
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The ability to use the Sun (and also an artificial source o f light, e.g. a lamp in 
a dark room) as a sort o f compass was discovered also for the ants by Felix 
Santschi (as early as in 1911), but only the bees inserted this kind o f knowledge 
into their communication system.
The difference was introduced in the Moscow-Tartu semiotic school that 
used this terminology. The borders between the two types are not absolute, as, for
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some types o f signalization similar to human primary semiotic sys­
tems are known among the animals, particularly primates, it is pos­
sible to study their origin on a comparative base.
1.2.1. Gestures
Predominant use o f gestures in connection to intellectual tasks charac­
terizes large apes (chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans). For all these 
high primates a particular importance o f the visual mode is characte­
ristic.8
To reconstruct the probable earliest types o f gestural signalization 
o f a common ancestor o f humans and all the large apes (including 
orangutans whose split from the rest is dated more than 11 mill, years 
BP) recent observations on the communicational possibilities and 
learning o f orangutans are particularly important. The experiments 
with a young orangutan Chantek made in 1979-1986 have been 
described in detail.9 Being immersed into a human cultural environ­
ment he acquired 127 gestural signs combining them later sometimes 
in groups o f two signs following each other (chimpanzees in similar 
experiments could combine several signs although they were learning 
them more slowly than Chantek did). Situations in which Chantek 
signed were connected to food and drinking (a favorite topic of the 
ape-human symbolic interaction in all the experiments o f the last 
decades), playing and some details o f the everyday life. Each sign 
referred to a very large complex o f objects linked through associa­
tions. Thus a sign referring to a bug could designate different insects, 
but also a picture o f a graph shaped like a butterfly, tiny brown pieces 
o f cat food, and small bits o f feces. A sign denoting a dog referred 
also to pictures o f a dog and o f a cheetah and to some other animals
instance, some gestures may be receded in words (see below on numerals) and 
thus different sign systems are interrelated historically.
Gibbons (Hylobates) that are the closest relatives o f the great apes use vocal 
signalization to much larger extent. It may be supposed that at some point in the 
evolution o f  the higher branch o f  primates there occurred a shift to gesture 
signalization and visual mode, traces o f  which can be seen in human traditions as 
well. Chimpanzees use vocal signals (calls), but their function is different from 
that o f gestures.
An informative documentary film is also available.
(including orangutans on television and a tiger at the circus), to 
barking noises at the radio and to a noisy (“barking”) helicopter 
(Miles 1994: 528). Chantek preferred to use proper names and not 
pronouns while addressing people. That can be compared to a similar 
behavior o f a small child experiencing difficulties in the use o f 
personal pronouns and other shifters. In comparison to a human child 
an orangutan educated by his caretakers could reach the level o f 
Piaget’s sensorimotor period moving towards the preoperational one.
Methodology and theoretical conclusions o f  many similar recent 
studies on the use o f gestures and other visual (such as modem 
artificial computerized) systems o f communication among common 
chimpanzees, pigmy chimpanzees (bonobos) and gorillas rest dispu­
table. Still it seems that the number n o f basic signs learned by apes in 
the human-ape interaction does not exceed two hundred:10
n< 2 x 102. (1)
A quantitative difference from the size o f an average everyday 
vocabulary of any human language is very large: the latter includes no 
less than 2x103 words, the whole amount o f the lexical items reaching 
up to 2x104. But numerically and semantically analogous system was 
used by very small children (up to 3 years old) talking to adult 
members o f an American Indian Comanche tribe. In this specialized 
language there are approximately 40=22x l0  words that usually refer to 
a very broad range o f objects: [ uma?] may be translated as “good; 
beautiful; let me do your hair; let me put a dress on you” (words o f a 
mother addressed to her child), also “look, what a good dress! what a 
beautiful toy!”; the same word can designate any beautiful, colored or 
bright thing attractive for a child; it renders the colors “red”, “yellow”, 
“blue” (Casagrande 1965: 245-246).11 A necessity to refer with one
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10 According to some preliminary data the largest number o f signs has been 
found in gorilla-human communication (Patterson, Linden 1981), but one should 
distinguish between the basic set o f signs and one-time compounds (cf. Terrace 
1984).
" A sign [-J refers to a glottal stop as in a dialectal American English [w oe] 
instead of ‘water’. It seems that a small vocabulary may be a characteristic feature 
of such “pidgins” created to facilitate the interaction between creatures with 
different communicational capacities. From the same point o f view the sets o f 
words (mostly interjections, very often o f onomatopoetic character, but also 
equivalents o f  proper names) used in addressing different domestic animals in
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sign to many different objects may be a result o f these quantitative 
limitations. Such objects are linked to each other by associations that 
are far from being logical; a comparison to “complex thinking” of a 
child as described by Vygotskij suggests itself.
In some cases the associations used by chimpanzees are of the 
same kind as those o f orangutans: a sign denoting a dog is also used 
for barking. Chimpanzees are able to create new combinations of 
signs. Thus instead o f the standard combination {“cold” + “box”} sug­
gested by Gardners to Washoe to denote refrigerator she invented 
herself another one: {“open” + “food”+ “drink”} (Gardner, Gard- 
nerl972: 38). In comparable data on the communication with a gorilla 
(Koko in F. Patterson’s experiments) particularly interesting are the 
cases where she tries to deceive a teacher transmitting a lie or 
probably joking, but at the same showing some elements of logical 
thinking when she acknowledges her lie. Particularly interesting are 
the unexpected linguistic successes o f a pigmy chimpanzee (bonobo) 
Kanzi. In his early childhood he had learned meaning of several oral 
sentences o f English and could fulfill the tasks given to him orally 
using at the same time a whole set o f possible combinations of signs 
o f an artificial visual system o f communication that he had understood 
him self by observation without special teaching directed at him 
(Savage-Rumbaux, Lewin 1994).12
Such studies have shown the ability o f apes to imitate, partly 
develop and distort communication systems taught to them by humans 
in artificial conditions. Much more rewarding should be the data on 
gestural communication o f large apes in natural environment. Some of 
the common gestures o f gorillas are comparable to those of humans, 
as for instance, iconic signs representing the degree of social closeness 
between individuals by the spatial relations (signs similar to hand­
shake and embrace). But some o f such signs that might have been 
inherited (genetically or culturally) have different functions; thus, a 
sign o f putting out one’s tongue means extreme surprise among 
gorillas and in some human cultures o f the Far East, but has another
different languages (first o f  all in specialized dialects o f cattle-breeders) might 
become particularly interesting.
12 On a possible explanation o f  Kanzi’s abilities connected to his exposure to 
English at an early age cf. Deacon 1997: 126-127. Kanzi’s passive understanding 
o f human vocal commands that he could not reproduce reminds similar 
possibilities o f  some dogs.
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(offensive) meaning in Europe. Such comparisons are still isolated as 
there is no systematic description o f natural sign systems o f  different 
cultural groups o f large apes.
Studies in primate communication made it possible to suppose that 
gestures were more important for the intellectual operations o f early 
hominids although they coexisted with a relatively small number o f 
sound signals (calls, similar to those used by some other high mam­
mals) that had not yet developed into a phonemic language. The 
common origin o f the latter and the gestural communication may be 
reflected in the relation between the modem systems o f gestures and 
the left (dominant) hemisphere (Poizner, Klima, Bellugi 1987). The 
emerging difference between gestural communication and human 
acoustic codes (language, songs and music) has been crucial for the 
emergence of human brain.
Languages o f gestures belong to those systems o f signs that are 
widely used as substitute o f natural language. For the mankind not 
only linguistic diversity but coexistence o f different semiotic systems 
seems to be very important starting with the earliest periods o f history. 
In modem societies gestures substitute natural phonemic language 
only in some pathological cases (such as the communication o f deaf- 
mute people13) as well as in some exceptional social situations.14 But 
the extraordinary importance o f this type o f semiotic systems not only 
for communication (particularly between tribes speaking different 
phonemic languages), but also for the archaic intellectual processes 
still might have been observed among American Indians in the 
previous century. The great American anthropologist Cushing (1857— 
1900) who had been introduced into the mysteries o f the Zuni tribe 
performed an experiment that Levy-Brühl called possible for a genius 
only: he achieved the formation o f manual concepts connected to 
gestures'5; it was only in our century that the experiment was
For semiotic studies particularly important were the works o f A. I. Sokolians- 
kij and his followers on blind-deaf-mutes, see Ivanov 1998: 490-494. Through 
this example, it proved possible to study relations between different (hieroglyphic 
and alphabetical) sign systems and the ways to acquire one o f them after another.
14 For instance, a prohibition to speak is observed by members of some 
monastic orders. A similar substitution o f the oral language by a gestural one is 
observed in connection with funerary rites and some other rituals among the 
Aranta tribe in Australia.
Ina recently published letter o f 1880, Cushing wrote that among the Zunis “a 
most elaborate gesticulation accompanies excited or emphatic oral demonstrations
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appreciated and repeated by the great Russian cinema-maker and a 
forerunner o f semiotics Sergei Eisenstein who was fascinated with 
C ushing's discovery.
To the areas in which for a long time gestural signs had coexisted 
with their synonyms in natural language (originally their own 
linguistic names) belonged the system of finger counting (Cushing 
1892).16 The link between counting and gestures o f fingers goes back 
to the period when the left temporal zone o f the brain of Homo 
sapiens sapiem w?as shaped. A damage to this zone may result both in 
finger agnosia (incapacity to recognize one’s own fingers) and 
aculculia (incapacity to count).1 As Vygotskij remarked in his studies 
on the fossilized traces o f ancient signs in the behavior of modem 
meru early finger counting is an elementary form of cultural arith­
metic. It appears both among small children in modem cities and in 
the ancient societies such as the Egyptian one where it was necessary 
to showr one's ability for finger counting to reach the privileged 
position in the Netherworld.18 Most native peoples o f Australia and
—  yet many o f  the signs thus used being too artificial to have had origin in simple 
natural conceptions, and from this not only but also from their close affinity to 
those o f  other tribes, we must infer that they have been remotely acquired or at 
least that thev are survivals o f  an ancient intertribal gesture speech" (Cushing 
1990: 98-99).
10 In a recently published manuscript On Zuni language Cushing remarked that 
"the Zunis. although they have the words for the expression o f numbers [...] 
always use the fingers in counting” (Cushing 1990: 106). From the linguistic 
designations o f  numbers and fingers he reconstructed "the time when the Zunis or 
their ancestors could not express the number without the use o f the fingers" 
(Cushing 1990: 107; cf. also Cushing 1892: 292-296).
1 Combination o f  these deficiencies with the loss o f  the binary spatial opposition 
left-right and also with agraphia (damage done to writing) was called “Gerstmann 
syndrome” after the German neurologist who discovered it in 1930. Later studies 
have shown that each o f  these incapacities may appear isolated also. Nevertheless, 
for cooperation o f  cultural and neurosemiotic studies it seems important that all 
these different abilities are shown to be represented in the same area o f the brain. 
As to writing, its possible original link to counting is supposed by the recent 
discoveries discussed below'. Particularly interesting is the possibility to connect 
these features o f  the parietal zone o f  the dominant hemisphere o f  the human brain 
to the partly similar spatial incapacities (unilateral neglect) found in case of a 
damage to corresponding parietal zones o f  the brain o f monkeys. Here it is 
possible to suggest a way from the earlier spatial capacities to those connected to 
such special human semiotic gifts as counting and w riting.
the Pacific area have continued to use similar archaic systems o f  body 
parts counting until 20th century and it may be supposed that in this 
particular area a shift from gestural code to oral language occurred 
relatively late.|Q
Semiotics o f  the 20th century 195
1.2.2. Acoustic signals. Natural language
To discover the order in which different sign systems might have 
developed in the course o f human history and prehistory one may tiy 
to combine data o f biological sciences including molecular biology 
and those of linguistics and other semiotic disciplines. Some nume­
rical characteristics o f systems o f the vertebrate communication make 
it possible to reconstruct the earliest stage o f the prehistory. In all 
these systems the number n o f different signals can be expressed by
90the inequality (2)“ :
10<« < 50 (2)
s In an ancient Egyptian conjuration studied by Sethe a dead king asks a 
ferryman (a double o f the Greek Kharon) to take him to the Eastern part o f the 
channel in the Otherworld. The ferryman retorts: “Have not you brought a man 
who can not count his fingers?” In reply to this the king recites a poem in which 
each line corresponds to a finger and the order o f lines is determined by the 
pattern of the ancient Egyptian finger counting. In modem Coptic tradition 
continuing the ancient Egyptian one, gestures are still used in the system o f  
organizing musical performance partly similar to modem conducting. In Egypt 
starting from the Dynasty period and later, pictographic and hieroglyphic 
(logographic) signs were used which represented archaic gestures corresponding 
to musical scores and designated to conduct musicians (as it is continued also in 
the modem Coptic tradition, cf. Coptic “PTQPE”, that means “to clap hands, to 
sing accompanying song with gestures”. In ancient Egyptian “ir tr”=  “dance”, 
“...rF  = “hand”). The expression “to sing with a hand” is attested already in 
ancient Egyptian hymn to the river Nile. Gestural signs connected to music find 
parallels in Egyptian gestures linked to counting and in “manual concepts” o f  
many archaic cultures.
; In such modem languages as English the old gestural counting system can still 
be discovered through the etymology o f terms for 5 and 10.
Those systems that have been taught by humans to apes in the experiments 
discussed above are much larger. But it has still to be investigated whether 
anything comparable might be found in the natural environment (such 
suggestions were made, for instance, about bonobos, but they have not been 
confirmed by actual observation).
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As the average number o f the signals in different primate vocal 
communication systems is around 40 it can be supposed that the main 
difference in the process o f hominisation consisted o f the change of 
the level o f organization. The number m o f the elementary sound units 
or phonemes in different languages o f the world can be expressed by 
the inequality (3)21:
10< w < 85 (3)
The number o f the elementary sound signals has remained the same as 
in the other vocal primate communication systems. But in the latter 
each o f these units has a certain semantic function. Each o f them 
refers to some situations that are important for the whole group of 
animals (for instance, a signal o f danger). Phonemes o f human natural 
languages do not have a direct semantic function. They are combined 
into sequences rendering certain meanings. In modem languages a 
relatively small number o f phonemes m is used to produce many 
thousand words.22
21 The smallest number o f  phonemes (10 < m <  15) is known in the languages of 
Pacific area from the Ainu language on the Hokkaido island in the north to 
Polynesian languages o f  the Austronesian family in the south (the amazingly 
small number o f  consonants in these languages was discussed from this 
geographical point o f  view by Haudricourt) and also in some parts o f the 
Amazonian zone in Southern America (originally maybe connected to the Pacific 
area) as well as those Australian languages that have only one series o f stops. The 
largest known number o f phonemes is represented by Modem North-Western 
Caucasian languages as Abkhazian and its dialects with m~80 (or exactly 82) 
phonemes. For the protolanguage o f  the whole North Caucasian family a very 
rich system with a comparable number o f  consonantal phonemes has been 
reconstructed. Thus it seems that the rich consonant systems have been 
characteristic o f  the Caucasian area for last several thousand years.
Roman Jakobson and Claude Levi-Strauss supposed that such creation of 
multi-level systems on the base o f  much simpler ones inherited from the previous 
stages of development is characteristic not only o f  the development o f  language 
but as well o f  the other aspects o f human cultural evolution (such as tools to 
produce tools and the incest prohibition with its social consequences) specific for 
man only.
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A long discussion on the anatomical possibility o f an oral phone­
mic language for Neanderthals has not lead to a definite conclusion.23 
It is supposed that some development o f an inferior frontal lobule in 
the Broca area as well as o f  the inferior parietal lobule corresponding 
to Wernicke area is observed already on the endocasts from me sculls 
of Homo habilis that may point to a progress in linguistic capacities 
connected to these speech zones. But they might have been connected 
initially not only to vocal calls, but to other signs (for instance, 
gestural). A definite conclusion on the functional asymmetry o f the 
brain and a probable dominance o f the oral language connected to the 
left hemisphere may be made on the base o f the sculls o f the humans 
of the Upper Paleolithic time. Connecting data o f physical anthropo­
logy, archaeology, paleoneurology and molecular genetics several 
scholars have started the investigation o f a probable ancient distribu­
tion of the varieties o f language o f Homo sapiens sapiens. Data o f 
other sciences can be linked to those o f comparative linguistics.
Classical Indo-European comparative grammar created and deve­
loped in the 19th century was successful in reconstructing a common 
ancestor of a whole family o f languages. In the late 19th and 20th 
centuries these methods were applied to most o f the languages o f  the 
world that gave a picture o f their history in the last millenia. In the 
1950s and 1960s an important achievement was made by the Ameri­
can linguist Moris Swadesh (1909-1967) and his followers who 
introduced lexicostatistical methods o f establishing glottochronology 
of cognate languages by finding percent o f historically identical words 
belonging to lists of 200 or 100 most often used basic terms (such as, 
for instance, ‘to come’, ‘to drink’, ‘long’, ‘black’ etc.).24 The calcu­
lated time t between the present (or the moment when the vocabulary 
is observed) and the split of dialects o f an ancestral language giving 
rise to its descendants is estimated according to the formula (4):
Lieberman (1984, 1991) suggested that the structure o f a reconstructed throat 
excludes possibilities o f a human-like speech; but it was supposed that a recently 
found Neanderthal hyoid bone was compatible with an oral language.
The empirical conclusion on a relative stability o f the basic vocabulary is 
corroborated by the necessity to continue contact between generations starting 
with the age when the native language is learned. In the last decade methods o f  
computational cladistics have also been applied to find formal criteria o f the 
degree o f closeness o f related languages.
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t  = log С / 21og r  (4)
where С is the portion o f coinciding words in the lists for both 
languages and r  is a coefficient o f preserving the basic vocabulary for 
an interval o f historical time (empirically deduced as 0.81 to 0.86 in 
one thousand years). Glottochronology has shown an approximate age 
of many known linguistic families and the degree o f lexical closeness 
between their members inside each family. But this technique works 
safely only if the distance between languages is measured no more 
than by 5-7 thousand years; otherwise the number o f disappearing 
words grows and the results would become less reliable. For 
theoretical studies o f the approaches to the category of time in the 
science o f the 20th century it seems interesting to notice parallel use 
o f quantitative methods to establish linguistic time in glottochro­
nology and the molecular clock in the genetical studies comparing 
corresponding parts o f genomes of related species.
Most o f the existing and known (dead written) languages are 
grouped into several hundreds o f linguistic families. Dispersal of most 
o f them has taken place relatively late. That means that the proto­
languages o f these families (their hypothetical ancestors) had existed 
no earlier than some millenia ago (and thus the lexicostatistical 
method can be successfully applied to them).
The next step permitting an in-depth reconstruction has been 
inaugurated by Vladislav M. Illich-Svitych (1934-1966). Developing 
the idea put forward by the great Danish scholar Holger Pedersen 
(1867-1953), Illich-Svitych (e.g. 1989, 1990) has laid foundation for 
an exact comparative study o f the Nostratic macro-family that 
includes as its separate branches Indo-European, Kartvelian (Southern 
Caucasian including Georgian and Svanetian)“3, Uralic (Finno-Ugrian 
and Samoyed)26, Altaic (Turkic and Mongolian, Tungus-Manchu,
25 Some amazing coincidences o f  Kartvelian and Indo-European had been 
discovered already by the founder o f the Indo-European comparative grammar
Franz Bopp who dedicated his last book to this question. In the 20th century 
Gamkrelidze and Machavarini have demonstrated the extraordinary similarity of 
the whole systems o f Indo-European and Proto-Kartvelian nominal derivation and 
root structure.
~6 Yukagir (now spoken by few people in the North o f Siberia) seems to be an 
archaic language distantly related to Uralic. Close connections between Uralic
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Korean and Japanese), Dravidian27 and probably Afro-Asiatic (Se- 
mito-Chamitic including Semitic, Ancient Egyptian, Cushitic, Berber, 
Chadic and Omotic) family28. The new aspect o f  comparative studies 
of a macro-family introduced by Illich-Svitych consisted in a rigorous 
phonetic comparison o f the reconstructed protolanguages o f  separate 
families included into a larger unit. The technique o f comparison and 
reconstruction is the same as in the traditional historical linguistics, 
but the objects o f study are pushed back at the temporal distance that 
exceeds that o f the previous comparisons more than twice (the 
estimated time o f Proto-Indo-European —  4000-5000 yr, the 
estimated time of Proto-Nostratic —  more than 10,000 yr)29. A similar 
attempt to reconstruct a large macro-family has also been made
and Indo-European were first discovered by the Swedish scholar Collinder £.nd 
studied later by the Slovene scholar Chop and the Finnish linguist Koivulehto.
: According to McAlpin’s hypothesis, Dravidian is related to Elamite, one o f  
the ancient Oriental languages attested in a very old series o f  monuments (in the 
Western Iran). Although several group o f researchers attempting to decipher the 
Proto-Indian inscriptions o f 3 -2  mill. BC suggest a Dravidian character o f  their 
language, there is no definite reading o f the texts as yet.
:s Some scholars following Illich-Svitych suppose that Afro-Asiatic is included 
into Nostratic while according to another point o f  view it is a separate macro­
family but distantly related to Nostratic. Several scholars include also Eskimo- 
Aleut and Chukchee-Koryak families into the Nostratic macro-family.
29 As the methods o f Illich-Svitych and his strict followers are not different from 
those used in the traditional historical linguistics, a certain neglect o f  the 
achievements o f this school seen in many American linguistic publications can 
hardly be defended. There are still several real methodological problems in 
connection to the long-distance reconstruction o f macro-families. First, as the 
number of words (or morphs) being substituted by innovations or borrowings 
grows, only few elements remain on which the comparison should rest. Second, 
for a very distant time some objects might have become cultural achievements, the 
names of which might have been interborrowed. Third, as the long-distance 
reconstruction depends on the comparison o f protolanguages the unsafe results of 
the latter might be detrimental to the more distant studies. Another problem is 
connected to the possibility to demonstrate main macro-families by multilateral 
comparison o f lexical items as attempted by Greenberg in respect to languages o f  
Africa (where his classification has been accepted by specialists), America 
(rejected by many specialists; a similar hypothesis was hinted at by Sapir and 
developed 25 years ago by E. Matheson using traditional technique o f  
reconstruction) and the Indo-Pacific area (where most languages, as Papua groups 
on the New Guinea) are still not sufficiently known; the last suggestion partly 
coincides with the one made later by Wurm.
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30 •concerning the family that includes Northem-Caucasian' , Yemsse- 
yan31, Sino-Tibetan and probably Na-Dene32. It can be supposed that 
all the known languages o f the world are descendants o f no more than 
10 macro-families such as (besides those enumerated above) Khoi- 
Sanj3, Niger-Kordofanian (including Benue-Congo to which belong 
all the widely spread Bantoid and Bantu languages), Nilo-Saharan' ,
j0 The comparative grammar o f North Caucasian has been built by the great 
Russian migre scholar Prince Nikolai Trubetzkoy and developed recently by 
Nikolaev and Starostin (Nikolaev, Starostin 1994). As shown by Diakonoff (1983) 
and Starostin, Human (attested in the 3rd-2nd mill. BC in Northern Syria 
Northern Mesopotamia and Asia Minor) and Urartian (documents in the area of 
the Lake Van and Armenia, 1st mill. BC) belonged to the same family; a similar 
hypothesis seems to be proven in connection to Hattie (a sacred language of the 
Hittite Empire, dead by the beginning o f the 2nd mill. BC). Northern Caucasian 
origin o f Etruscan (brought to Italy from Asia Minor) is not yet definitely shown, 
as the texts have not been interpreted. A hypothesis on a relationship o f North- 
Caucasian and Basque is been discussed, but the definite proof has not been given.
31 Now the family is represented only by the Ket language spoken by several 
hundreds people in the Western Siberia. In 1962 I had yet an occasion to work 
with the old women who were the last speakers o f a related Yug language that 
disappeared several years after that. In the 19th century castren described Kot that 
belonged to the same family, but was dead soon after he had made his notes. 
Words and forms o f some other languages and dialects o f  the same group have 
been written down by travellers in the 18th century. As the brilliant scholar A. P. 
Dulson has shown, in the old times the rivers o f the Northern part o f Central Asia 
had names related to Yenisseian words for river and water. That proves the wider 
spread o f the family before it had been ousted by the newcomers. A distantly 
related language o f the same macro-family Burushaski (in the Himalayan 
mountains) has some grammatical features reminding o f Yenisseian.
’2 The idea o f Sapir concerning a Sino-Tibetan connection o f Na-Dene has been 
revived in the recent studies. But some specialists (without relevant arguments) 
generalized fashionable scepticism suggesting some faults in the Na-Dene 
reconstruction as well.
33 This group o f languages (including so called Bushman and Hottentot) has a 
chance to be the only relictal trace o f the speech o f original African population 
and thus may be crucial for the picture o f  the early development o f human 
language. Unfortunately these languages have not been studied thoroughly 
enough and may soon disappear. Thus an international endeavour at their 
description seems to be among the urgent tasks o f the linguists o f  the future 
century.
A hypothesis on a possible larger macro-macro-family —  “Congo-Saharan" 
(previously called Sudan ’) including both Niger-Kordofanian and Nilo-Saharan 
has not yet been widely accepted. As there are some features common to Afro-
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Austro-Thai (to which belong the Austro-Asiatic and Thai languages 
of the Southern Asia and the Austronesian languages o f the Pacific 
islands), Australian and Amerindian. The recent comparative 
historical research on large macro-families o f Eurasian languages 
suggests a possible common origin o f all o f them although the whole 
problem o f long-distance linguistic relationship has remained 
controversial. If the hypothesis on the common origin o f  such macro­
families as Nostratic, Afro-Asiatic, Sino-Tibetan-Yenisseian- 
Northem-Caucasian is proven, it might be connected to the idea o f the 
African homeland o f Homo sapiens sapiens.7,5 The genetic data on the 
oldest waves o f the dispersal o f the early humans migrating from 
Africa seem to correspond to recent linguistic hypotheses (Cavalli- 
Sforza, Menozzi, Piazza 1994).36 Differentiation o f languages and the 
dispersal of original macro-families was the result o f later movements 
across Eurasia and the other continents. For a period after the 
Neolithic revolution a spread and dispersal o f macro-families and
Asiatic and Niger-Kordofanian, one may speak about a chain relating all the 
groups o f the languages o f Africa with the exception o f  Khoi-San. It is exactly 
this isolated position that makes the latter a particularly important object for 
historical studies.
35 In that sense the myth about the existence o f one language in the earliest times 
such as can be found already in the Sumerian texts and is continued in the story o f 
the tower o f Babel, anticipated modem scholarly research. While supposing that 
the existing linguistic families (with some possible exceptions, cf. above on Khoi- 
San as a probable trace o f those African languages that had remained in Africa) go 
back to a single language, modem scholars do not exclude the possibility o f  the 
disappearance o f some o f the most ancient languages. The over-all picture is not 
yet quite clear because many o f existing (and rapidly dying out) languages have 
not yet been described and several old languages were put down in the written 
form that has not yet been deciphered (for instance the Cretan Linear A and 
Hieroglyphic writing, an unknown writing system of the Central Asia o f  1 mill. 
BC many monuments o f which have been recently found etc.). The place o f  
several culturally important languages (for instance, Sumerian) and o f several 
unclassified ones (as Ainu that has been spoken on the islands Sahalin and 
Hokkaido) in the whole scheme has not been found.
'f Not only cultural achievements, but also natural catastrophes (such as the 
cyclic warming o f  the Central Asian climate or a sudden flooding o f  the Black 
Sea around 5500 yr BC) might have caused migrations o f the type found in the 
history o f the speakers o f Indo-European dialects. A return to the idea o f the 
importance o f catastrophes seems a feature o f  the recent development o f several 
sciences.
families having split from the former is connected to the diffusion of 
new inventions and explained by economic trends.37
Modem studies o f endangered languages suggest that no more than 
600 languages out o f 6,000 that exist in the world may survive in the 
next generation (Robins, Uhlenbeck 1991). This possible catastrophe 
o f the nearest future might be even more serious than the one studied 
by the specialists in ecology. Mankind is rapidly losing the degree of 
linguistic diversity that it had for last thousands o f years.
As it is supposed that a large part o f the world’s population will 
live in large cities in the 20th century, the future o f linguistic and other 
semiotic systems will depend o f the urban situation. We may identify 
two main types o f the large city in the last 9 millennia of the history of 
civilization. The first type is characterized mainly by the linguistic 
diversity o f the population. A large city o f this type was either at least 
bilingual in its oral and/or written linguistic network of commu­
nication or multilingual like already the large cities o f the ancient 
Western Asia starting with Ebla (Northern Syria, the middle of the 3rd 
mill. BC), Ugarit (Northern Syria, 14th—15th century BC) etc. In the 
second type o f cities the semiotic diversity is normal, whereas the 
linguistic one may be minimal or reduced (as Athens o f the 5th c. B.C. 
where most o f the semiotic systems o f European arts and sciences 
have been founded). In post-industrial American large cities, such as 
New York, Boston, Chicago, as well as in the large cities of 
California, both types are united. The linguistic diversity in its utmost 
form (approximately 150 different languages in Boston, etc.'8) 
coexists with a very large number o f specialized semiotic systems (of 
religions, sciences, humanities, arts), including the mass media and 
other sign systems (such as advertising, traffic signals etc.) that are 
addressed to the average citizen. However, there have been no large
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Recent series o f  studies by Colin Renfrew (1996), Peter Bellwood (1997), and 
other scholars. Renfrew uses the conclusions o f Johanna Nichols on the difference 
between the languages having spread at the early times and those which might 
have diffused much later in connection to the technological achievements. These 
results are based mostly on typological data.
38 In Los Angeles no less than 200 languages are spoken, with more than 10 of 
them having a large number o f  speakers from several millions (Spanish being 
second only to English) to several hundreds thousands (Armenian, Persian, 
Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Tagalog, Khmer, 
Russian).
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cities without a complex network o f linguistic and/or other signs —  a 
network comprised o f no less than two (and usually more) systems o f 
such signs.
1.2.3. Music
There are several problems o f animal communication that probably 
will be solved only in the future century'. These include the semantic 
aspect of the long acoustic messages transmitted (and sometimes 
repeated) by cetaceans (whales and dolphins).39 Among different 
species acoustic communication is particularly developed by those 
animals that are connected to the air as the main element o f  their 
environment (birds, partly gibbons that are most vocal among the apes 
that can be partly explained by the arboreal ecology o f their life on the 
branches) or to water like whales, dolphins and other marine mam­
mals. Some striking analogies found in the respective asymmetries o f 
nervous system may be due to parallel development. In the bird 
singing and cetaceans’ messages possible parallels can be found to 
personal songs that characterize an individual.40 This method might be 
older than the use o f personal names.41 In these biologically ancient 
cases musical text has an individual as its signifier. But later on also 
the social structures may find direct iconic representation in music 
(Putilov 1980). The investigation into probable origins o f a genetically 
transmitted specialization of certain zones o f the right (non-dominant)
Besides echolocation, the acoustic messages of cetaceans include for instance 
long song-like messages o f bowhead whales, complex utterances o f  humpback 
whales, high-energy clicks o f sperm whales and highly developed communication 
systems of dolphins. Only some elementary signals like those o f danger have been 
decoded so far, in spite o f a number o f serious studies and a lot o f popular 
writings about dolphins’ capacities.
40 For instance among Kets, Saami and Siriono (an American Indian tribe in 
Bolivia) As First noticed by Kandinsky in 1919, the principle is also very close to 
Wagner’s use o f leitmotifs to characterize a particular hero. This device was later 
used in some Films by Fellini (Otto e mezzo).
1 As remarked by such logicians as Russell, names do not have a corresponding 
concept (there is no notion like *peter-ness associated to Peter etc.). Thus a 
preference for names in the animal and man-domestic animal interaction (see 
above on apes) may be an indirect argument for a non-sign character o f a large 
part o f animal communication.
hemisphere where main musical capacities can be localized, might 
become a particularly rewarding evolutionary analysis. To understand 
the evolutionary relationship between different sign systems the 
problem of gradual separation o f language and music is o f utmost 
importance. There should have been some selective pressure (in the 
Darwinian sense) for musical abilities to become genetically trans­
mitted. Rhythmic structure might have been among the oldest biolo­
gically important constituents o f musical messages. Beside the 
probable concrete positive physiological value o f the rhythm (see 
below on this in connection to rites) it represented a symbolic image 
o f harmonia mundi in later human culture.42
Artificial capacities o f musical instruments were added to natural 
human vocal resources (arising with the emergence o f human throat 
that made singing possible) at a relatively early stage of cultural 
evolution, as it has recently been discovered. At the beginning of the 
semiotic activity o f modem man, one can find first traces of special 
devices such as those made o f reindeer toe bones with blowholes in 
them. They were found in France and date from around 22x l0,000 =
40,000 yr BP. It is possible that they were used as signalling whistles 
if  not as instruments in a modem sense. In the Bronze Age stringed 
instruments o f  the lyre or harp type became important not only for 
music and vocal performance it accompanied, but for the poetry and 
ritual in general. The links between their shapes and names in Greece 
and ancient Orient indicate the integration o f the whole large area 
where later European cultural tradition was anticipated and prepared 
for. As musical instrument technology was considered to be among 
the main aspects o f the religious life o f the society its international 
development has been spreading on a scale and with a speed 
comparable to modem achievements in the most advanced fields of 
technology.
The 20th century saw an attempt to restore the ancient social 
function o f music.43 The music o f the 20th century influenced by the
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42 See below on a possible (at least partial) explanation why the early funda­
mental role o f  music may be connected to the function o f  singing it accompanies.
43 First studies on the semiotics o f music attempted analyses fashioned 
according to the pattern o f  structural linguistics. As it was also in the case o f film, 
it is very slowly that those specific features o f  music have been recognized that 
make it quite different from natural language. O f these features, particularly the 
absence o f  any element equivalent to a word (=sign) has become evident,
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ideas o f Wagner and Nietzsche has struggled for synthetic global 
constructions as in M ahler’s compositions and stood in direct iconic 
relation to this epoch like Shostakovich’s symphonies or Schönberg’s 
Eyewitness from Warsaw. Probably the most courageous attempt was 
initiated by Skriabin, who died in 1915 without finishing his project 
Mysterium. The necessity o f a holistic semiotic approach to it follows 
from Skriabin’s wish to impress all the senses o f the audience, not 
only using sound and colour , but addressing also tactile and olfactory 
perception and taste. Skriabin was composing a sound-and-color 
music based on the assumption o f a one-to-one correspondence o f  the 
colours and elements o f the harmonic structure. Approximately at the 
same time when Skriabin worked on Mysterium, but later than 
Prometheus (1911; the work had been composed at 1910), Schönberg 
introduced a similar line into the scores o f Die glückliche Hand (op. 
18, 1913; the work had started at 1909). As Eisenstein supposed, these 
ideas of Skriabin could be developed in the modem coloured film (as 
in the second series o f Ivan the Terrible and other audio-visual arts o f 
the future.
The performance o f the Mysterium that Skriabin had planned to 
take place in India44 in 1917 was supposed to put an end to the world 
history. This problem had been studied by him long before it became 
fashionable after Fukuyama’s work. As Skriabin was thinking about 
the deepest problems of the religious philosophy o f his time using all 
the most radical devices o f modem avant-garde art his Mysterium 
might have become a decisive breakthrough in the cultural history.
The main problem remains. Keeping in mind Berdyaev’s idea 
about modem politics as a kind of continuation o f the avant-garde art, 
one may ask whether the performance planned by Skriabin has been 
continuously rehearsed after his death by the forces that determine the 
modem history of the world.
although music and poetical discourse (as distinguished from the everyday 
speech) may share some characteristics. Recently temporal structure o f music has 
been elucidated from a semiotic perspective. Different periods o f the European 
music history have been studied from the point o f view o f their semiotic features.
” For Skriabin India was important not only because of the ancient Indian 
thinkers with whose ideas he became acquainted through theosophy. Skriabin 
studied Sanskrit and remarked that one had to go through it to come to something 
that is higher. We can draw a parallel here with the great Russian futurist poet 
Hlebnikov who studied Sanskrit in his search for a new international language.
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1.2.4. Visual art
It may be supposed that no less than 200,000 years ago the red colour 
(ochre) already entered the symbolic triangle red-black-white, which 
is universally represented in all the languages and cultures o f Homo 
sapiens sapiens. If the earliest human societies could use both gestural 
signs and phonemic language to express the set o f notions of the 
primitive culture, the next major step was achieved with the beginning 
o f visual art (Leroi-Gourhan 1964, 1965). The earliest visual signs of 
the Upper Paleolithic art according to radio-carbon dates for symbolic 
statuettes found in Vogelherd (the Southern Germany) are attested 
already 30,000-29,000 years BP. New discoveries in Southern France 
have shown that cave painting begins also at that time —  approxi­
mately 10,000 years after Homo sapiens sapiens had appeared in 
Europe. Such widely represented cave painting images as hands seem 
to be connected with gestural communication, thus it may be supposed 
that there was a direct connection between different forms of visual 
representation and gestural symbolism. In modem man, the visual art 
oriented towards holistic images belongs (like musical creativity) 
mostly to the functions o f the non-dominant hemisphere. But the 
dominant one is responsible for details o f the images that are 
characteristic o f the early period o f the history o f cave art. According 
to chronology established by Andre Leroi-Gourhan (1965: 205-256; 
1986: 79-144; 1983: 145-151), after an early pre-figurative period 
(35,000-30,000 years ago) the Aurignician and Gravetician styles I 
and II appear (30,000-20,000 years ago). At that time mostly very 
large details o f animals are represented; the signs that are symbolic 
show their connection to images o f genitalia. The next (Solutrean) 
period is characterized by the archaic style in (20,000-15,000 years 
BP) in which proportions are not natural with the head being shown 
much smaller than the body o f an animal. The signs become more 
abstract; this tendency develops during the next period. In the 
Magdalenian period (15,000-11,000 years BP) the classical style III 
appears and the figures o f animals acquire realistic proportions.
As the joint French-American studies o f the Lascaux cave have 
shown, to produce excellent paintings found on its walls such 
advanced methods as wooden constructions (of the type used until
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recently in order to reach high parts o f  the wall surfaces) and high 
temperature needed to prepare red paint had been applied.45
The art is not only highly developed technically, but its semiotic 
structure seems already complicated. Some o f  the binary oppositions 
that determine the structure and semantics o f cave painting may be 
expressed by several different images. It is supposed that the figures 
of horses and bisons denote the same poles o f the male and female 
principles that are also expressed by the sex signs.
In the later history o f arts some o f the motifs o f the Upper Paleo­
lithic art reappear. But it is supposed that such main symbols as the 
world tree are introduced at a later time and determine the schemes o f 
most religious (Christian and Buddhist) works o f the next periods46. 
The 20th century saw a combination o f most advanced experiments in 
the visual art and o f their theoretical analysis. An attempt to find a 
new technique o f semiotic art analysis based on the idea o f disco­
vering elementary units o f artistic perception has been made by the 
Orthodox Priest Pavel Florenskij in his studies o f spatiality in the 
visual arts.47 He supposed that human perception divides any picture 
into several areas the borders between which are shown by the painter.
Both the way to raise the temperature and the kind o f  the bone catalytic 
mixture added to the iron ore to produce the red paint are similar to those used at 
the beginning of the Iron Age (more than 10 thousand years later!). One may 
suggest that theoretically inhabitants o f Lascaux could have produced iron (and 
iron weapons that at this early age might have lead to complete disappearance o f  
the whole species). But they preferred to make excellent pictures. To them 
religious and aesthetic values connected to these pictures were so important that 
all the potential o f the culture had been exhausted to produce them. In this a 
possible answer can be found to the question put by Levi-Strauss in his Pensee 
sauvage: why people o f the Stone Age did not invent the atomic weapon although 
their mind was already capable o f doing it?
46 V. N. Toporov who has published a serious o f works to this question suggests 
a term “the epoch o f the World Tree” for the period that includes also the classical 
European art o f the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
4 Florenskij’s work from the middle o f the 1920s, long before he was arrested 
for the second time and executed, has been published recently: the most complete 
text was translated into Italian by N. Misler: Florenskij 1995 (a shortened Russian 
version: Florenskij 1993). For the general semiotic theory o f art a three-volume 
book of Ernst Cassirer was particularly valuable; in it a difference between the 
symbols (signs) o f  art and o f those o f natural language and myth have been 
studied (Cassirer 1924-1929). A similar approach was developed by Spet and his 
collaborators at the Russian Academy o f Artistic Sciences (Misler 1997).
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A semiotic theory o f the inverted perspective as opposed to the linear 
one was exposed by Florenskij in connection with a distinction of the 
two main views o f the space in the history o f culture.48 Florenskij 
started to work on an encyclopedic dictionary o f signs of different 
cultures called SymbolariumA But after his death only the first 
chapter dedicated to the sign o f a point was found and published. It 
seems that after Peirce, Florenskij was the scholar who had the 
broadest view of different aspects o f human semiotic activity.
1.3. Secondary modelling systems
There are several types o f secondary sign systems. First, there are 
ways to recode the elements o f another code as written language in its 
relationship to the oral (natural) one or to express the elements of one 
code (for instance, literature) by means o f another one (the natural 
language). Second, there is a possibility to use elements of the 
everyday life (dwelling, dress, food) in a symbolic sense. The process 
is partly similar to the one studied by Vygotskij in respect to what he 
called ‘higher psychic functions’: such abilities as memory existed 
earlier than the time when they were reinterpreted as elements of the 
new psycho-cultural social structure. Third, there is a possibility of 
combining different elements into one complex semiotic system, as 
ritual in an archaic society or movie in a modern one.
48 Approximately at the same time working independently o f Florenskij. 
Panofsky published his version o f  the symbolic concept o f perspective. He has 
studied a series o f  works by Francastel from the point o f view o f the historical 
transformation o f  perspective in Western European art. Among several parallel 
studies o f  perspective as a symbolic (semiotic) device carried out in the first part 
o f the 20th century those begun by Eisenstein seem particularly interesting in 
comparison to the one accomplished by Florenskij. To both o f them the linear 
perspective seems particularly hostile as it was associated with the official style 
introduced by the totalitarian regime. In that case a semantic and pragmatic 
interpretation o f  an artistic device has been forced upon a scholar by the society. 
Eisenstein’s views on perspective were connected to his studies o f the structure of 
the depth composition o f  a shot in cinema.
49 Most numerous collections o f  signs (or “symbols”, although in Peirce’s terms 
one would prefer to call most o f  them icons and indexes) that were published as 
special reference books almost exclusively deal with visual semiotic units with 
addition o f  some signs met in mythology and folklore.
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The oldest archaeological traces o f a visual system that encoded the 
earlier finger count are discovered on the Paleolithic monuments. 
According to an important discovery made almost simultaneously by 
Marshack (1972, 1976) and Frolov (1974), the oldest tallies have 
numerical function. Tallies and notches that are found from the 
earliest period are divided into sets with 5 or 10 members each that 
makes a comparison with finger counting evident (Frolov 1974: 116). 
Marshack supposes that the groups o f signs represent a lunar calendar. 
Later the development o f pre-writing devices was caused by the new 
functional needs o f a growing food-producing society. Schmandt- 
Besserat reckons that the tokens considered by her as the first precur­
sors of writing appeared after the Neolithic revolution in connection 
with the necessities o f developing economy o f production (Schmandt- 
Besserat 1992).
Numerical quantifiers exist in several natural languages. They are 
used with specific nouns denoting objects to be counted. A similar 
tactile and visual three-dimensional system has been developed after 
the Neolithic revolution covering the whole area o f the Near East50. 
The earliest deciphered writing appeared in ancient Egypt. During 
recent excavations at Abydos (near Cairo) inscriptions on the ivory 
labels attached to oil jars have been found. They record in hieroglyphs 
where the jars come from. O f a similar applied character are the oldest 
Mesopotamian (“Proto-Sumerian”) inscriptions on the administrative 
tablets known from the very end o f the 4th mill. BC. Chronologically
1.3.1. Tokens. Hieroglyphic and alphabetic writing
MJ For each type o f commodity a special three-dimensional token was used. The 
regular solids (cones, cylinders, spheres, tetrahedrons) and some other geometrical 
figures represented objects (grain, cattle etc.) to be counted. To make a transaction 
safer the tokens were put in a special clay envelope. The next step consisted o f 
impressing the tokens on the surface o f an envelope. When a three-dimensional 
symbol had been represented by a two-dimensional one, a possibility o f creating 
writing appeared. Some o f the archaic cuneiform signs are supposed to have 
arisen from respective tokens. One of the most interesting discoveries consisted in 
Finding the special token-based signs on the oldest tablet that had proceeded 
cuneiform writing. The set o f regular solids used as tokens is interesting for two 
reasons: on the hand, in order to apply some geometrical ideas to the history o f  
writing; and on the other hand, to prove the suggestion according to which a 
restricted number o f visual images constitutes the alphabet seen in primitive art 
and religion.
close are Proto-Elamite and Proto-Indian inscriptions. The language of 
the latter rests unknown.51 As the signs on a Vincea inscription found 
in the area o f the old Balkan culture o f the 4th mill. BC are very close 
to Proto-Sumerian, it is possible that there was a link between these 
two areas o f the early writing. But since the ancient Balkanic writing 
(used in a number o f monumental inscriptions o f the 6th-4th mill. BC 
in different parts o f the Balkans and also in Hungary) has not yet been 
deciphered, it is not known whether really writing appeared in the 
Southern-Eastern Europe two millennia earlier than in Egypt and 
Mesopotamia.
An important innovation in the information-preserving system in 
Ebla (3rd mill. BC, Northern Syria) consists in the existence of a large 
and well-organized archive —  a multilingual library o f cuneiform 
documents. Many general semiotic principles o f modem libraries and 
archives have been known since the middle o f the 3rd mill. BC.
The early hieroglyphic sign systems based on pictorial or 
pictographical representation slowly moved towards logographic link 
to the phonemic language. A major step in the development of the 
semiotic systems was a shift from logographic representation of words 
to the later alphabetic principle. In the development of a normal child 
in a modem society, after the child achieves a certain degree of 
knowledge based on learning holistic (global) images, the acquisition 
o f literacy makes it possible to perform successive operations not only 
on letters but also on natural numbers and other sequences of discrete 
symbols. With this opens a possibility o f understanding the notions of 
order and set and o f rational and legal reasoning. Diachronic historical 
research on a similar change from logographically oriented ancient 
Oriental cultures towards those built on the discrete alphabetic 
principle (as started in Western Semitic traditions and continued in the 
Ancient Greece) has revealed the role o f the elements52.
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51 See above on Dravidian. Absolutely unknown is the origin o f the ancient 
Chinese characters (there exists a theory about a connection to some special types 
o f Western Eurasian astrological symbols, but this hypothesis has not been 
proven) and o f the MesoAmerican (Mayan and Aztec) writing and o f the old 
Peruvian (Inkas’) (mostly) mathematical knot writing quipu. Although Trans­
pacific cultural influences seem possible in this case (as in many other aspects ol 
Pre-Columbian cultures), definite proofs have not been found.
52 Latin elementa (rendering Greek stoikheia) was derived from the names of the 
letters l-m-n in the middle o f  the alphabet (cf. a-b-c in its initial part). In 
alphabetic cultures elements usually are called by nouns (e.g. atoms, molecules,
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Historically a particular and very complicated question concerns 
the development o f the written musical notation for songs. Long after 
written signs had been used to encode the oral speech in its semantic 
and phonic form, a similar attempt was made in connection to the 
music and verbal text o f a song.53
1.3.2. Space. Architecture. Urban semiotics
The huts and the cultural habits o f constructing them have some 
rudimentary parallels in the ape behavior and are known as early as
200,000 years BP (already at the Paleolithic site o f  Terra Amata). But 
a step ahead led to the “domestication o f space” to use Andre Leroi- 
Gourhan’s expression. One o f the important achievements in the 
semiotic study of early culture o f Homo sapiens sapiens consisted in 
establishing the structure of the space o f the caves on the walls o f 
which animals have been represented. It appeared that to the main 
couple A+B (usually a horse and a bison) a third animal С (mostly an 
ibex or a mammoth, sometimes a stag or a doe) is added. There might 
also be a fourth or a fifth animal (Д  a rhinoceros, a feline beast). 
Distribution of these images on the walls permits to understand the 
structure of a cave (Leroi-Gourhan 1986: 98-118~4).
After the Ice Age such buildings as temples were built partly as 
reproductions of the old habitation. A proof may be seen, for instance, 
in stalagmites and stalactites brought to a temple in £atal Höyük (one 
of the oldest cities in Asia Minor, 7th—6th mill. BC); it can be 
presumed that a similar function was transferred to candles much later. 
There was a steady growth in the semiotic potential (and the linguistic
genes, quanta, particles, strings, phonemes in the European scientific traditions) 
different from the verbs as the main linguistic means of description in such 
languages as Iroquois (for instance, Onondaga) and many other American Indian 
ones (cf. Ivanov 1993a).
The first known example is a song in Human with notation for strings o f a 
Иаф ar>d possible intervals between their pitches found in the international city of 
Ugarit (Ras Shamra), 13th century BC. Such a system had been first elaborated in 
Mesopotamia from which corresponding Akkadian terms were borrowed into 
Human just as Italian musical terminology spread in European languages in the 
post-Renaissance period.
4 On the base o f the studies o f Leroi-Gourhan, V. N. Toporov gave a semiotic 
description o f the prehistory o f space in art.
potential) o f  a large city beginning with the Neolithic Revolution (City 
Revolution in terms o f Gordon Childe.) Not only cities themselves 
tended to become larger and larger according to the laws o f so-called 
“social physics” but also their sign systems. The old sign systems 
(such as those o f natural languages and visual signs based on the 
languages o f gestures and other archaic and/or archetypal symbols), 
some o f which had been inherited from the ancient eras in which early 
settlements were founded (i.e., the Upper Paleolithic caves), were 
reinterpreted and integrated into the new urban semiotic webs of 
communication. In the first known cities o f Asia Minor (such as £atal 
Höyük according to M ellaart’s studies), and in other parts of the 
ancient Near East, new complicated systems o f visual signs, partly 
based on reinterpreted archaic symbols, were constructed. These new 
complex systems were mostly employed in the most important 
communicational city centres o f that period (and much later) — the 
temples (in £atal Höyük, for example, these buildings had specific 
symbols incorporated in them such as bucranias and columns, symbols 
o f the right and left hands, etc.). The role o f a temple as the main 
information-preserving centre o f the city has remained significant 
throughout history until modem times. No matter what other urban 
activities (particularly military and commercial) became important, 
the temples remained the main places o f informational activity. 
Therefore, one may speak o f a temple-oriented stage in the semiotic 
history o f the cities. This stage continued for many millennia and can 
still be seen in the importance o f temples and churches, both as 
religious centre and as the most important element o f the preserved 
cultural semiotic history o f cities.
An important iconic role has been attributed to the spatial scheme 
o f a whole village or a city. Thus in a society with dualistic 
organization the opposition o f the two moieties (opposed exogamic 
halves o f the tribe) and their subsections was reproduced in the 
arrangement o f huts or houses o f their members. A city is considered a 
model o f the universe.55
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55 Its structure corresponds to the scheme o f  the relations between the main gods 
o f the pantheon: for example, the four temples o f  Ebla are devoted to the four 
main Semitic gods and are oriented according to corresponding cardinal points (a 
similar semiotic scheme was preserved in Nenevia and, may be seen in a 
transformed form in later cities o f  Ancient and Medieval Western, Central, 
Southern and South-Eastern Asia).
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If for most o f  the Middle Ages the main communicative and 
particularly information-preserving or information-transmitting func­
tions were fulfilled by monasteries, during the next stage o f the 
semiotic history the universities fulfilled this role. The differences 
between entire areas in Europe may be defined as monastery-oriented 
city versus a university-oriented city.
1.3.3. Dress as symbol
Although dress (at least in countries to the north o f tropical areas) may 
be important for the survival, and also serves as a ternary sexual 
feature, it acquires the role o f  a sign (o f an ethnic group, social 
position).56 As archaic culture is partly based on the ritual inversion o f 
the structure (or on the anti-structure according to Victor Turner), it is 
symbolized by the carnival dresses; in the archetypal carnival men 
dress as women and women dress as men. Accordingly the role o f 
masks becomes prominent57.
As dresses and some other objects o f the everyday life (for 
instance, kitchen utensils, means o f transportation) become a part o f 
semiotic life of a community, the role o f such devices as ornaments 
grows. Ornament is based on symmetry. Its study is an important link 
between such natural sciences as physics, redefined as completely 
based on the notion of symmetry (Yang 1996) and semiotics objects 
obeying similar laws at another level.
1.3.4. Food and drink as symbols
As sacrifices to the gods were considered mostly as serving food and 
drink (sometimes also smell of burned food) for them, this aspect has 
become one of particularly significant elements o f religion. 8 Some
Hjelmslev (1943) emphasized particularly the innovative character o f P. 
Bogatyrev’s study o f the dress as sign, created in the atmosphere o f the Prague 
Linguistic Circle o f the interwar period.
It is worth noticing that the notion o f a person in European languages goes 
back to Etruscan (originally Greek) term designating a theatrical mask.
In a motif repeated in the mythologies of several ancient Oriental peoples and 
also in the archaic folklore o f some European countries (for instance, in Latvian
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tribes (for instance, Xihkaryana in Brazil) consider difference in diet 
and observing food taboos the main difference between humans and 
animals. Some restrictions (as prohibition o f cannibalism and eating 
some animals) reveal most striking ethnic and cultural differences. In 
this respect Spaniards accepted at M ontezuma’s court suffered their 
first terrible shock. Comparable differences between Indian castes are 
connected with fundamentals o f the Hindu religion.
1.3.5. Sexual urge and love
Sex being understood from a purely physiological point o f view is 
different from those infrastructures o f social (see above on kinship in 
Levi-Strauss’ view), religious and aesthetic character that are super­
posed on it at the level called “sublimation” in psychoanalysis. 
Already in the signs o f the cave art interpreted as symbols of genitalia 
one may suspect a broader meaning. They might have been connected, 
for instance, to the social and religious binary opposition o f a dualistic 
society. As a later example studied in comparative poetics one may 
cite the notions o f the “mad love” and “fair lady” as developed in 
medieval Judeo-Arabic and some other Oriental59, Spanish and 
Proven9 al traditions. As it intersected with Gnostic ideas, it influenced 
Dante and his followers in modem European literature. An interesting 
side o f the 20th century culture might be seen in a systematic attempt 
to return from such infrastructure to its supposed physiological roots 
using procedures prescribed by psychoanalysis.60
folk songs) gods decided not to kill mankind since they will lose their source of 
food in that case. This god-human relation appears to be mutual. In the 2nd mill. 
BC an expression “to drink a god”, “to eat a god” is attested in ritual texts of Asia 
Minor, and it is there that the origin o f  an image developed much later into the 
concept o f communion can be found.
59 The introductory stanzas o f Vepxis tqaosani (“A Knight in the Leopard's 
Skin’’) by Rustaveli has been studied by a great specialist in Caucasian philology 
N. Marr who developed ideas from Veselovskij’s treatise on the same motif in the 
medieval European poetry.
60 In modem literature, for instance, in Joyce’s Ulysses and in many works 
influenced by this novel, there was also an attempt to ignore all other cultural 
taboos connected to physiological functions o f human organism. This systematic 
anti-semiotic attitude might be understood as camivalistic Anti-Structure;
Some of elements seen in these early synthetic rituals may be older 
than Homo sapiens sapiens,61 Those signs that appear in modem 
pantomimic arts and ballet are probably historically linked to the old 
syncretic art that combined music and gestures. According to the 
theory proposed by the great Russian specialist in historical poetics 
Alexander Veselovskij, the original syncretic performance o f the early 
times joined together elements o f what we now might have designated 
as music, song, dance, drama, ballet. For all these most ancient forms 
of art integrated into a syncretic ritual performance, the rhythm seems 
to be the decisive constructive principle. Modem neurophysiological 
research has shown the connection o f different forms o f rhythmical 
activity (such as rhythmic music, dance or jogging) to the positive 
action of endogeneous opioid peptide neurotransmitters like the five 
amino-acid encephalins, endorphines and dynorphin. The latter are 
mimicked by the drugs spreading in the modem society. It can be 
suggested that one o f the main reasons for this may be connected to 
the loss of the main function o f the art (particularly o f music) that 
rendered harmonia mundi. Historically this function might have been 
the most important one. It could have antedated the social 
mnemotechnical role o f singing that grew more and more valuable as 
the amount of knowledge to be memorized and transmitted became 
larger with the development o f culture.
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1.3.6. Myths and Rituals
1.3.7. Songs. Folklore
According to a probable hypothesis music and singing became neces­
sary for the cultural survival o f the illiterate societies.62 It seems that
according to Bakhtin, the use o f the images o f  “the bottom o f  the body” is 
characteristic o f folk carnival.
' Thus rain dances and rain charms documented in very old texts and attested in 
different societies especially as relictal childhood forms find interesting analogies 
in recently studied precultural patterns o f  behaviour in many groups o f  
chimpanzees.
I his function might have remained in those early Neolithic societies in which 
prewriting in the form o f tokens and later writing served only to encode 
bureaucratic lists o f objects and were not yet applied to put down mythopoetical 
and legal texts. If one compares the spread o f computers to the introduction o f
for several thousand years the memory o f culture was mostly 
connected to songs accompanied by music. Important discoveries 
made by Lord studying the Southern Slavic folklore have shown the 
formulaic character o f the original poetry yet inseparable from singing 
and music. By comparing experimental facts on Slavic and Central 
Asiatic Turk (Uzbek, Kirgiz a.o.) rhapsodies one comes to the conclu­
sion that each o f them could reproduce (with possible variations) texts 
containing as much as 107 bits o f information.63 The role o f singers in 
such societies as the modern Southern Slavic, comparable to the 
Homeric audience, suggests that they were initially responsible for the 
transmission o f all the mythological historical heritage of the tribe.64 If 
artificial methods o f information transmission were absent or under­
developed they might be substituted by memorizing and repeating 
such combinations o f words o f the natural language that had been 
transformed into parts o f poetical compositions which were performed 
with the musical accompaniment.
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1.3.8. Literature
Literature has originally been connected to folklore. As Propp re­
marked, the first literary texts (as Gilgamesh) were simply folklore 
compositions put in the written form. The possibility to write down 
such compositions did not come easily.
Caesar formulates the opposition o f the religious use of the 
traditional memorization o f the oral texts and a possible use of Greek
writing one might suppose that the predominant use o f  sophisticated sign-transfor- 
mational computing machinery for business and administrative work (as different 
from creative activity) repeats a similar delay as that experienced by the early 
Neolithic societies.
63 For such exceptional singers as the Kirgiz Pulkanshair who could dictate up to 
25x104 lines, the estimated quantity o f  the transmitted information may be even 
more and approaches the upper limit o f the memory as suggested in experimental 
psychology. For a general view on the importance o f  aesthetical rhythms in 
connection to social memory cf. also Leroi-Gourhan 1965.
64 That makes plausible the idea o f the great Russian poet Nikolaj Gumilev 
(executed by the Bolsheviks in 1921): according to his recently published studies 
in comparative poetics interrupted by his death, he supposed that an archaism had 
been preserved in the role o f  druids and poets (“bards”) in the Old Irish society 
(cf. modem views tracing these institutions back to the Proto-Indo-European.
letters to render simple everyday sentences in Gaulish (as documented 
later in the Gaulish inscriptions). This seems important for under­
standing analogous facts in other areas. It can help to explain why 
writing in many societies (as Mycenaean Greece and early Mesopota­
mian cities o f the pre-Sumerian or Uruk period) was not used for 
rendering sacred or mythopoetic texts still transmitted only orally. A 
tension between conversational folklore elements o f literature and 
those aspects that are connected to the written speech are charac­
teristic of later periods o f its development. Social linguistic differen­
ces caused by urban life are reflected in the works o f authors who 
started to introduce features o f this new urban language in such genres 
as short stories (in China first developed by Pu Sung Ling-Liao Chai). 
But the use o f hieroglyphic writing made this particular aspect o f the 
literature quite different from the one based on the principles o f 
alphabetic cultures. Thus, for instance, although in the Chinese tradi­
tion the genre o f the detective story (a genre strongly based on the 
criminality and communicational features o f a large city) developed in 
the Tang period; however, Pu Sung Ling’s detective stories, cha­
racterized by archaic semiotic methods o f divination by dreams, were 
antithetical to the alphabetic detective principles o f the first detective 
stores about Paris (written by Poe) more than two centuries later.
Language not only became the main topic o f philosophical 
disputes in the 20th century: a discussion o f its role for literature be­
came crucial both for poets (T. S. Eliot, Mandelstam, Brodsky) as well 
as for critics and literary scholars (New Criticism, Russian formalists).
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1.3.9. Theatre
Modem anthropological studies (particularly those o f Victor Tur­
ner— Turner 1982, 199265) have shown the close relationship o f the 
ancient ritual and theatre. Olga Freidenberg (1977) remarks in her
After this great ethnologist-semiotician had moved to America, his main 
semiotic interests were concentrated on the anthropology o f performance. Not 
only did he study the ritual as a protoform o f a theatrical performance. He himself 
participated in theatrical activities serving as an aesthetical experiment. A parallel 
to Eisenstein’s attempt at a “revival o f  a myth” in his Wagner’s Die Walküre 
performance o f 1940 (and a series o f  theoretical works on the same topic) is 
striking.
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writings on the subject that theatrical space and a bidding of a theatre 
has long preserved the character of a model o f the whole universe. A 
particular social and semiotic role of the theatre became most evident 
in classical Greece. Theatre had an important unifying function in an 
extraordinarily diversified system of different sign systems and texts, 
many of which had been established in the Pericles’ age (tragedies, 
comedies, geometry, architecture, sculpture, rhetoric, to name just a 
few). Theatrical performances contained verbal parts, action, dances, 
singing and music, representing a later transformation of the original 
syntactic or total performance as reconstructed by Veselovskij. The 
conversational features of a local city dialect representing a social 
dialect are pronounced in genres such as an Aristophanic comedy. One 
may compare this phenomenon to partly similar linguistic features of 
the plays o f great Old Indian authors, like Kalidasa, in which person­
ages speak different Indo-Aryan languages (Sanskrit and a variety of 
Prakrits) according to their social position and gender. Different from 
Greece, India did not know the genre of tragedy.68
In modem Europe starting from Diderot and up to Vygotskij, the 
philosophers, aestheticians and psychologists have been analyzing the 
semiotic features o f an actor. A capacity of playing another person 
becoming a signified in theatrical semiosis constitutes one of the 
amazing features o f modem culture that has its continuation in cinema.
66 It was reflected in such terms as French ‘paradis’ (originally a word for
'Paradise' —- “the top gallery”, “The Gods” in British English), Russian ray ok 
(originally diminutive from ray “paradise”) in the same meaning. 
c Approximately 1000 free citizens o f the city might have attended a given 
theatrical performance according to the calculations of the mathematician, A. N. 
Kolmogorov. There as also at the sporting games the whole adult active 
population was present and these were places where it was possible for all the 
members to exchange information. Such meetings are different from the small 
symposia, described by Plato, in which relatively restricted groups, for instance, 
oF Socrates’ pupils engaged in dialogues were present.
68 V. N. Toporov, one oFthe main Founders oF the Moscow-Tartu semiotic school, 
has studied the semiotic aspects oF classical Sanskrit drama in a recently published 
book. In early Roman literary theatrical masterpieces one may Find traces of the 
original multilingual situation o f the ancient cities, for instance, in the Punic, i.e. 
dialectal Phoenician-Semitic parts oF Plautus’ play Poenulus. Its Latin title uses the 
Etruscan designation For a Carthaginian person speaking Punic. This fragment helps 
to reconstruct Western Semitic (Punic) genre o f comedies that influenced also 
Etruscan theatre (the latter can be reconstructed on the bases oF those Features of 
Roman comedy that can be traced back to the Etruscan influence).
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1.3.10. Audio-visual media and cinema
The general tendency towards a synthesis characteristic o f  the first 
half o f the 20th century has manifested itself in the creation o f audio­
visual media. This aspect o f modem communication acquired extra­
ordinary importance for entertainment, advertising and other commer­
cial and political goals. From the aesthetic point o f view cinema has 
remained the most interesting achievement. Here a completely new 
semiotic system has evolved which made the combination o f theore­
tical analysis with an aesthetic experiment possible. In modem semio­
tics and in the neighboring area o f  humanities, particular attention has 
been given to film language, the study o f which was begun already by 
Sergei Eisenstein. In the semiotic studies o f cinema the first stage 
consisted of the comparison o f a m ovie’s structure and a verbal text. 
Specialists were interested in finding units corresponding to words 
and sentences in a cinematographic discourse.69 With the development 
of sound movies, it appeared possible to reduce the importance o f 
short-cut montage, building a whole film on the plan-sequence (as, for 
instance, Renoire did); Bazin became the main theoretician o f this new 
wave.
The next stage in the development o f semiotic theory o f cinemato­
graphic discourse was connected with Roman Jakobson. He intro­
duced a difference between metaphorical movies (to which early silent 
films using montage imagery belonged) and metonymic films in 
which close-up and other methods based on spatial contiguity became 
prominent (Jakobson 1990).70 Enormous possibilities opened up by
As Eisenstein and other great film-makers o f his generation were particularly 
interested in montage as the main device they were approaching the film as a text 
comparable to texts in linguistics. Most o f all they were interested in the 
possibility o f finding discrete units or cadres-shots equivalent to words and 
montage phrases built from sequences o f  these elements. Eisensteines montage 
theory included a comparison to hieroglyphic writing. Eisenstein planned movies 
in which the avant-garde montage technique would be used to create intellectual 
cinema.
As shown by Jakobson, the opposition between metaphoric movies and 
metonymic ones is similar to those found in other fields o f  semiotic activities, for 
instance, rites (similarity-based magical rituals as opposed to those where an 
object is substituted by its part according to the pars pro toto principle). The 
general problem o f the parts and wholes in different semiotic texts has been 
investigated in the light o f Husserl’s phenomenology. Recent developments o f
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computerized montage may be seen as a new vista for experimental 
film semiotics. At the same time it becomes possible to start analysis 
o f semiotic foundations of new audio-visual systems that are techni­
cally ripe for being used, but have not yet become true art.71 Even the 
position o f the TV as an independent semiotic system is not yet clear. 
The future century might bring quite a new breakthrough in this field.
1.3.11. Sciences
From the point of view of semiotics, different sciences are considered 
as a separate secondary modeling semiotic network. The independence 
o f each o f them is connected to elaboration of a specific sign system. 
The oldest specific notation in the area of humanities intersecting with 
modem semiotics has been invented by ancient Indian linguists (no 
later than in the middle of the 1st mill. BC if not much earlier). The 
construction o f the artificial —  and to a large extent formalized — 
metalanguage o f Panini’s Sanskrit grammar had been made possible 
by the character o f Sanskrit as an “elaborated” language (sams-krta 
“following the rules o f grammar”). It had remained an example of 
formal description for Bloomfield (1887-1949) who initiated a formal 
trend in the American descriptive linguistics of the 20th century.'  As 
it was discovered by Egyptologists o f the 20th century, some special 
forms and constructions different from texts o f the other genres can be 
found in ancient Egyptian scientific (mathematical and medical) texts. 
But a new language for mathematics has been elaborated in the 
European tradition starting with the ancient Greece. The mathematical
semiotic film analysis included an application o f metalinguistic methods of 
analyzing the utterance, particularly deictic relations as well as pragmatic 
dimension.
71 The situation can be compared to the one that Hocart (1936) found similar in
the development o f  ritual and social institutions and biological organs: a special
technical device exists long before its function appears.
The purely formal character o f  Panini’s grammar made it also possible to 
manipulate with its symbols in search for internal reconstruction o f the past of the 
system (as it was done in the 19th century by Saussure and in the 20th century by 
Benveniste in his Origines). As the great Danish linguist Otto Jespersen declared 
in his speech at the 4th International Congress o f  Linguists, “the chain between 
Panini and I rubetzkoy is unbroken”. The formal analysis started by Panini was 
continued both by comparative studies and in structural description.
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sign system for analysis, as developed by Newton and Leibniz, is the 
best example o f a completely new semiotic system.73
2. Semiotic science
2.1. Logical semiotics
Peirce (1839-1914), a great universal mind exploring almost all the 
kinds of semiotic systems, has laid down the foundations o f this 
science in its modem shape. In the beginning o f the 20th century 
returning to his previous studies Peirce was emphasised the impor­
tance of “General science o f the nature o f Signs” for modern know­
ledge (Peirce 1966 [1908]: 378).74 In his later works Peirce anticipated 
an important field o f modem semiotic studies devoted to comparative
75 Hilbert, who founded modem metamathematics, declared: “hierin liegt die 
feste philosophische Einstellung, die ich zur Begründung der reinen Mathema­
tik—  wie überhaupt zu allem wissenschaflichen Denken, Verstehen und Mitteilen
— für erforderlich halte: am Anfang —  so heisst es hier —  ist das Zeichen ’ 
(Hilbert 1928: 1). As he has remarked in another work o f the 1920s, a main point 
of reference is, “die konkreten Zeichen selbst” (Hilbert 1926: 89). From this point 
of view, semiotic study of the signs of mathematics might clarify its theoretical 
foundations (Bogarin 1991).
From the point oF view of the founder o f the quantum mechanics Niels Bohr, 
mathematics is a special language created on the bases o f natural language. Lan­
guage has remained a main object o f reflections for physicists and philosophers.
In 1895-1902 in a treatise on Speculative Grammar Peirce has elaborated his 
exhaustive classification of signs from the point o f view o f their function that has 
remained the most detailed one so far attempted. While discussing the relation o f  
a sign to an object he was developing ideas of Classical Greek, Roman and 
medieval philosophers and logicians whose works he discussed at length. But he 
went far beyond the usual logical sphere o f interests. He also touched upon 
different ways of the logical categories relateto corresponding forms in natural 
languages giving as examples, for instance, the ancient Egyptian use o f pronouns 
in a function of a copula different from its expression by verbs or a particular role 
of nouns in Basque (Pcirce 1960: §§ 4, 6). He was insisting on the necessity to get 
rid of the influence o f some chance grammatical particularities of Indo-European 
languages. Pcirce suggested that a linguist should participate in work on the 
general theory o f signs. Being (among other things) a professional specialist in 
chemistry, Peirce was the first to notice the similarity o f the structure o f some new 
chemical compound names o f substances and o f incorporated forms in American 
Indian languages.
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grammar o f natural and scientific (particularly, logical) languages 
(Reichenbach 1947).75 This kind o f research has become particularly 
important much later in connection to artificial intelligence. Thus 
while writing a set o f rules for an automatic translation from Russian 
into a predicate calculus it has appeared necessary to introduce a 
special equivalent to a category o f adjectives that is absent in most 
logical languages.76 In modem generative semantics and related fields 
o f mathematical linguistics, the comparison o f the functional elements 
o f mathematical logic and corresponding forms and words in natural 
languages (such as a universal quantifier V and English all) has 
become the favorite object o f studies.77
One o f the main theoretical results o f these studies has been the 
introduction o f a notion o f a metalanguage coined to discuss an object 
language. In the case o f the conversational natural languages that do 
not strictly obey grammatical rules only some fragments of a system 
may be discussed in terms o f such universal metalinguistic elements 
as Jakobsonian differential phonological features.78
75 Among later semiotic studies in this area one may mention a series of 
outstanding works o f  J. Chmielewski who has shown an exact correspondence of 
the syntax o f  Archaic Chinese and the structures o f mathematical logic.
76 A comparison to such natural languages as Yukagir (in Northern Siberia) 
where a verb is used where in English corresponds an adjective, helps to see that 
one may speak o f different degrees o f similarity between natural and artificial 
means o f  communication.
77 Among those logical schools whose contribution to modem semiotics is 
prominent, the Warsaw-Krakow one succeeded in discovering main features of 
semantics o f  formalized languages as well as in finding elegant solutions to the 
description o f  syntactic relations. Logical semiotics has become the most 
advanced formalized area o f  research on sign systems. The “linguistic turn" in the 
history o f  thought o f  the 20th century was so influential mainly due to the work of 
such scientists, who, like Russell and Wittgenstein, had started with the 
investigation o f  the logical languages and then applied similar concepts in an 
attempt to understand the everyday speech. In Hjelmslev’s words, “modem 
logistics has revealed the fact that scientific sign-systems, e.g. those employed in 
mathematics, must be languages, and that the structure o f  such languages is by no 
means fundamentally different from linguistic structure as a whole. That is why 
modem logicians consider the languages studied by linguists as a particular case 
within a larger class” (Hjelmslev 1973: 121). According to Carnap, the task of 
philosophy is semiotic analysis, including the study o f  the abstract part of 
everyday language and o f the language o f  sciences (Carnap 1942).
78 In case o f  metamathematics, metasemiosis (Curry 1977: 61, 89) can be applied 
only to a language o f  a formalized structure.
2.2. Linguistics as a branch o f semiotics
A difference between logical trend in semiotics founded by Peirce and 
the concept o f semiology based on linguistics as developed by Saus- 
sure (1857-1913) is not necessarily as large as may be inferred from 
many recent publications.79 Among important new ideas contained in 
Saussure’s Course (the first posthumous edition: Saussure 1916) was 
that of the oppositions constituting the semiotic system. Being in­
fluenced by Durkheim’s general sociological outlook, Saussure was 
the first to develop a new theory o f natural language as a social 
institution Stressing the role o f value for a semiotic system o f natural 
languages, Saussure pointed out resemblances between the sign sys­
tems and economic systems also based on an axiological principle.80 
Although this idea opens a new vista not only in semiotic studies, only
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The modem theory o f formal grammars oriented towards mathematically 
concise definitions can be valid only in so far as the requirement for metasemiosis 
is fulfilled. Two most important examples o f grammars in the history o f  
linguistics are built for the languages following exact rules: Panini’s Sanskrit 
grammar in ancient India and the Palais Royal grammar o f French constructed for 
a formalized system of the language. In Europe for de Saussure the latter 
represented a paradigmatical example o f a synchronous linguistic description. 
Try ing to apply the notion of metalanguage to non-formalized linguistic systems, 
Hjelmslev suggested a completely new approach. According to his innovative 
idea, the term metasemiology may be used in the sense o f a scientific metasystem 
studying the semiotic objects (called semiologies) that are not in themselves 
sciences. Metasemiology is describing the substance o f the signs: the objects 
designated by the signified and the sounds (or graphic and other visual elements) 
of the signifiers.
J Peirce joined the trend of logical thinking about signs that started in antiquity 
and continued through the Middle Ages. Saussure’s sign theory developed certain 
ideas from the rational grammars of the post-Renaissance period which were 
another offshoot of essentially the same line o f thought. Saussure’s connection to 
early Greek concept o f sign has been explored recently.
The intrinsic value o f the elements o f a system was made clear by Saussure 
already in his work postdicting the “sonantic coefficients” (later known as 
laryngeals) at an early stage o f Indo-European. Comparative linguistics still 
remains the main example o f an exact humanitarian semiotic science as its 
postdictions (conjectures about the history) can be falsified (in Popper’s sense): 
thus in 1927, Kurylowicz found in Hittite (after its decipherment by Hrozny) 
traces of these phonemes that were reconstructed by Saussure long before. The 
best account o f the algebraic character o f that work o f Saussure in relation to his 
Course was made by Hjelmslev (Hjelmslev 1959: 29).
a few special studies deal with this topic in the economic and social 
theory.
In the early 1940s Louis Hjelmslev sought to rethink Saussure’s 
semiology by combining results o f  modern structural linguistics and of 
the first applications o f similar methods to anthropology, as well as 
the ideas o f the Vienna and W arszaw-Krakow logical schools. 
Hjelmslev began the appropriate section o f his as yet underestimated 
Prolegomena by suggesting a necessity o f an immanent (internal 
logical) approach to sign systems that would make it possible to study 
from the same general point o f view such different fields as literature, 
art, music, history and also logic and mathematics. Still, he supposed 
that natural language is in a privileged position among all other 
semiotic structures since they all may be translated into it. This may 
be explained by the extraordinary freedom in the shaping o f new 
linguistic signs combined into longer texts consisting o f an unlimited 
number o f words (even if false, contradictory, inexact, or unaesthetic). 
Natural language differs in this respect from other goal-oriented 
semiotic structures (Hjelmslev 1943).81 Hjelmslev was particularly 
interested in the analogy between language and games; later on a 
synthesis was suggested in an image o f linguistic games developed in 
the later writings o f Wittgenstein. Hjelmslev chose some quite simple 
semiotic systems to be analyzed such as traffic signals, dial telephone, 
striking turret clock, Morse code, systems the prisoners use while 
knocking at the wall in jail. This kind o f research was developed by 
Zalizniak in his excellent study o f street signals. In this work 
Zalizniak pointed out some concrete relations to which equivalents 
(like, for instance, synonyms) may be found in natural language. He 
has also paid attention to the possibility to compare some of the 
problems discussed in connection to these simple systems to main 
problems o f the semiotic study o f law*2 At approximately the time
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81 Similar ideas on the role o f natural language have led to the distinction made 
in the works o f  the Moscow-Tartu Semiotic School between linguistic primary 
systems and the secondary modelling ones using language as their plane of 
expression.
82 Particularly detailed are semiotic studies in the field o f  primitive law or pre­
law. At an early stage o f  the development the pre-law systems are still very 
closely connected to the other types o f  signs, particularly those o f magic. Thus it 
becomes possible to clarify the strictly semiotic character o f  some o f these 
systems and to apply to their reconstruction methods close to those o f  comparative 
linguistics.
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when Hjelmslev had worked on his main book, the semiotic ideas o f 
Saussure were developed by Buyssens (1943, 1956) who gave a first 
sketch o f different sign systems and suggested principles o f their 
functional classification. Later general surveys o f  systems o f signs had 
Buyssens’s work as their base that they have tried to expand.
2.3. Syntax, semantics, pragmatics
In the twenties and thirties it appeared to most scientists that a purely 
syntactical analysis without the consideration o f  meaning might be 
sufficient for a description o f a sign system. The notion o f meaning as 
well as pragmatic context o f the signs use had escaped the attention o f 
scholars as well as o f the avant-garde artists and art historians to 
whom the internal structure o f an object seemed the only relevant 
object of study.83 In all the fields o f semiotic activities, beginning with 
Malevich’s Suprematie geometrical figures to Carnap’s logical syntax 
and similar research o f his colleagues o f the Viennese circle, the 
internal (purely syntactical) relations among the elements seemed 
much more important than their semantic interpretation or pragmatic 
use. The Russian formalist (or “morphological”) school o f literary 
studies declared (beginning with Viktor Shklovskij) that the color o f a 
banner positioned on the top o f a fortress was not relevant. In a way, 
modem avant-garde art performed a peculiar semiotic experiment 
divorcing the plane o f expression from that o f content. However, it 
becomes increasingly questionable whether or not the isolation o f the 
syntactic, pragmatic, and semantic branches o f semiotics is indeed 
possible and viable.84 Games (such as chess in Saussure’s famous
s’ Hilbert’s program o f axiomatic approach to formal mathematical systems 
(Hilbert 1926, 1928) still remained attractive (for instance, Hilbert’s views were 
cited as exemplary in Kurylowicz’s well known work on theoretical linguistics). 
Although Gödel’s theorem had been proved by that time, its results had not yet 
been generalized (see a discussion in Penrose 1990).
84 With the development o f  Propp’s model, semiotics became associated to the 
technique o f narratology. When analyzing Propp’s perception in the West, one is 
amazed at the long period that divided the continuation o f his formal syntactical 
analysis o f the morphology o f the fairy-tale (1928) and the apprehension o f the 
importance o f  his following work on the semantic and pragmatic interpretation of 
the same scheme (cf. on this difference: Ginzburg 1989: xii). The speech acts
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example, also used independently in metamathematics) as well as 
logical calculi and some aesthetic structures (in music) were seen by 
Hjelmslev as systems showing only the pure scheme o f the structure 
as such. These semiotic structures cannot be interpreted in a logical or 
mathematical sense. This gives them a specific semiotic status. The 
same semiotic problem in connection to modem visual art and music 
was discussed by Levi-Strauss (Levi-Strauss 1964). The absence of 
one o f the planes means a deformation o f the aesthetic sign85.
2.4. Semiotics o f texts
Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) was the first to discover a difference 
between an abstract linguistic system o f signs and a concrete utterance 
in which each sign gets another “metalinguistic” function due to its 
role in the whole o f discourse.86 Twenty years later, this distinction 
was rediscovered by the great French linguist Emile Benveniste 
(1902-1976).87 This field o f research studying discourse as a field
theory helped to find adequate ways o f description o f  such pragmatically 
important units o f natural language as performative sentences.
85 Hjelmslev has shown that one-plane semiotic systems that cannot be inter­
preted have semiotic features different from natural language (Hjelmslev’s so 
called commutation test as generalization o f phonological methods was introduced 
to study relations between the expression plane and the plane o f content in natural 
language).
86 Following the research o f  Hermann Cohen and Martin Buber in philosophical 
anthropology, Mikhail Bakhtin discussed the problem o f the relation o f  /  and Thou 
{Other) also from a linguistic and general semiotic point o f view. Starting with his 
early aesthetic writings, Bakhtin became interested in the way the speech of a 
person interacting with the author had been represented in artistic writings. The 
results o f Vossler’s school, particularly Spitzer’s stylistic studies (1961, 1988) 
have been incorporated in metalinguistic research o f this kind. The different forms 
o f direct speech, quasi-direct speech, reported speech, transposed discourse and 
pseudo-objective motivation as studied by Vossler, Lerch, Lorck and Spitzer were 
subsumed into a larger metalinguistic scheme. These new perspectives of 
philological analysis trespassing the restrictions o f  a traditional linguistic one 
appeared to be close to the philosophical study o f  the Other. The aesthetic 
problem ol the relation between author and hero had been a continuation o f the 
study o f indirect speech and other types o f  discourse.
87 This gap between system and text constituted the main point o f  his semiotic 
theory. He suggested that the semiotic approach would be possible only insofar as 
linguistic signs or separate words are concerned, whereas the structure o f  texts
much broader than a sentence (which has remained the upper limit o f 
strictly linguistic study) became quite popular among the scholars 
applying pragmatic methods. In the writings o f  the Tartu-M oscow 
School an attempt was made to overcome the line separating system 
and text (that was evident at least for semioticians following Bakhtin 
and Benveniste). In the works o f  the scholars belonging to this school, 
literary, folkloric88 and mythological texts as well as works o f  
different arts became the main objects o f study.
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2.5. Information theory
Although the works by Carnap, Bar Hillel and other scholars aimed at 
measuring semantic information89 were very close to the goal o f  se­
miotic research, there still remains a problem o f the relationship 
between the latter and the mathematical theory o f information. This 
branch of mathematics as founded by Shannon, Kolmogorov and other 
scientists studies information o f every kind and its transmittance 
through channels. The case o f discrete transfer o f information is rele­
vant for linguistic studies as well as for all other (secondary) modeling 
semiotic systems using discrete code o f natural language as their plane 
of expression. As shown by Roman Jakobson, the informational
should be studied by semantics. At the time when this idea became popular among 
French semioticians, Barthes introduced the term “translinguistics’’ (Barthes 
1969) corresponding to what Benveniste (1969) had suggested to call semantics 
and Bakhtin had designated as metalinguistics.
M The special attention given to folklore genres starting with the pioneering 
works of Bogatyrev and Jakobson of the late 1920s can be explained by a 
transparent character of the rules of generating a text belonging to this category 
(as shown, For instance, in the above-mentioned classical book by Propp). 
Mythological studies helped to link a narratological point o f view and the 
discovery of a ritual scheme explaining the origin of a folklore one (cf. Watkins 
1995). Thus Propp suggested that the morphology o f fairy tales and the sequence 
of stages in archaic initiation rites are in an isomorphic relationship. In this way 
formal analysis has lead to universal insights into general laws governing human 
societies (as in the book on kingship by Hocart published almost simultaneously 
with Propp’s study: Flocart 1927). A similar approach was used in lectures by 
Olga Freidenberg to support a semiotical critical study of traces of the irrational 
archaic features preserved in such modem institutions as court, state and army (cf. 
Freidenberg 1997). 
v> Hauffe 1981 with references.
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dichotomy o f code and message clarifies some important points 
referring to the relation between a language system and a text.
In the electroacoustical works o f Fant and other scholars, based on 
Jakobsonian universal system o f phonemic differential features, the 
latter are studied from the point o f view o f the information theory. 
Continuous messages that are particularly important for mass media 
are still much less investigated by semioticians, with the only impor­
tant exception being film semiotics.
Particularly important seem general semiotic problems related to 
information and its role in modem scientific outlook90 and their explo­
ration in connection to language and poetry. Kolmogorov who worked 
on mathematical foundations o f the theory o f information suggested 
main principles o f the probabilistic poetics. It appears possible to 
combine it with the statistical study o f verse founded by Andrej Belyj 
(1980-1934), particularly in his articles o f 1910 (Belyj 1985). In these 
early studies Belyj suggested a whole program of turning aesthetics 
into an exact science using experimental methods.
90 Pavel Florenskij (1882-1937; executed in the time o f Stalin’s purges after 
being kept in a Northern Russian camp for political prisoners) was among the first 
to suggest the opposition o f  Logos or “ectropy” (represented by culture and cult) 
to the second principle o f  thermodynamics determining the growth o f entropy (cf. 
Ivanov 1995). Approximately at the same time Szilard (1898-1964) published his 
study on the entropy being diminished by an interference o f a thinking person 
measuring a physical process and serving as a paradoxical Maxwell's demon 
(Szilard 1929). According to later cybernetic works by Wiener and Brillouin a 
probable explanation o f  the difference in the minus/plus sign between the 
‘‘'negentropy’1 (negative entropy = Florenskij’s ectropy) or information (in the 
sense o f  Shannon’s mathematical information theory) and entropy may be 
understood in a similar vein. Suggesting a special pneumatosphere (from Greek 
7rv£Öpa “soul, spirit” to Florenskij) —  semiosphere (sphere o f  signs in the sense of 
Lotman 1990) based on the principles o f exact science. In that case we may say 
that the works o f  Teilhard and Vemadskij suggest a general tendency o f the 
growth o f  the amount o f  information. The arrow o f  time in the human biological 
evolution as well as in the history o f  noosphere/ pneumatosphere/ semiosphere is 
defined by this tendency just as the time direction in the physical world is mea­
sured according to the second law o f  thermodynamics.
Semiotics o f the 20th century 229
Semiotic studies o f the typology o f writing were connected to the suc­
cesses o f the decipherment and cryptography theory. The latter was 
developed in the light o f  Shannon’s mathematical theory o f infor­
mation. In his article on this subject Shannon suggested a general 
probabilistic approach showing that a relatively short text (not 
exceeding 20 signs) is sufficient for the decipherment if  a language is 
known. Several magnificent successes in decipherment have been 
connected to a sophisticated system relating the type o f writing to a 
certain linguistic set o f characteristics.91 Outstanding successes in 
deciphering a number o f unknown systems o f writing are significant 
not only from an internal semiotic point o f view. They show the gene­
rally high level o f research connected to fundamentals o f  human 
knowledge. In a way an important part o f natural sciences can be 
interpreted as similar to cryptographic work.92
2.6. The theory o f  decipherment
91 One o f the most remarkable achievements in this area was made by a Russian 
linguist Nevskij (1892-1937; executed at the time o f Stalin’s terror). To discover 
the shape o f Tangut (Hsi-Hsia) words he studied their Tibetan transcriptions as 
well as correspondences to the other Sino-Tibetan languages. His first publication 
in the field has remained the best introduction to the Tangut language even for 
those who did not agree with some o f his results; although delayed. 40 years later 
a publication o f his other works that contained a large comparative dictionary' o f  
the dead Tangut language caused a revival o f Tangut studies in Russia, Japan, 
China and Europe. Gelb’s (1963) theoretical study o f writing that has remained 
the main semiotic work in the field was a continuation o f  his important 
contribution to the decipherment o f Luwian hieroglyphics. The marvellous 
achievement o f Ventris and Chadwick was based on the interpretation o f Ventris’ 
grid and Kroeber’s triads. Approximately at the same time, Yuri Knorozov 
achieved important results in deciphering Maya glyphs (cf. Kelley 1976) basing 
himself on a formal quantitative theory o f the layers o f  language in its relation to 
writing. Shevoroshkin’s study o f typology o f sound chains in different languages 
helped him in the general description o f  Carian writing. Although some details of  
the phonetic interpretation o f  letters o f  Carian alphabet have been corrected in the 
light o f recently studied Carian-Egyptian bilinguals, the general conclusion about 
the closeness o f the language to Luwian has been confirmed.
92 This approach was shown to be not only a metaphor when Gamov first 
suggested a linguistic model in genetic studies. Although his original attempt at 
decipherment was not successful, later achievements were partly due to this 
general attitude.
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2.7. Neurosemiotics and the functional 
asymmetry o f the brain. Biology and culture
If the achievements o f human knowledge were made possible by the 
coevolution o f brain and language,93 the main part o f it should be con­
nected to the dominant (in a major part o f population, left) hemisphere 
that is responsible for speech, logical thinking, counting and other 
operations with discrete signs and objects. According to Eccles, self- 
consciousness is connected to particular zones o f the left hemisphere 
(Popper, Eccles 1977; Eccles 1994; 1995). Since the linguistic 
abilities are directly connected to shaping the structure o f the speech 
zones o f the dominant hemisphere, it seems that the coevolution of 
brain and language is a cross-point o f the biological and sociocultural 
development o f the noosphere. The first glimpses o f understanding the 
respective role o f the two large hemispheres o f the brain were known 
by the middle o f the previous century. But it was the great English 
neurologist Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) who came to the general 
conclusion on “the duality o f the brain'’94 (Jackson 1958). Due to the 
research on aphasia, split-brain studies and other new experimental 
methods, the neuropsychological and neurolinguistic studies have 
become one o f the most promising fields o f research.
93 The idea was widely discussed in several evolutionary and paleoneurological 
studies o f  the last decades, see references in Ivanov 1998; Monod 1970; Eccles 
1995: the last comprehensive study (almost completely neglecting an important 
aspect o f  the hemispheric specialization maybe as a sort o f  counterbalancing a 
somewhat exaggerated interest in it in the previous literature): Deacon 1997.
4 Roman Jakobson who considered Jackson to be one o f the founders of the 
modem linguistics (Jakobson 1990: 116, 125-126, 485, 511) paid particular 
attention to his discussion o f  the distinction between automatic verbal utterances 
like Thank God  and the normal speech (Jackson 1958: 135). As Roman Jakobson 
has commented on Jackson’s conclusions summing up some results o f the recent 
Russian experimental work: “It is characteristic that these zero parts o f the speech 
get easily misinterpreted or simply lost by subjects with a fully active left but 
simultaneously inactivated right hemisphere. The same situation frequently befalls 
violent swearing or cursing words and, on the other hand, endearments and other 
ritualized iormulas o f courtly etiquette’’ (Jakobson 1990: 505). These conclusions 
ol the neurolinguistic studies seem important for the understanding o f  the different 
functions o f linguistic communication.
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2.8. Symbolism o f psychoanalysis and archetypes
In Freud’s book on the interpretation o f dreams published just in the 
very beginning o f me 20th century, a whole system o f  the symbolism 
of the unconsciousness and some methods o f their interpretation have 
been discussed. During the following century the concepts o f psycho­
analysis have been studied and criticized from different points o f  view 
including the semiotic one. As shown by Benveniste in a special 
article, many comparisons o f this system to those o f natural languages 
suggested by Freud are not valid. But the symbols themselves are 
extraordinarily interesting as many parallels to them are found in 
archaic mythologies as pointed out by Freud. Among those later 
developments that originally were connected to psychoanalysis, 
Jung’s teaching o f archetypes has been particularly well explored from 
this historical point o f view. Many visual archetypes found by Jung in 
primitive art and religion as well as in the imagery o f children and 
mentally ill people are important also for the semiotic study o f human 
creative psychology.
2.9. Possible non-human sign systems
In connection to the search for other extraterrestrial civilizations 
several specific semiotic problems have been studied. N. Kardashev 
has attempted to give a measure o f the global amount o f information 
that is contained in all the libraries o f the world and to compare it to 
the energetic possibilities to transmit it to the other possible civiliza­
tions. Studying the probable energetic capacities o f the civilizations 
that spread all over their native planetary system specialists in semio­
tics suggested that another type o f sign systems might be used by 
them. As a message bearing an enormously large amount o f informa­
tion may last a very short period o f time, it has been suggested that in 
such a text there might be no discrete signs at all. The civilization 
based on a hieroglyphic global text principle may not have equivalent 
to our system of numbers and that may make the use o f our mathe­
matics for the purposes o f interstarry communication more difficult 
than it was supposed, for instance, by Freudental in his Lincos project.
Early prehistory o f semiotics has been enriched by recent studies on 
the Greek origins o f its name. As Gregory Nagy remarks in the 
introduction to his important study o f the topic, “the word semiotic- 
[...] may be perceived in a new light if  we look again at its Greek 
origins” (Nagy 1990: 200). As stressed by a great Russian semiotician 
G. Spet (1879-1937; executed at the time o f Stalin’s terror) in his 
important manuscript o f 1918 (published recently) and by later histo­
rians o f science (Coseriu 1975: 122-129), the foundations for a 
general study o f sign were laid down already by St. Augustine in 
whose writings many future ideas o f  Peirce had been anticipated. 
Medieval sign theory recently has been revived due to the work of 
such authors as Eco. He not only studied it with his associates (Eco 
1984; Eco, Marmo 1989), but also based on it a part o f his famous 
first novel (cf. Coletti 1988). It has also been discovered recently that 
such postmedieval authors as John Thomas (John Poinsot, 1589- 
1644) who synthesized the results o f  the scholastic theory o f signs 
may be considered as predecessors o f Peirce particularly in their 
classification o f signs (Deely 1985; Herculano de Carvalho 1961). 
Development o f semiotics in post-Renaissance times has become an 
object o f a series o f fundamental studies.
232 Vyacheslav V. Ivanov
2.10. History o f  semiotic studies
3. Some questions for the future studies
A. Place o f semiotics among exact disciplines. Semiotics and natural 
sciences. Information and message in physics.
Although the connections to mathematical logic and the theory of 
information point to a possible position o f semiotics among exact 
sciences, still most o f these possibilities have not yet been fully 
explored. The exact borders between disciplines are not easily 
delineated.95
Widely spread popular articles and books on sign systems are far away from a 
strictly defined research. Semiotics is being misused by a number o f writers 
mixing this term with postmodernist literature or superficial trivialities connected 
to an old-fashioned behaviouristic approach. In many recent books propositions 
have been repeatedly made concerning a possible future separation o f several 
semiotic disciplines. It remains to be decided whether semiotics should be one
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A possible future development o f humanities may be connected to 
establishing a bridge between them and modem natural sciences. Just 
as tremendous achievements o f the molecular biology have been based 
on the use o f  the methods and results o f chemistry and physics, the 
time has come to build a new synthetic picture o f human culture and 
its history uniting the facts discovered in the traditional fields o f 
research and the new approach inherent to such disciplines as 
neuropsychology.
Modern physics has been interested in the problems o f the 
transmission o f signals and in the relation o f the observer, the device 
used by the latter and the information received, thus several topics 
unite semiotics and other sciences.
B. Historical tendency.
The general views o f noosphere in Vemadskij’s theory (as well as the 
semiosphere of Lotman) were based on the rational notion o f the 
movement towards the highest type o f reasoning while Teilhard (and 
partly also Florenskij) interpreted a similar idea in a Christian way. 
Teilhard combined the final aim o f the movement (his Omega) with 
the image of Jesus.96 The movement towards Noosphere (the realm of 
the Thought and Reason) was suggested as the main trend o f the 
human evolution by Teilhard de Chardin and Vemadskij. According 
to the anthropic principle developed in modem physics the beginning 
of the movement starts with the formation o f the Universe. Particular 
role of different sign systems and symbols o f language, art, mythology 
and religion in this movement may be discussed. Different kinds o f 
linguistic and semiotic diversity are compared in an attempt to see the 
possibilities o f their preservation in a global capitalist world.
field o f research or several. The differences between fields where semiotic 
methods are applied seem to speak in favour o f a split between them. At the same 
time it is apparent that if there is a certain common core o f ideas about signs it 
might be valid in relation to all the possible kinds o f them. Thus if  semiotics 
becomes a science, it is supposed not to be split in two.
% It seems that just a religious aspect o f  Teilhard’s ideas looked hostile to such 
scientists as Monod (see a remark on Teilhard’s Jesuit theology in Monod 1970: 
45; 1971: 33, which appears strange having in mind the resolute opposition o f the 
Jesuit order to Teilhard’s concepts and works). At the same time some o f  
Monod’s statements look pretty close to Teilhard’s notions o f the direction o f time 
in connection to the development o f the brain and the Noosphere.
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С. Future o f semiotic systems.
What could be the result o f the substitution o f the methods o f cultural 
transmission (libraries, archives) that have existed for the last 5000 
years? Is it possible that the new ways o f cultural transmission 
(mainly through computerized systems linked to the other electronic 
devices, systems o f the virtual reality reconstructing the past etc.) will 
change some of the human high psychological systems such as 
memory? Can radical transformation o f the present-day systems of 
elementary and high education be suggested on the base o f the modern 
knowledge concerning the possibilities and early critical ages of 
acquiring different specific systems o f signs (mathematical, artistic)? 
Combining research in artificial intelligence with neurosciences 
promises to yield in the foreseeable future automatic devices of a new 
type to solve problems (for example, the perception o f visual signs) 
that pose great difficulties for computers today. Computer methods 
form the basis o f bio-information technology and bio-technology, 
which promise radical advances in applied molecular biology and 
medicine. Natural languages may and should be compared not only to 
the software o f computers, but also to the different artificial languages 
o f mathematical logic to which the programming languages are 
connected historically. Semantics o f the natural languages can be 
approached (as Zadeh suggested) by the fuzzy structures. Is it possible 
to build artificial systems oriented towards less rigid logical 
classification and closer to human imagery o f art? If computers are 
models o f the logical operations o f the left hemisphere, can we try to 
imitate the non-exact (or fuzzy) way o f reasoning o f the right 
hemisphere? How can the system o f the genetic transmission of 
information through messages that is studied in molecular biology be 
compared to the transmission o f culture through linguistic and other 
symbolic (sign) systems? What are the analogies to genetic mutations 
in the cultural transmission o f information? Is it less stable and 
reliable than the genetic one?
Pavel Florenskij in his posthumous works suggested the impor­
tance o f organoprojection (the continuation o f our body through some 
technological devices). The same idea was discussed by Niels Bohr in 
some o f his philosophical essays: to him a scientist and his device are 
united, they constitute one observer. Can a border between a scholar 
and his library be drawn (compare the episode o f the destruction of 
Don Quijote’s library in Cervantes’ novel)? The problem of the
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borders o f our body and our self (mind, consciousness) is not solved 
in the European science and philosophy. In some Oriental schools o f 
thought (Buddhism) the reality o f Self (Cartesian ego) is denied and it 
is thought that the existence is continued through other bodies. Can a 
computer program continue some features o f its creator? What is the 
present-day relationship between interiorized signs (in the sense o f 
Piaget and Vygotskij) and the exteriorized computational devices? 
What are the limits and restrictions o f some o f the most advanced 
modem computers in so far as the rigorous thinking is concerned 
(since most computers compute with approximations with quite 
inexact results)? How are our concepts o f  space-time (Bakhtinian 
chronotope) influenced by the modem linguistic and semiotic 
research? What world-views are compatible with the results o f the 
modem neurosemiotics? Is the role o f causality changed in the studies 
of man?
Conclusion
Semiotic and linguistic studies o f the 20th century have been impor­
tant mostly in two senses: on one hand they have opened a road for 
comparative research on the origin and development o f language and 
other systems o f signs adding a new dimension to the history o f 
culture (this aspect is studied in detail in the first part o f my paper). 
On the other hand, they have shown a possibility o f uniting different 
fields of humanities around semiotics suggesting a way to trespass 
separation and atomisation of different trends in investigating culture 
(that side o f the development is described in the second part o f the 
paper). In the 21st century one may hope for closer integration of 
semiotics and exact and natural sciences. The points o f intersection 
with the mathematical logic, computer science and information theory 
that already exist might lead to restructuring theoretical semiotics 
making it a coherent and methodologically rigid discipline. At the 
same time, the continuation o f neurosemiotic studies promises a 
breakthrough in understanding those parts o f the work o f the brain that 
are most intimately connected to culture. From this point o f view 
semiotics may play an outstanding role in the synthesis o f biological 
science and humanities. In my mind that makes it a particularly 
important field o f future research. To practical applications o f these
studies a work on possible engineering models o f the brain may 
belong that will be oriented to solution o f problems, which have 
remained beyond the possibilities o f modem computers. Under­
standing the sign-and-texts transmission and transformation in the 
brain may give an impetus to new technological achievements. I am 
personally very much interested in a possibility to apply a rich set of 
audio-visual technological means that are now at our disposal to create 
truly new methods o f sign transmission and texts construction not only 
in the arts and media but also to revolutionize education. In 
combination with the advances in computer sciences these new 
potential technologies may completely change the way the young 
generation learns about the world and its history.
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Семиотика XX века
Семиотические и лингвистические исследования XX века были 
важны главным образом в двух смыслах —  (1) они открыли дорогу 
для сравнительного исследования происхождения и развития языка и 
других систем знаков, добавив новое измерение к истории культуры; 
(2) они показали возможность объединения различных областей 
гуманитарных наук вокруг семиотики, предлагающей способ нару­
шить обособленнность и раздробленность различных дисциплин, за­
нимающихся исследованиями культуры. В XXI веке можно на­
деяться на большую интеграцию семиотики и точных и естествен­
ных наук. Пункты пересечения с математической логикой, инфор­
матикой и информационной теорией, которые уже существуют, 
могли бы привести к реструктурированию теоретической семиотики, 
превращая ее в последовательную и методологически стойкую 
дисциплину. В то же время, продолжение нейросемиотических ис­
следований обещает прорыв в понимании тех частей работы мозга, 
которые наиболее тесно связаны с культурой. С этой точки зрения 
семиотика может играть выдающуюся роль в синтезе биологической 
науки и гуманитарных наук. Полагаю, что это делает семиотику осо­
бенно важной областью будущих исследований.
Kahekümnenda sajandi semiootika
XX sajandi semiootilised ja  lingvistilised uurimused olid olulised eel­
kõige kahes mõttes: (1) nad avasid tee keele ja  teiste märgisüsteemide 
päritolu ja  arengu võrdlevatele uuringutele; (2) näitasid kätte võimaluse 
erinevate humanitaarteaduse valdkondade ühinemiseks semiootika ümber, 
mis pakkus välja mooduse seni eksisteerinud distsiplinaarsete piiride 
ületamiseks. XXI sajandil on veelgi suurem lootus integreerida semioo­
tika ja  täppis- ning loodusteadused. Olemasolevad lõikepunktid mate­
maatilise loogika, informaatika ja  informatsiooniteooriaga võiksid tuua 
endaga kaasa teoreetilise semiootika restruktureerumise, muutes ta järje­
kindlaks ja  metodoloogiliselt pädevaks distsipliiniks. Samas lubab neuro- 
semiootiliste uuringute areng läbimurret kultuuriga tihedalt seotud aju­
osade tööprintsiibist arusaamises. Sellest vaatepunktist võib semiootikal 
olla otsustav roll bio- ja  humanitaarteaduste sünteesis, mis on minu jaoks 
eriti oluline tulevaste uuringute valguses.
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